

**Asian CORE Workshop  
Interface, Negotiation, and Interaction  
in Southeast Asia  
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**ABSTRACTS**

**SESSION 1**

***Riverine Interfaces and Social Formation in Maritime Southeast Asia***

Noboru Ishikawa

The state-centered perspective that stresses a stark difference between “*hulu* (upriver)” and “*hilir* (downriver)” has long dominated the conceptualization of the social formation in the territorial state as well as pre-state polity of maritime Southeast Asia. In the binary view that resulted, the upriver region is portrayed as a periphery as opposed to the political, economic, and cultural center in the coastal area. Such spatial divide has permeated the description and analysis of regional history as well as ethnography. The peoples who predated the state or exist outside of the central realm of its geo-body have either been marginalized or essentialized.

Cases abound. Models of port cities and state formation at the river-mouth have been presented from Sumatera, the Malay Peninsula, and other islands including Borneo. Historical evidence based on such royal chronicles as *hikayat* and colonial documents is employed to examine the politico-economic relationship between upriver and downriver, and the differences between the two spaces have become a priori assumption for the state-oriented perspective.

This paper, however, argues against such a model. The model showcases an ideal type and is problematic, as it has constrained scholarly analysis that reflects empirical diversity. The conventional view on the power relation between downriver and upriver often fails to address the dynamic responses to the center and activities of the periphery. The downriver-upriver interaction is not simply one-way diffusion of the state power and market demand for commodity exchange, however. I instead present an alternative framework that pays attention to interfaces, connected by and mechanisms connecting upriver and downriver. The paper closely looks into various interfaces formulated between upriver and downriver as well as numerous tributaries in Central Borneo to better comprehend social and identity formation, political economy, natural environment and history of the riverine society.

## ***Connection of the Regional Trade and the Riverine Trade in West Kalimantan, c.1820-1850***

Atsushi Ota

The period in question falls on the time when the Dutch colonial authority started to penetrate the local societies gradually from the coastal areas to the inland areas. Up to around 1820 in the coastal areas of West Kalimantan regional trade was prospering through the activities of Malay, Bugis, Chinese, and other groups of migrants, who originated from Riau, Siak and other places, and established their settlements in the scattered places along the coast. They conducted the coastal trade to carry marine and forest products from the small coastal ports to the core ports such as Pontianak and Simpang, and also the regional trade to export these products to the principal ports in insular Southeast Asia, such as Singapore and Batavia. After around 1820, the Dutch colonial authority attempted to concentrate the coastal trade on the two ports under their control: Pontianak and Sukadana. Under this policy, the migrants on the coastal areas moved again. A part of them migrated to these two port towns, while others moved into the inland areas and concentrated more on the riverine trade between the mid-stream areas and the coastal ports. This series of changes must have reorganized the trade both in the coastal and inland areas of West Kalimantan.

My presentation attempts to trace these changes in the coastal trade and the riverine trade as a result of the Dutch policy, and to analyze its impact on the local economy, by examining Dutch colonial records. I will attempt to discuss how the regional trade and the riverine trade were connected under these circumstances, and what sort of negotiations and interactions took place between the groups of people in the coastal and inland areas.

## ***Transformation of Regional Economy and Riverine Networks in Sarawak 1900-40***

Atsushi Kobayashi

This presentation purposes to examine the role of the riverine commercial networks for the growth of Sarawak trade in the first half of the twentieth century. Using statistical tools, we see that Sarawak trade grew rapidly after the 1920s based on the expansion of plantation rubber exports to industrial countries. Previous studies have argued that this rapid increase in trade was brought about by the promotion policies of the Brooke government, such as the foundation of the organization checking the quality of export commodities, and invitation measures of Chinese immigrants as labors. Besides the viewpoint stressing the political effects, this presentation reveals that change of commercial relationships having formed along a river since the nineteenth century contributed to the growth of Sarawak trade in the 1920s.

