Transnational Local Minorities: Push and Pull Across the Sino-Lao Border

Nathan Badenoch

Several national boundaries run through the mountainous areas of mainland Southeast Asia. While these borderlines have done much to separate people through times of conflict and along different ideological trajectories, they have also been a constant reminder to the governments of the region that many ethnic groups live on both sides of these boundaries. Of course these boundaries have meaning for the people who live along them as well. This paper will look at the multiple and changing meanings that the Sino-Lao border holds for ethnic minority people living on the Lao side. To do this, I will present three perspectives, as seen in the dynamics of livelihood and cultural change experienced by the Lanten, an ethnic group that has been heavily influenced by Chinese language, ritual and economy for as long as their history recalls, but one that has more recently made large sacrifices towards the establishment of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic.

The basic context for this investigation is the rapidly growing presence of China in Laos, but the narrative will be based in observations from the village. The paper will relate three areas of Lao Lanten life illustrating how they interact with the border, China and the Chinese Lanten. First is an economic story in which the Lanten, like many other farmers in Laos, have begun to plant rubber for the Chinese market. This entails forming networks of information and technological exchange, in addition to negotiation of latex sales. Second is a cultural story involving a Lanten singing tradition that is suffering in Laos from a decline in literacy in Chinese, the language used in Lanten rituals. Here, movement of people across borders has been followed by a nascent flow of locally produced Lanten DVDs, along with movement of ritual texts and other forms of written culture. Finally, is a social story that concerns people’s choices for health care. With the extension and improvement of government health services into new areas of the country, there have been two main options a rural person has in the event of sickness or accident – traditional treatments involving rituals or Lao government hospitals. However, a third option of increasing popularity is to go to Chinese hospitals, many of which provide a mixture of Western and Chinese medicine.

The Lanten have recognized the opportunities and services available in China, many of which are much slower to develop in Laos. It is interesting to note that much of the linkages created across the border into Chinese society are achieved through networking among Lanten on both sides of the border. The social resources of a minority cultural world provide the point of interface and negotiation with the larger, economically more powerful and risky Chinese world. As Lao citizens, they express the need for caution in dealing with the Chinese state. At the same time, the Lanten are moving themselves more solidly back into the Chinese world, one that is culturally more comfortable than the Lao world where they have lived for the past three generations. In these border crossings, we see their own Lanten cultural concerns, historical Chinese affiliations and Lao citizenship merge in a local view on the meanings of modern geopolitical boundaries. At this level of observation, we lose sight of the commotion of reactions to ‘China rising’ and see a new chapter in historical relations at the local intersection of the Chinese and non-Chinese world. While the short-term perspective gives a sense change,
a longer perspective may suggest a storyline of persistence.

“Are We Them?: Textual and Literary Representation of the Chinese in 20th-Century Siam/Thailand”

Thak Chaloemtiarana

King Vachirawut famously published a short article titled *Jews of the Orient* in 1914 demonizing the Chinese in Siam as ingrates and parasites. The local Chinese became the ‘other within’ a Thai nation that the King was trying to establish. Whether his reaction to the local Chinese was fueled by being upset with the recent strike of the Chinese which paralyzed Bangkok, or a reflection of his English education and exposure to European anti-Semitism, is not the focus of my concern. My interest for this exercise is to study how the Chinese in Siam/Thailand are portrayed in Thai language texts, that is, prose fiction and non-fiction produced in the 20th century (I will not include related area such as movies, TV drama, music, cartoons, etc.). This study does not involve an exhaustive review of all texts but will focus on a few well-known and popular texts. I would like to know if King Vachirawut’s portrayal of the Chinese is reflected in subsequent literary production or whether it is muted by other realities that existed in Thai society, and how the production of texts on the local Chinese changed over time. More importantly, I am very curious to know how this issue is played out in neighboring countries especially, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Burma, Laos, and Cambodia, countries where the “assimilation” of the Chinese into the majority culture happens in varying degrees.

The Limits of Performing Public Loyalty: Migrants, Football and the Law

Inga Gruß

On Thailand’s south-west coast in the province Phang Nga, thousands of migrants from Myanmar have set up their lives around employment they found there. Despite the continuous increase in the migrant population, migrants remain oddly invisible in the public sphere; it is a rare occasion that they claim public space as a population. This paper narrates and analyses one such occasion. I argue that migrants from Myanmar are welcomed and tolerated in Thailand as long as they don’t lay claim to shaping public spaces beyond the work field. When this unwritten rule is violated, their presence is curbed and finally silenced by evoking the law and legality, leaving little recourse but the retreat from the public sphere.

