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Editorial

The 18th military coup since 1932 has once again underscored the fragile nature of democracy in Thailand. Tumultuous anti-government protests between November 2013 and May 2014 organized by the People's Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) led to the occupation of government buildings and offices, road intersections, and mass rallies in the capital, Bangkok. After being found guilty of abuses of power, the then Prime Minister, Yingluck Shinawatra, was removed from office. On May 20, 2014 martial law was declared throughout the nation and then on May 22, after months of political unrest in Thailand, Prayut Chan-o-cha, a retired Royal Thai army officer and a former Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army overthrew Niwatthamrong Boonsongpaisan in a coup d'état.

In this special issue we bring together a group of concerned Thai scholars who contextualize the current political turmoil that has engulfed the nation. Thongchai Winichakul examines the different discourses that have been used to explain democratization in Thailand; one which revolves around military coups and new constitutions; another traces democracy as part of a linear process that emerges in 1932 with the transition from an absolute to constitutional monarchy. Thongchai scrutinizes the role of the monarchy and contextualizes the issue of royalist democracy against the background of the current round of coups in the early 21st century. Leading on from this analysis, Pavin Chachavalpongpun also focuses on the links between the military and the monarchy and examines the relationship between these two institutions and their influence on Thai democracy. Titipol Phakdeewanich asks if the current "caretaker" military junta will set a long-term precedent for the autocratic management of a society deemed unmanageable and irredeemable. Or will democracy return as a counterweight to trump authoritarian interventions and solutions? Tanet Charoenmuang looks back over the last year and compares the coup's dynamics to the 2006 coup. He details what conditions have been reorganizing politics within the nation and raises the issue that we may be seeing the "constitutionalization" of coups. Finally, David Streckfuss comments on both the spectacle and drama of the coup and presents a concerned analysis of the societal effects of military intervention 15 months later.

This year celebrates CSEAS 50th anniversary and the Center is currently preparing for its anniversary event in December 2015. This will be followed by the 1st consortium for Southeast Asian Studies in Asia (SEASIA) conference in which 600 scholars from around the world will participate in Kyoto on December 12–13. This event will be attended by our guest of honor his Excellency Fukuda Yasuo, the former Prime Minister of Japan (2007–08). CSEAS looks forward to all the guests, friends, and collegues, old and new, who will participate in the events we have planned to help cement our position in Southeast Asian studies both regionally and globally.

The Editors

Thailand's Royalist Democracy in Crisis

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The 2014 coup in Thailand is normally explained according to two conventional discourses of democratization in Thailand. First is the vicious cycle discourse: a repeated cycle of military coups, followed by a new constitution, a general election. However, the serious failure of the elected government—either due to corruption scandals, threats to the monarchy, by communists or a combination of them—leads to another coup. This discourse was more prevalent between the 1950s and 1980s when coups were more frequent. Yet, from 1992 to 2006, when electoral democracy was more stable, a second discourse became more common, one where the history of democratization in Thailand developed through a process of linear progress starting in 1932; from the end of the absolute monarchy, the 1973 popular uprising that ended 23 year-long military rule through to the 1992 uprising that finally put military rule to rest as it was believed up to 2006. The latest two coups in 2006 and 2014 have revived the vicious cycle as an explanation.

Both discourses have one thing in common, that is, an understanding that democratization is the struggle against the military for an electoral democracy of civilian rule. This is a common political experience for Thai adults today, almost all of whom were born in the 1940s or after and coming of age in the late 1950s. Democratization in the world in the 1970s, as they might have learned, were mostly struggles against military regimes. Apparently they, including academics and historians, think that the

political role of the monarchy and monarchists[1] completely stopped after the 1932 revolution which ended absolute monarchy in Siam.

Over the past 50 years, this has been a common historical misperception in Thailand. Thai historiography is oblivious to the counter-revolutionary battles and actions by the monarchists long after 1932. It overlooks the role of the monarchy in politics which was revived in the late 1940s and has been active at least since the 1960s. Generally, Thais believe that the monarchy is truly "above" politics as the official mantra has propagated for decades. After the 2006 coup, however, people were increasingly aware of the "palace's" support for putsch. It then became common knowledge to political observers in Thailand and around the world that the latest coup in 2014 was about the palace.