Until the first half of the twentieth century, commercial transaction in Sarawak was based on credit sale due to a lack of money, despite there were a lot of risks for a creditor, such as plunder, disaster, and escape of a debtor. We can assume that local merchants dealt with these high risks through setting a high rate of interest on credit sale to compensate for a loss, while it hindered the expansion of commerce in Sarawak. As a result of a statistical analysis extracting interest rate from seasonal prices of grain, we find out the possibility that interest rate in capital Kuching declined after 1922. In addition, in 1922 the Brooke government reformed the judicial system which had declared the protection of native interests and impeded the relationships of mutual trust among merchants severely since the 1870s, and the new court judged a case rightly; it resulted in the improvement of credit of transactions and the decline of interest rate. The lower interest rate might facilitate the prior investment in production of rubber, which needed to wait for several years to tap a tree. The expansion of trade of Sarawak in the 1920s was attributed in not only the political initiatives but the enhancement of credit of the riverine commercial networks.

### ***Whaleshark Used to be Food: How it has become an eco-icon representing marine environmental conservation movements in the Philippines***

Jun Akamine

Whaling has become an international political issue at least for the last 40 years. Not a few anti-whaling opinions strongly argue non-lethal use of whale, namely whale watching. Similarly, marine tourism gains popularity and conservationists argue protection of marine environment as well as some popular species necessary. The sea around the Philippine attracts environmentalist's concerns as part of so called the precious "coral triangle" and whalesharks (*Rhincodon typus*) is one of the marine wildlife that receives worldwide attention. The paper will deal with three inter-related issues on whaleshark conservation in the Philippines: (i) the paper will explore the recent global efforts toward conservation of commercially exploited aquatic species (CEASs) including whalesharks; (ii) the paper will trace the processes how whalesharks became an eco-icon (icon for environmental conservation) in the Philippines in 1998 and in the world in 2002 when it was listed in the Appendix II of the CITES (Convention of International Trades in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora); (iii); and the paper will describe how whalesharks are now non-lethally used in the Philippines based on my own fieldwork. Then, the paper will raise several points for CEASs conservation in the world as well as for whaleshark conservation in the Philippines.

## **Jalan Tikus on the Sea:**

### ***Persisting Maritime Frontiers and Multi-layered Networks in Wallacea***

Kazufumi Nagatsu

Southeast Asian Maritime world is not merely a geographic entity, but also a historically formed ecological, social and cultural geo-body. Throughout the insular world, a variety of maritime folks have long maintained sea-oriented way of life based on fishing, inter-regional trade, shipbuilding, or piracy. Although the sea was enclosed by the modern political authorities, they have continued aquatic movements passing through their own local networks. Their aquatic movements have often been motivated by commoditization-oriented use of natural resources. They have repeated the movements and expanded the networks to search for or trade the resources such as trepang, shark's fin, tortoise shell and etc. which were usually exported to the overseas.

The Sama-Bajau, once known as sea nomads in European literature, constitute part of the most mobile populations in Southeast Asian Maritime world. Their settlements are mainly dispersed in and around Wallacea, or the eastern part of the Maritime world which covers southern part of the Philippines, Sabah in Malaysia, and eastern part of Indonesia. With a population of 1,100,000, many of the Sama-Bajau live along coasts and on islands. I once drew a map demonstrating their population distribution based on the censuses of year 2000 of the three countries. From the map we can gather that they have so far migrated and established settlements along the politically peripheral or *backdoor* sea routes that are relatively far from the centres of modern states, be it colonial or national. The maritime folks sometimes referred to such routes as *jalan tikus* or mouse's routes on the sea. They have taken advantage of the *jalan tikus* not only to exploit the marine resources, but also to evade the intervention in their activities by established authorities such as modern states or global actors (e.g. environmentalists).

This paper firstly traces the brief chronology of maritime movements of the Sama-Bajau and then points out "*backdoorness*" as a characteristic of their sea routes, from the mid-nineteenth century, when the colonial powers launched a series of substantial interventions in the region, up to the present. Secondly, it explores the ecological and economic contexts in which the sea people have repeatedly reconstructed their maritime networks and its focal points out of *jalan tikus*. Here the discussion attempts to introduce the concept of "persisting maritime frontier" to

better understand the eco-spatial niche of their networks and its focal points. Finally, it tries to analyse the functions and meanings of their micro networks by placing the networks in the wider multi-layered networks of the maritime folks in Wallacea. The analysis may contribute to the general understanding on how the maritime folks have responded to the expansion of modern states and maintained their maritime world in Wallacea.