December 5, the king’s birthday, kicked off a football tournament, all the teams made up of male migrants from Myanmar. It was a welcome opportunity for many migrant families to have a day-out, to enjoy an event that was a reminder of their lives in Myanmar where social interaction is not only confined to the domestic sphere. Most of the participating teams had equipped themselves with semiotically charged symbols during their introduction to the audience: they were carrying images of the king, the Thai and the royal flag. Once the event started, the only reminders though that the tournament was taking place in Thailand and not Myanmar were the Thai-speaking snack vendors. There were no Thais or other foreigners among the numerous spectators (with the exception of me). The event lasted several hours and
at the end of the first day, people went home, cheerfully anticipating the next tournament day. On the second day, however, a police raid occurred that resulted in the arrest of a few migrants and the temporary suspension of the tournament. A complicated set of interpersonal and arbitrary legal relations was revealed after the sudden end that speaks to the limitations that migrants experience in advancing into the public sphere in the host society.

Tiger Mother as Ethnopreneur: Amy Chua and the Cultural Politics of Chineseness

Caroline S. Hau

Amy Chua catapulted to fame in the United States with the publication of her bestselling *World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability* (2002) and a much-discussed *Wall Street Journal* excerpt from her *Battle Hymn of the Tiger Mother* (2011). The first book, which showed how economically dominant minorities could be scapegoated in countries in which free market democratic systems do not necessarily lead to equitable distribution of wealth, drew on her Chinese-Filipino family’s experience in the Philippines. A wry account of her efforts, not all successful, as a self-proclaimed “Chinese mother” to raise her children to be high-achievers, the other book created some controversy because of its critique of “Western”-style parenting and its perceived advocacy of a “Tiger Mother” brand of parenting that drew on the author’s own experience of being raised by strict Chinese-Filipino immigrant parents in America. Not only did *Battle Hymn* generate heated discussion in America about the stereotyping of Asian-Americans as “model minority,” it also tapped into American anxieties about the waning of US power in the wake of a rising China. This paper looks closely at Amy Chua career as an “ethnopreneur” (to use a term by the Comaroffs) who capitalizes on her claims of “Chineseness” and access to “Chinese culture.” Drawing on localized/provincialized, regional, and family-mediated notions of Chineseness, Chua is an example of an “Anglo-Chinese” (with regional counterparts like Thailand’s Chitra Konuntakiet and Malaysia’s Lillian Too) who exploits--and profits from--national and cultural differences within nations as well as among Southeast Asia, the U.S., and China in order to promote particular forms of hybridized (trans)national identities while eschewing the idea of mainland China as the ultimate cultural arbiter of Chineseness.

Transnational Mission among Karen: Cross-border Connections, Ethnicity and Christianity

Yoko Hayami

Baptist mission among the Karen in Burma since the 1830s has been well-known, either lauded as a heroic success story among missionaries, or blamed, along with colonial administration, for laying the foundation for later ethnic conflicts. Post-colonial analysts, too, have argued that ethnic categories in Myanmar today, were constructed in the same process. While it can be hardly refuted that the ethnic label and category “Karen” emerged under colonial rule, isn’t it going overboard to say that colonialism and Christian missions created a category out of the blue? Furthermore, over-emphasis on the missionary role in their success
among Karen tends to neglect attention towards the initiative of the converted people themselves. Much less is known about the quiet Christian beginnings among Karen in Siam’s north which was actually started by the labor of four Karen preachers who ventured across from Burma, right at the time when the modern national border was being negotiated between the British administration and Siam, as well as when the Karen National Association, the first of a burgeoning ethno-nationalist organization in Burma was taking shape. What was it that instigated the early Christian converts to make the arduous trip across the border? What were the obstacles to be negotiated, and what was the outcome? The mission effort took place amidst different speculations among the missionary society in Burma, the sending missionary headquarters in America, rival missions already stationed in Siam, and the Karen churches in Burma. Questions of territoriality and ethnic ties emerge in the process of transnational religion taking place on the threshold of modernity. In this paper, I follow this process and the formal and informal connections between the Karen churches on both sides, to consider the evolving dynamics between state, ethnic group/ethnicity, and religious faith and institution across the border.