For those who can explain the role of the monarchy in the current crisis, so far they have argued that the 2006 and 2014 coups were due to looming problem of succession.[2] The reign of King Bhumibol (1946 to present) and the source of privileges, power and benefits for monarchists is coming to its end. But his successor will unlikely be able to fill his father's shoes, and worse, could undermine the glory of the monarchy. Meanwhile, the former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra is considered as a threat to the throne. His wealth, power and popularity put him in direct contest with the royalist elite for the "kingmaker" in the post-Bhumibol era. The two coups were attempts by a coalition of royalist kingmakers to secure the succession firmly in their hands (despite the differences among themselves). Whether or not, or how much, Thaksin is truly a threat to the monarchy is beside the point. The monarchists' fear of him is real.

The question here though, is why the succession and why do the kingmakers matter so much? Why would not a succession to the throne in, say, England, Denmark, or Japan, lead to a political crisis to the extent that is unfurling in Thailand? The legal rule for succession is not a cause for concern for it has been clearly established. The answer lies in the fact that while in a democratic country the monarchy does not have effective political or economic relevance, let alone real authority or power, such is not the case in Thailand where the stake of the succession is very high. One might prompt to think of the

wealth of the crown (Porphant 2008), which is among the richest in the world. But probably more important but much less known is the political power of the monarchy in the current political system—the "royalist democracy."

Royalist democracy is a form of "guided democracy"—an ostensibly democratic polity but one in which the electorate and elected authority do not have substantive power or have little impact on public policy because true power remains in the hands of the oligarchy or autocracy. Its formal name, "the Democratic Regime with the Monarchy as the Head of the State," is quite a revealing euphemism for a political system in which the formal parliamentary system is under the domination of the unelected, undemocratic power of the monarchy.

The monarchy is supposed to be "above" politics in the sense of being uninvolved, beyond, or clearly separated from politics. Instead, it is "above" politics in the sense of being "on top of" the formal and apparent political system. It is not separated from, uninvolved, or beyond politics. On the contrary, the monarchy is actively involved, thanks to its enormous influence, in the political system albeit informally. I hope to show concretely how the royalist democracy operates in the realms of public policies, key personnel, budgets, and resources allocation, although the limited space of this essay does not allow to make further elaborations. Suffice it to say that the bureaucracy—literally servants of the king—is the main functionary of royalist democracy. The military—who often proclaim that they are "soldiers of the king"—its protector. The judiciary—who by law is "the judges of the king"—the ultimate lawmakers in this system.

The elected authority under the royalist democracy is a necessary function in the operation of the state. But it should stay within the guided parameters, not in competition or in conflict with royalist interests. The elected authority should have as much power as necessary for its role as the efficient manager of the state. New initiatives, policies, personnel, budget allocations, nevertheless, should reflect its role within the limits but not beyond.

Royalist democracy relies on a charismatic king who is either genuine or an invented and orchestrated one. The ideal characteristics of modern monarchy, as put forward by royalist ideologues over the years and successfully materialized in the reign of King Bhumibol, includes being sacred and extraordinary or super-human, yet a popular king who appears close to and cares for the well-being of his people (Dhani Nivat 1969). According to a royalist ideologue, Thailand's sovereignty is co-owned by the monarch and people, hence the royalist democracy (Bowornsak 1994; 2007).

The strength of royalist democracy thus far has been developed in tandem with the one of King Bhumibol. Indispensable for royalist democracy, his charisma and accomplishments have been amplified by "hyper-royalism"—a politico-cultural atmosphere in which the monarch is considered superlative in ways not humanly possible. Hyper-royalism has penetrated into and permeated the everyday life of Thais (Thongchai 2014). Together with the draconian lèse-majesté law, the monarch becomes literally, ideologically, and legally inviolable. Thai royalism becomes religious-like; violation becomes blasphemy (Streckfuss 2011).

The history of royalist democracy is closely related to the history of democratization in Thailand. It is a legacy of the absolute monarchy (one that began in the 1880s and ended in 1932) in the sense that it has been formulated by the monarchists in their effort to regain power after the end of absolute monarchy. After a short-lived initial revival in 1947–51, the development of King Bhumibol as ideal modern monarch began in the early 1960s, thanks to the US who promoted the monarchy as a strategic instrument to counter communism. The turning point toward supremacy for royalist democracy came with the popular uprising in 1973 against military rule. The monarchists grew to dominance in 1992 and royalist democracy has thrived since then at the expense of the military that has gradually declined in political power.