## SESSION 2

### ***Interfaces of Burmese and Thai Buddhism in Thai-Burma Frontier***

Kwanchewan Buadaeng

Thai Buddhist Sangha or monk organization is centralized, nationalistic and controlled by Thai state as concluded by many scholars.\* In the past century or so, it has been challenged by many Buddhist movements, some of which were later outlawed and had to leave the official Sangha. However, diverse Buddhist practices following differences in ethnic and local traditions do exist elsewhere in Thailand. Having looked into cases which have been in conflict with and outlawed by Thai Sangha, I find that difference in Buddhist practices are not the main reason for the conflict and the outlaw, although the Sangha may claim that it is. The main factor is more about either the challenge to state power or the competition over resources. Following this argument, I will present cases of conflict between groups of “Burmese” monks and laymen and local Thai Sangha in Thai-Burma frontiers, from data collected during 2011-2012. I use the term Thai-Burma frontier to cover also Northern Thailand as well as Western Thailand. As these areas had been under the control of Burmese kingdom for around 200 years during the 17<sup>th</sup>-18<sup>th</sup> century, Burmese temples set up by Burmese monks and laymen in the old days have continued some of their traditions until nowadays. Apparently, recent Burmese migrants, with an estimate of 3 million people, have become main donors and care takers for these temples. Consequently, Thai authorities and Sangha start to pay more attention to these temples and tried to control them. The paper will describe interfaces of Burmese and Thai Buddhism in which Thai and Burmese monks and laymen interact and negotiate with each other by referring to both state law and Buddhist doctrine. It will show also that modern media plays important role in the interaction and negotiation of various actors in this interface.

\*For example, Duncan, McCargo. 2004. “Buddhism, Democracy and Identity in Thailand,”

*Democratization*. 11 (4): 155–170. Keyes, Charles F. 1971. "Buddhism and National Integration in Thailand," *Journal of Asian Studies* 30(3): 551-67. Sirindhorn Anthropology Center. 1999. *Wiklit*

*Buddha sasana*. [Buddhism in Crisis]. Bangkok: Sirindhorn Anthropology Center. Somboon Suksamran. 1977. *Political Buddhism in Southeast Asia*. London: C. Hurst & company.

### ***Millenarianism, Ethnicity and the States: Khruba Bunchum Worship among the Lahu in Thailand and Burma***

Tatsuki Kataoka

This paper examines the recent development of cross-national and cross-ethnic movement of worshipping Khruba Bunchum, a charismatic Theravada monk who has been working along the Thai-Burmese borderlands, from the viewpoint of the highlanders and their relationship with modern nation states. Khruba Bunchum has become famous among the Lahu on the hills of Thailand and Burma since the 1990's when a Lahu "man-god" assisted his meditation. After that some cults of the Lahu joined the Bunchum movement and discovered that he is a reincarnation of the past saints of the Lahu tradition of Mahayana Buddhism and nativistic movements. The Lahu legend says that these past saints used miraculous power to defend their theocracies against the modern states of China and Burma. In this context, for the Lahu, the Bunchum movement articulates their longing for redemption of "lost kingdoms". The Bunchum movement itself also shows some aspects of "state evasion", in terms that Bunchum has been active outside state control of the Sangha. However, at the same time, from another perspective, the Bunchum movement among the upland minorities is equally viewed as a showcase of Buddhist propagation program initiated by both governments of Thailand and Burma. The nature of the Bunchum movement is still ambivalent, for such contradicting functions of the movement in regard to nation-states are working at the same time and at the same field.

### ***Cross-boundary Dynamics and Local Buddhist Practices on the China-Myanmar Border: A Case of Tǎi Dehong, Yunnan***

Takahiro Kojima

This presentation will explore the religious practices of Theravada Buddhists in Dehong Dai and Jingpo Autonomous Prefecture, Yunnan Province. Dehong Prefecture is located on the China-Myanmar border. One of the main groups in this area is the Dai (Tǎi), who follow Theravada Buddhism. The local religious practices have many things in common with Buddhist

practices in other places of Southeast Asia, sharing the same Pali canon. However, this area differs from other Theravada Buddhist societies in the relatively low number of monks and novices. Although all the villages in Dehong have a monastery just as in Southeast Asia, most of the monasteries are uninhabited. Therefore, without resident monks, Buddhist rituals are performed by virtue of the direct relationship between the lay community and their Buddhist scriptures, Buddha images, and Pagodas. In particular, *holu*, experts in reciting Buddhist scriptures, play an important role as mediators in this relationship.