**Becoming an Independent Woman: Leisure and Romances in the Literary Narratives of Indonesian Overseas Workers**

Jafar Suryomenggolo

This essay reads Tarini Sorrita’s *Penari naga kecil* (2006) and Maria Bo Niok’s *Geliat sang kung yan* (2007), two pioneering works of fiction by overseas workers. It analyses how Indonesian domestic workers in urban-capitalist Hong Kong are sharing their stories and experiences about seeking leisure and romance, in the context of how globalization has challenged their lives and perceptions. It shows how these works of fiction, as a literary subject, have become part of the workers’ collective efforts to actively define the world they live in and to pursue self-autonomy.

**Command on the Forests: International Relations of Southeast Asia as Viewed from the Highlands**

Tatsuki Kataoka

This paper is a hypothetical thought experiment to reconsider international relations of mainland Southeast Asia from a viewpoint of the highland societies. Conventional understanding of international relations and political systems of mainland Southeast Asia has focused on its “galactic” or “mandala” nature among the valley states. However, this hypothesis uncritically assumes that valley states have been sole players of international (or inter-state) political systems of Southeast Asia. What drops from this model is the highland and forest surrounding such small valley states. In other words, existing models inevitably omit most of the area they mention. It is unrealistic to suppose the highlanders have taken no part in regional politics. Without highlanders’ support, the valley kings could not exercise their power over the mountainous region. This fact implies that the highlanders have always reserved “veto” and “casting votes” in regional politics. Ethnographic and historical evidences
of the highlanders reveal that they have been engaged in spy activities, supplying logistics, and unreliable allies to provide reinforcements. Actually sometimes the highland forces have determined winners and losers in disputes between valley states. In this paper I try to develop this view on the highlands of mainland Southeast Asia as the area of casting votes, and, I hope, this viewpoint will advance our understanding of regional system of Southeast Asia a step further from previous discussions on “mandala” polities and highland anarchism.

The Networks and Activities of al-Azhar Graduates in Contemporary Indonesia

Hiroko Yamao Kinoshita

In this presentation, I attempt to reconsider social transformation of contemporary Indonesian as well as its dynamism through focusing on transnational networks of the Middle Eastern graduates.

The number of students who are studying Islam in the Middle Eastern countries has increased in contemporary Indonesia. In particular, students studying at al-Azhar University in Cairo increased to nearly 4,500 in 2012, and al-Azhar hold the biggest number of the students among those who studying in the Middle East. Consequently the role of the Middle Eastern graduates has expanded. It can be pointed out that Islam has crucial issues both politically and socially. Thus, it is necessary to focus on its expanding role in the society in order to consider the social transformation of contemporary Indonesia.

In preceding researches, great attention has been paid to transnational activities of Islamist or radical Islamist groups in respect to the connection between Indonesia and the Middle East. However, we also need to take a perspective of social network of people who practicing transnational activities into consideration when we effectively argue the social transformation of the Indonesian society. In this presentation, therefore, I try to focus on the social network of the Middle Eastern graduates in contemporary Indonesia.

Studying in the Middle East is a particular example of the transnational connection with the Middle East. As well as pilgrimage, it is said that learning in the Middle East has been continuing since 16th century. The Middle Eastern graduates, especially al-Azhar alumni have been playing significant role in Indonesian society: contributed to establish and expand the Islamic higher education, and to construct a regime of administration of Islam are prominent examples.

In this respect, how is the significance of al-Azhar graduates in contemporary Indonesian society? To clarify the question, I put an attention to their social networks and observe Indonesian students' community in Cairo. In addition, I argue social role of the graduates in Indonesian society through several examples: expansion of Islamic educational system; extension of Islamic publishing market.