Royalist democracy is also a main factor in the current political crisis. Fundamentally, at the roots of the crisis is a conflict between a changing political demography and an obstinate political system that refuses to change accordingly. The semi-urban, semi-rural people outside the metropoles and urban poor in the metropoles are the emerging classes as a result of the changing socio-economy particularly in the rural sector since the late 1980s. These emerging classes enjoy electoral democracy for it has provided better material benefits, a fairer share of public resources, and above all better access to power. This is in stark contrast with the benefits and services provided by the centralized bureaucracy which favors the upper classes in Bangkok and the metropoles. The obstinate political system is a royalist democracy which relies on bureaucracy as its backbone and dislikes electoral democracy.

The structural conflict above erupted into the open when elected authority increased its power and was more aggressive during Thaksin's period of government rule (2001–06), due to the huge popular mandates they got from landslide electoral victories. Their efforts in trying to change too much too fast (Suehiro 2014) thus became a threat to the status quo of royalist democracy. Around the same time in

the early 2000s, royalist democracy also faced a crisis within. Given its reliance on the charisma of King Bhumibol, his deteriorating health caused grave concerns. The prospect of having a successor who is anything but an ideal modern monarchy compounded issues. The looming problem of succession could spell the end of royalist democracy from within at a time when structural conflict is erupting.

The latest two coups in 2006 and 2014, thus, were the efforts of the monarchists to take control of the state and get rid of the perceived threats to royalist democracy and critics of the monarchy. Unfortunately, these measures may backfire on two counts. First, as the enforcement of the lèse-majesté law becomes more frequent, harsher, and unreasonable (the number of people charged skyrocketed after the 2006 coup; the unprecedented severity of punishments for a crime of expression; and the dubious process with outrageous interpretations of the law), instead of eliminating the critics of the monarchy, it has generated more dissent. Critics of the monarchy are no longer limited to small circles of intelligentsia as in previous periods, but are widespread among common folk who were once the royalist populace.

Secondly, as the military was brought back to serve the monarchy while the latter is weaker and potentially weakening even further, how long in the future can the military remain the protector of royalist interests? Is it possible that the monarchists have unlocked the door for the return of Praetorianism, themselves bringing the end to royalist democracy? The answer depends on the post-Bhumibol situation, particularly the next king's charisma, performance, and his relationship with the military and with people, all of which will be telling about the fate of the monarchy as a political force and how it will survive in the twenty first century as well. On the other hand, a positive sign from the crisis in the past decade is that Thai politics is no longer the exclusive business of the elites. Thai people have awakened. Popular democracy will be a factor determining the future of both the monarchy and the possibility of Praetorianism.

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Notes

[1] By "monarchy," I mean a social institution and entity that are active in cultural, social, economic, and political life like every other. Duncan McCargo (2005) shows that the monarchy "institution," as it is often called, is a network of non-monolithic groups and people whose interests rely on, and who get legitimacy from, their varying associations with the monarch (king). It is "network-monarchy." The monarchy in this sense is a larger entity than the king. The charismatic king himself is the pivot of the machine, not an unknowing or passive part. The monarchy in this sense is a very active political force. I use the term "monarchy" in this sense throughout, in contrast with the monarch, king, queen, prince, princess, and so on for the individuals. Another term, the "palace," is ambiguous but justifiably so to denote the fuzzy actor(s) or subject(s) who can be identified only by its spatial metaphor.

[2] Among the proponents of this view are Andrew MacGregor Marshall (2014), and Pavin Chachavalpongpun in his several writings and public addresses.

Royal Succession at Stake: The Future of the Thai Monarchy

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In this short essay my argument on the grounds of the current Thai political crisis is straightforward: The military staged a coup on May 22, 2014 mainly to take control of the upcoming royal succession. This important event will determine the future of Thailand, simply because the monarchy has long been at the center of Thai politics. The military, during this transitional period, has continued to exploit the revered institution, not only to defend the political interest of the monarchy, but also that of its own.