Buddhism in Dehong was stopped during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution for more than 10 years. After the Cultural Revolution, there was a major policy change and *holu* began to migrate from the Shan State to the Chinese side. They played an important role in the revival of Buddhism in Dehong. As a result, the script used in the Buddhist texts changed to that of Shan State.

But this does not mean that the everyday practices of villagers simply are assimilated into those of Myanmar style. The local intonation used in reciting the Buddhist texts was not allowed to change, as villagers demand that *holu* from Myanmar adopt the local style. Thus the villagers choose and establish their way of local practice. They are particularly keen to maintain practices which relate to the physical senses.

This implies that while cross-boundary dynamics are extremely important in this day and age, we must not lose sight of the possibility of more rooted local practices, in this case cultural preferences that proved to be remarkably resilient in the face of extreme political change, that provide the larger social context for cross-boundary movement.

### ***The Flow of Bujan: Negotiation and Adat Nikah among the Temuan in Negeri Sembilan, Malaysia***

Chih-Hui Liang

Marriage is the main process of social reproduction in most societies, and every society has a set of rules and conventions governing it. It is not just a union between a man and a woman, who are building a new family, but even more importantly the creation of ties between two clans/households, and often two villages. To make this happen, communication is necessary, and several rounds of negotiation are generally required before the wedding can go ahead. By taking a close look at this complex procedure, we can understand the essence of marriage among the

*Temuan*.

To obey rules it is first necessary to know what the rules are. People's behavior generally accords with all kinds of rules, but at the same time it is true that only through action and interaction may one come to a full understanding and realization of the rules. Therefore, rules are not a prerequisite for action/behavior, but are learned through action, which implies that rule-following is a realization process.

In the discussion of *Temuan* marriage practices and the conventions and rules relating to them, we can gain a fresh perspective on the *adat* and the rules it generates. We will find that the *adat* supplies the *Temuan* with a system of values. The rules formulated to uphold these values are by no means rigid and immutable, though. Neither are they completely inviolable. Since the rules, and the following of the rules, are something that people learn about as they go along, it follows that the rules display a certain degree of openness and mutability. When violations of the rules occur, people find new ways of realizing their purpose in accordance with the *adat* values.

### ***Between Religion and Customary Practices among Buddhist Karen***

Yoko Hayami

As in other regions in Myanmar, in the plains surrounding Paan in Karen State too, the landscape is scattered with innumerable pagodas. At some of these pagodas, one can observe something like a mass wedding vow at specific times of the year. The brides and grooms are mostly clad in Karen costume. One couple after another make ritual vows with the help of a ritual specialist. This is a major component of what the local Pwo Karen refer to as *duwae* practice. What is *duwae*, and why is it performed at the pagoda? Is this a Buddhist ritual or what? Pagoda committee members will say, it is simply Karen custom rather than Buddhist, while monks with strict ideas of Buddhism will say it is spirit cult.

This leads us to question, 1) what kind of space does the pagoda constitute and what are the appropriate activities within its space? How is it situated in Burmese Buddhist ideology/ideologies in its varied contexts? 2) what is the Karen logic for conducting this rite at the pagoda? How does it relate to other customary practices among the Karen in this region especially in relation to marriage? Finally, both of these questions actually point to the issue of the delineation of Buddhist practices from other activities whether magical or mundane non-religious customary everyday practices.

For half a century, scholars of Buddhism in Mainland Southeast Asia from the "practical" point of view had tried to understand the relationship between Buddhism and spirit beliefs. This literature

became more complex as observers have become aware of the role of the state and/or religious orthodoxy in defining and delineating, and furthermore that such delineation itself shifts. By taking up this ritual vow of marriage at the pagoda, which practitioners differently assess as custom, spirit cult or religion, this paper deals with the question of the interface of religious practice with non-religious customary practices, as well as other practices related to the supernatural.