Through these observations, it can be clarified that social networks of al-Azhar graduates promote the newly Islamic practices in a contemporary Indonesian society.
Competition and Integration in the Southeast Asian Rice Market, c. 1830-1913

Atsushi Kobayashi

Rice, staple food for Asians, became an international commodity, and boosted its distribution worldwide in the nineteenth century. This presentation purposes to explore the process of formation of the rice market in Southeast Asia through a statistical analysis, focusing on competition and integration between Singapore and Java.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, mainland Southeast Asia, British Burma, Siam, and French Indochina expanded exports of rice not only to the West but to Asia. In particular, some of rice exports from mainland went to insular Southeast Asia, where many Chinese immigrants and local peasants produced primary goods for Western industrial countries and consumed rice. British free port Singapore developed as an entrepôt port for the rice distribution inside the region. Thus, in the course of integration of Southeast Asia into the world economy, the regional rice market was formed, as Singapore was taking a central role.

Meanwhile, the center of regional rice market in the first half of the nineteenth century was not Singapore but Java. Dutch Java played a pivotal role for the rice distribution and price fixing in insular Southeast Asia in those days. Singapore imported a large amount of Javanese rice and its price couldn’t escape from the fluctuation of rice price in Java. Singapore was getting out of this Java centered rice market after the late 1840s by importing rice from mainland countries, and finally replaced Java as the center of regional rice market by the early 1870s. Hence, there was the competition between Java and Singapore for the reorganization of regional rice distribution system, and the rise of Singapore culminated in the integration of rice market across the region, from mainland to insular countries.

Sino-Siamese Treaty Negotiations in the Early 1900s

Junko Koizumi

On February 2, 1907, the Chinese Minister in London visited the Siamese Legation in London, and presented the idea of a treaty of alliance “with a view to form an Asiatic Confederation for mutual help and defense.” The news of this proposal arrived in Bangkok on March 20, 1907, only a few days before the departure of King Chulalongkorn for his second grand tour to Europe. A series of moves and counter moves followed on both the Chinese and Siamese sides for the next few years; yet Siam remained consistent in not accepting China’s proposal.

This paper is a preliminary examination of the process of negotiation between Siam and China, prompted by China’s proposal of an alliance treaty in early 1907 and the resulting issues raised during the course of negotiations. It reveals the deep dilemma Siam had to face—even though a modern treaty would be understood as recognition of an agreement between two equal sovereigns, Siam could not accept a treaty with China because it would make a large number of Chinese living in Siam foreign subjects. Moreover, this paper proposes to look at Siam’s status as an independent state by taking the Sino-centric world order, or historically rooted tributary relations in Asia into consideration.
Transnational Networks of Burmese Refugees/Migrants to Thailand

Tadayuki Kubo

Zomia, or non-state space had disappeared in South East Asia before the 1950s, according to James Scott. But one exception is the “hiding villages” of refugees in Burma. They represent the extreme instance of non-state spaces in current South East Asia. This paper looks at their strategy and routes to cross the border.

Refugees are known as victims of civil war; thus, they are treated as a burden in the host countries. Because of their in-betwixt and between status, they are seen as just vulnerable, passive object. However, this overlooks the refugees’ strategy of crossing the border to escape, seeking better life.

Historically, Thailand has hosted de fact refugees as displaced persons from neighboring countries since the 1970s. Indochinese refugees and Burmese refugees had been used as human buffers on both sides of the border area in Thailand.

I will overview the actual routes and network to cross the boundary from Kayah state, Burma to Thai side from the 1980s up to now. This paper will clarify at what stage they recognize their refugee-ness, and then analyze the difference between refugees and migrants. Refugees tend to be labeled as irregular objects in the context of the national order of things. But if we look at them in terms of mobility, they are not refugees in a state of disorder.

The Problem of Nationality in an Era of Imperial Competition

Oiyan Liu

“Would a Chinese lose his Chinese nationality through Dutch naturalization?” the Netherlands Minister of Justice asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs on 18 December 1906 with regards to finding ways to obstruct China’s nationalization campaign on Dutch territory. This paper centers on the developments that led to the creation of the first nationality law of China (1909) and Dutch colonial law of subjectness (1910). Prior to the declaration of these laws, neither China nor Holland had given the Indies Chinese an official status of subjectness, citizenship or nationality that was supported by law. This paper analyzes why these two laws were promulgated one after another and seeks to understand the dynamics between the Indies Chinese, Chinese imperial authorities, and the Dutch empire in the process of creating legal statuses. By focusing on the cross-imperial exchanges of knowledge, people, and state activities, my paper examines the conditions and circumstances under which China and Holland declared the Indies Chinese as its subjects by law. This paper suggests approaching the making of state-bounded identities of the Chinese diaspora from the perspective of competing empires and the diasporic angle.
Renegade Royalist: Historiography and Siam’s Disavowed Prince Prisdang