Now more than a year since the latest coup, the military has evidently failed to bring peace and stability back to Thai society. On the contrary, the military government of Prime Minister General Prayuth Chanocha has further deepened rifts in society, among other things, by incessantly tracking down those with different political opinions. Among these targets, critics of the monarchy are dealt with ever more harshly. The fact that King Bhumibol Adulyadej has been an active political player periodically intervening in politics over the past decades seems to indicate why what has been going on within the walls of the palace stirs up a deep sense of apprehension among the Thai public (Handley 2006, 9).[1]

On May 31, 2015, King Bhumibol was hurriedly airlifted to Bangkok's Siriraj hospital following his return to Bangkok from his seaside palace at Hua Hin just three weeks before. His ailing wife, Queen Sirikit, who had suffered a severe stroke in 2012, accompanied him. Their latest hospitalization ignited frenzied speculation about the looming end of the Bhumibol era. The king has been in and out of the hospital since 2009. In the past, rumors about the king's deteriorating health badly impacted the Thai stock market. Yet, while the king has played a tremendous role in politics, being able to talk openly about the monarchy is still forbidden in Thailand. As an academic working on the Thai monarchy, I myself have become a victim of the draconian lèse-majesté law, or the crime of injury to royalty, which is defined by Article 112 of the Thai Criminal Code. It states that defamatory, insulting, or threatening comments about the king, queen, and regent, are punishable by 3 to 15 years in prison.

On the throne since 1946, Bhumibol is the world's longest-reigning monarch. But his worsening health has caused anxiety among Thais about what the future holds. This nervousness is partly due to the generally uncertain political environment now that the nation is once again in the custody of a self-appointed military government. But it is also the result of Bhumibol's reign having been perhaps too successful: Can his successor match up? Revered by the military, bureaucrats, big businesses, and mainstream society alike, the king is extolled in schools and the media as a demigod and lauded as the people's monarch. Photos released by the palace show him travelling through remote regions with maps and cameras in hand, a trickle of sweat on his brow.

The royal family has long played an indispensable role in Thai politics, especially by maintaining close relations with the military, even during periods of civilian rule. Over the years, Bhumibol has managed to become an indispensable partner of the generals, and they have cast themselves as the monarchy's ultimate defenders. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the king developed ties with Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, who ruled Thailand like a strongman. In exchange, obsolete practices honoring the royal family, such as prostration before the king, were revived, as part of further sanctifying Bhumibol. Old and invented royal ceremonies snowballed, according to Thongchai Winichakul (Thongchai 2014, 90). In the 1980s, Bhumibol appointed General Prem Tinsulanonda as prime minister; Prem is now the head of Bhumibol's Privy Council, where he fends off any attempts by the government to curtail royal prerogatives. British scholar Duncan McCargo argued that Prem is a part of the "network monarchy" designed to safeguard the power position of the king, and is often in competition with civilian governments (McCargo 2005, 499).

Bhumibol has exercised clout with the army in ways that are widely perceived to have been in the nation's general interest. During massive protests in 1992, he persuaded the unpopular prime minister of the day, General Suchinda Kraprayoon, to step down. Suchinda staged a coup in 1991, overthrowing the government of Chatichai Choonhavan. After allowing an election in 1992, Suchinda appointed himself as prime minister, prompting the public's

Fig. 1 Queen Sirikit attended a funeral of a royalist yellow shirt who was killed in a fatal clash with the police in 2008
Source: *Khom Chut Luek Newspaper*, October 15, 2008

Fig. 2 Princess Chulabhorn offered her support to the anti-Yingluck protesters in 2013
Source: *ASTV Manager Weekly*, Number 225, January 25–31, 2014

resentment, which led to widespread protests and violent crackdowns by the army. In 2006, after months of demonstrations against Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, the king endorsed the coup that deposed him. The footage of the king and the queen granting an audience with Prem and General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, one of the coup makers, signified the palace's backing of the military's political intervention. However, because his interventions have been periodic and limited, Bhumibol is somewhat perceived as being above politics.

This would be a tough act to follow for anyone, but Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn needs to step up to the plate. Yet his recent attempts to signal that he is a worthy successor appear to be falling short. In 1972, the king designated Vajiralongkorn, his only son, as heir to the throne, and under current succession law, Parliament should simply ratify the king's preference after his death. But for many years, the crown prince, now 62, showed little interest in royal and political affairs. Vajiralongkorn spent much of his time in Munich, living a life some consider dissolute, for example taking naked photos of his wives and marking the death of his dog Foo Foo, which he had promoted to the rank of air marshal, with a lavish funeral. These eccentricities contrast with the squeaky-clean image of the king, and have not

played well with either the people or the generals. Despite holding many military titles, Vajiralongkorn lacks the support of the armed forces. Since 1978, he has maintained a vast praetorian guard, known in Thai as the *Rachawallop* unit. Supposedly in place to ensure his security and perform charitable works, it is seen as a counterforce to the official military. Despite consisting of around 5,500 members, the Rachawallop has been unsuccessful in expanding its troop numbers due to its direct connection with the Crown Prince.[2]