Tamara Loos

In Thai history, biography and autobiography tend toward the hagiographical and self-aggrandizing, respectively. However, because of the power of the monarchy and lèse majesté laws in 20th century Thailand when western-style auto/biographies were first imaginable, the majority of writing about important historical figures has not only focused on royal family members, but has also been limited by what can publicly be acknowledged about these figures. This essay, by contrast, focuses on the contextually radical yet sanctimonious Prince Prisdang, a man who created a life that rather studiously and persistently worked against the status quo and his own interests. He professed, loudly and inappropriately for his status and times, monogamy, constitutional monarchy, westernization, and a kind of governmental transparency that exposed the private life of King Chulalongkorn to Western imperial authorities. His attempts to self-censor failed spectacularly, whether in self-exile in British Malaya or as abbot of a monastery in Ceylon, where he lived as a monk for 15 years. For the workshop, I will focus on his time spent abroad and his transnational allegiances.

This biographical study is part of a larger project that examines royal and non-royal elite men who studied abroad around the turn of the 20th century and returned infected not just with political ideas about democracy, as most histories of colonized Asians highlight, but with ideas and strategies about personal ethics that pushed normative limits. These men, well-mannered and educated, transgressed social norms by contemplating suicide, shooting their wives, believing their lives had an imminent expiration date, beating their children, challenging monarchical authority, allegedly engaging in adulterous infidelities, and otherwise behaving in ways that were, simply, human. I focus on these “black sheep” not to besmirch or aggrandize the Cakri lineage but to reveal the alternative, realistic daily lives of elites. More broadly, this project critiques the discipline of history’s demand for causality, which too often eclipses efforts to present a fuller, humanizing view of the social context in which decisions were made and actions taken. Privileging causality prioritizes certain historical details over others but only in retrospect, in the act of constructing history. I weave the individualized, emotive dimension into historical scholarship to bring contingency and specificity to the writing of history. These microhistories reveal subjective experiences of the world in a way that engages the reader in an intimate dialogue with history and role of affect in narrative nonfiction.


David Michael Malitz

The spread of nationalism in Asia is often understood in a “linear fashion”: Having emerged in Europe, nationalism was adopted in the local contexts of the colonial states and semi-colonized Siam through a process of hybridization. However, the case of Japan in the Siamese press implies a more complex process. Since at least the Russo-Japanese war, Japan was referred to as a benchmark for Siamese “progress” and level of “civilization” – e.g. in terms of
popular rights, women’s rights and their important role for the national community, as well as patriotism as the motivation behind the actions of individuals – pointing to a more “transnational, multi-dimensional” process.

This discourse seems to have emerged against the background of three developments. First, before and during the early phase of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, the British press in Siam created a very positive impression of the new power, e.g. Bushido is referred to by the Bangkok Times in a positive light already when reporting about the Boxer Rebellion. Second, the adoption of a racist Weltanschauung made Japan a – literally – natural case for comparisons. The writer and lawyer Thianwan already pointed out during the Russo-Japanese War that the Siamese and the Japanese shared the characteristic of “yellow skin”, and the royally acclaimed history of the Thai nation/race Lak Thai published twenty years later reproduced Arthur de Gobineau’s theory of the common origin of the members of the “yellow race” in the Altay Mountains. Third, references to the Asian power Japan could be used to outflank the cultural relativism of the official/royalist nationalism that stressed the irreconcilability of “Western” institutions such as parliaments and monogamy with the Thai nation. The power of this rhetoric strategy can be deduced from the attempts of King Rama VI to argue against the comparability of the Siamese and Japanese experiences regarding reforms and “development” in a number of his writings.

In this paper I will attempt to show that the perception of Japan as a benchmark for Siamese “progress” played an important role in shaping the nationalist discourse criticizing the absolute monarchy since the beginning of the twentieth century, a perception that was thus not limited to a small number of quasi-fascists around Phibun Songkhram and Vichit Vadakan.

**Transnational Textiles in Tow: Exploring Batik Hokokai and the Japanese In Colonial Southeast Asia**

Kaja M. McGowan

Part of a larger book project, this preliminary inquiry will explore a unique style of batik cloth introduced during the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia from 1940 to 1942. Called batik Hokokai, after the “Djawa Hokokai” movement which was active in Java in promoting a pan-Asian state and culture, this brightly colored cloth reveals a patchwork of Japanese motifs afloat on traditional Javanese backgrounds. There is much debate as to who were the intended clientele for these brightly colored eclectic cloths. Van Roojan suggests that the batik was primarily made to satisfy a Japanese market, especially for military personnel stationed in Java and their families. Other scholars and collectors argue that they were commissioned by local Indonesian and peranakan Chinese communities. The emergence of the colorful batik known as Hokokai during the otherwise bleak occupation years of the Japanese on Java has always been interpreted as somewhat of an anomaly. As a result, little to no research has been undertaken. Instead, it is essential that batik Hokokai be seen in direct relation to pre-war patterns of trade and the active transnational role of the Japanese oversea communities in colonial Southeast Asia.
The governance of natural resource use in Vietnam has long been solely the business of the state. Epitomizing the central-planning ethos of its socialist ideology, the Vietnamese state constitutionally holds exclusive control over the management of all natural resources within its territory on behalf of its citizenry. Yet, in the past two decades, a curious development has taken place that appears to be quietly undermining the foundations of this tenet. At various local sites, authorities have been experimenting with a novel mode of resource governance in which communities of local resource users share decision-making responsibility and authority with the government over the management of the resource system. Known as co-management, this approach is gaining appeal among policy-makers as a promising and pragmatic solution to widespread resource overexploitation and conflict. Implemented largely as a result of considerable advocacy, advice, expertise, and expense on the part of foreign development aid organizations as part of their agenda to promote sustainable development in the global South, co-management has come to be understood as a development intervention designed to solve what is essentially a technical problem—the poor design and enforcement of rules governing resource access and use. A more critical perspective, however, might detect a certain subversive potential in co-management that challenges entrenched notions of property, sovereignty, legitimacy, and citizenship. How and why, then, did an approach that is in principle so antithetical to Vietnam’s professed socialist ideals begin to take hold and gain such ascendancy in policy circles?

In this paper, I trace the origins of the co-management concept in Vietnam to understand both its improbable rise as well as its potential ramifications. Focusing on the co-management of aquatic resource systems, I examine how various organizations operating at different spatial scales have sought to influence the policy discourse in Vietnam. Through in-depth interviews with key actors and analysis of policy and project documents, I examine the historical context in which co-management has emerged and the factors that have contributed to its present appeal. In particular, I consider the ways in which the rise of co-management is being shaped by, and may also be shaping, three significant sociopolitical transformations that have marked Vietnam’s transition from a command economy to what has been termed a “market-oriented socialist economy under state guidance”: the evolution of property rights, the decentralization of power, and the emergence of civil society.

I argue that while a narrow understanding of co-management as a development intervention may give it considerable political appeal, it also constrains its potential to engender sustainable and equitable resource use. This is because such a discourse obscures the ways in which co-management arrangements embed themselves in—and invariably reconfigure—existing webs of power relations. However, for both the Vietnamese government and donor organizations that fund and promote co-management, co-management projects represent a useful and pragmatic way to further their respective agendas. It is in both parties’ interest to keep co-management couched within a highly technical discourse for two key reasons: First, such a
discourse confines the sharing of power within the relatively ‘safe’ realm of resource management, and no further. Second, by defining co-management in terms of knowledge sharing and transfer, the discourse serves to legitimize and entrench relations of power, between foreign ‘experts’ and local officials, between the central and local levels of government, and between the state and the people.

In demonstrating the ways in which the global discourse of sustainable development intersects with the Vietnamese nation-state’s efforts to maintain sovereignty and legitimacy in the face of sociopolitical change, this paper aims to offer one way of understanding trans-nationality as it is writ large upon the face of contemporary Vietnam.

Exporting Threats, Transmitting Instability Conflict in Myanmar: Effects on Thailand

Pavin Chachavalpongpun

Thailand shares a 2,400 kilometre border with Myanmar, of which only about 61 kilometres have been demarcated. The long strip of unsettled border has over the years permitted all sorts of undesired consequences caused by the internal conflicts in Myanmar to disturb bilateral relations and in particular the security situation on the Thai side. On the surface, it is convenient for Thailand to accuse the Myanmar government of “exporting threats” and “transmitting instability” across the border, simply because of the continued political conflicts between the military junta and the ethnic minorities. At a deeper level however, the nature of Thai policy toward Myanmar and the security imperatives of Thailand have seemed to willingly invite the troubles generated by the political unrest in Myanmar to land on the Thai soil. In other words, Bangkok’s long-held buffer policy vis-à-vis Yangon represents one of the main reasons why Thailand has been unable to ward off such negative impacts originated from Myanmar. Thailand has long assisted a number of ethnic minorities living along the Thai-Myanmar border in their rebellion against the central government, and at the same time assigning them as a buffer against the perceived Myanmar threat, even when such threat has never been clearly defined. But the buffer policy has brought with it a myriad of precarious effects, including the skirmishes, the inflow of refugees, the smuggling of drugs and arms, as well as the spread of infectious diseases. This study argues that the way Thailand has conducted its relations with Myanmar justifies the existence of transnational effects. Two contemporary case studies are to be discussed in order to support the argument. First, with Myanmar gradually opening itself up, the government needs ethnic groups to take part in the political process and their support would substantiate its claim that the whole country is behind the ongoing reforms. Resistant groups have therefore been suppressed. This could provoke a rise in refugee numbers into Thailand, especially into the buffer zone. Second, Thailand has continued to depend heavily on Myanmar’s energy in order to feed its demanding industrialisation. In the process, Thailand has invested in several projects involving the building of pipelines and dams in Myanmar. Most of these projects instigate forced relocation of those who had lived in the planned construction areas, thus sparking conflicts between the government and the local residents. Some have relocated in Thailand as illegal migrants in search of a new livelihood. These two cases reaffirm the inseparable link between certain Thai policies towards Myanmar and Thailand’s inevitability of having to face the spillover effects as a result of the implementation of its own policies.
From Kingdom to Province - Reconsidering the Integration of Pattani to Thailand in the Nineteenth to the Early Twentieth Century

Piyada Chonlaworn

Pattani, once a Malay autonomous state, was subjugated by Siam in the late eighteenth century and later incorporated to Thailand through a series of political control; a division of Pattani kingdom into seven principalities in 1810s, abolition of Pattani sultanate in 1902 and the creation of Monthon Pattani in 1906. Finally *Patani Darussalam* or Patani kingdom became Pattani province as a part of Thailand in 1933. These historical process has led to the conflict between the Thais and Malays which turns into ethnic-religious cleavage and political unrest in Thailand's southern border provinces until today. So far there are a lot of discourses about the Pattani-Siam relation in this crucial period. To name a few, Panngam (1976) and Somchote (1978) who rely mainly on Thai source to look at Thai's policy towards Pattani, Kobkua (1988) and Koch (1977) who examine Thai-Malay relation from the viewpoint of the Malays. Recent study by Loos (2002, 2010) also argues that Siamese policy to modernize southern states was proceeded as a form of colonization competing with the British Malaya at that time.

By drawing on the argument of these previous studies, this paper aims to re-examine the policy of Siam towards Pattani and nearby Malay dependencies during the nineteenth to the early twentieth century; what is the rationale of Siam in controlling the south, how the policy changed under domestic and international politics. This paper also takes into consideration the role of local officers and commissioners sent from Bangkok, and the socio-economic situation in the Malay Peninsular in that period.

Transnational Vietnam and the Trade Orbit of Asia, 1500-1825

Eric Tagliacozzo

Vietnam is not usually mentioned in the same breath with several other countries -- most notably China, Japan, and India -- when the maritime trading world of Early Modern Asia is described. Neither her commercial infrastructure, nor her incorporation into the mercantile orbit of the time have been judged as sufficient to place her on an even par with many of her larger neighbors. While this judgment remains essentially valid, Vietnam did have an important role to play in the transnational economic life of maritime Asia during this time. This paper attempts to briefly chronicle this role, which entwined the lands of the Nguyen and the Trinh with Europeans and other Asians for some three centuries. By examining these ongoing interactions, I hope to link concepts of tribute-trade, laissez-faire economics, and politics into one coherent narrative. The major trend that emerges from this analysis is a realization that the Vietnamese coasts provided an
important subsidiary trade milieu to a host of merchants linked within the greater "China Trade" of the region.