For a time, Vajiralongkorn sought to boost his appeal by cultivating relations with Thaksin, who won elections in 2001 and 2005. But the strategy backfired. Vajiralongkorn could have perceived that had he been alienated by the army, leaning toward Thaksin might have earned him some kind of popular support from Thaksin's loyal fans. Thus accordingly, he could have also earned a popular mandate. This explains why some of Thaksin's supporters in the red-shirt movement have openly endorsed the crown prince as the next monarch. In November 2013, during the protests against the government of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, Thaksin's sister, Vajiralongkorn asked the bureau chief of the Metropolitan Police, a known confidant of Thaksin, to negotiate with the demonstrators. This only alienated them further—as did the prince's decision, a few months later, to allow Thaksin's supporters to camp

outside one of his residences and to send his personal guard to protect Yingluck.

After Yingluck was ousted and the military took control in May 2014, Vajiralongkorn seemed to have changed tack. He started reaching out to the new Prayuth government. (As the king's designated heir, the crown prince's accession should simply be endorsed by Parliament, but under military rule, the army's support is also necessary.) In August 2014, Vajiralongkorn presided over the inauguration ceremony of the new military-appointed National Legislative Assembly, implicitly endorsing the coup. This March, he sent Prayuth flowers on the occasion of his 61st birthday. The prince also appeared to have been cleaning house. He divorced his wife, Princess Srirasmi, in December 2014, reportedly out of concern that her relatives had damaged the monarchy's dignity by exploiting his name for financial benefit. Her parents and brothers were later charged under the lèse-majesté law. It is unclear whether Vajiralongkorn's efforts are paying off, but there are no realistic alternatives. One of Vajiralongkorn's three sisters, Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn, is beloved by the people, thanks partly to her charitable activities. She is seen as humble and down to earth, much like her father. But current succession law and established practice does not readily allow her to accede to the throne. The constitution was amended in 1974 to permit a daughter of the king to ascend the throne—but only in the absence of a male heir apparent and under other strict requirements. This presumably means that Sirindhorn could become queen only if Bhumibol demoted Vajiralongkorn and designated her as his new heir—which would be unprecedented. The king may already be too weak to make such a daring move, especially since it might shake the entire monarchy by triggering a power struggle between the conservative royalists who favor Sirindhorn, and the crown prince and his supporters. It is possible that the military government, which is wary of Vajiralongkorn, could disregard the king's preference and designate another candidate to the throne. But that decision would surely divide this already fragmented nation. It is unlikely and the prince's newfound behavior may bring rapprochement with the military.

The monarchy remains a major political symbol in Thailand. But now, with the Bhumibol era in its twilight and a problematic succession ahead, the institution is weakening. Under these circumstances, Vajiralongkorn should be allowed to take the throne as prescribed by law, but with the understanding that he will essentially forgo politics. By withdrawing from the political fray, it is the royal family's best chance of maintaining its moral authority. It is also Thailand's best chance for some measure of stability.

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Notes

[1] He asserted, "Unlike other monarchs in the world, Bhumibol made himself a full-fledged, dominant political actor."

[2] In an email interview with Paul Chambers, who is Director of Research Institute of Southeast Asian Affairs (ISEAA), Chiang Mai University, on January 21, 2015.

Thailand Purports to Be in Search of an Upright Political System, But Can "Democracy" Still Be Regarded as a Viable Option?

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Thailand has been a society in limbo ever since the Thai military coup d'état of May 22, 2014, and yet, it remains as seemingly divided as it ever has been, after a decade and more of almost continual social-political discord. Nevertheless, in the wake of the coup—which was led by the National Council for Peace and Order (or NCPO)—and with it, the resulting establishment of an arbitrary and non-democratic authoritarian jurisdiction, Thailand's intractable problems now only threaten to escalate existing entrenched divisions.

In, what has been a concerted effort to further secure the power and status of this ruling Thai Junta, the attempt to silence the more vocal opponents will, most assuredly, have been a matter of primary concern. According to a recent report by the Freedom of Expression Documentation Center (based at iLaw, a Thai NGO), by the end of August 2015, the Junta had either directly summoned, or sent their military representatives to "visit" the homes of at least 782 Thai civilians—and at least 144 civilians have been repeatedly trailed by the military, since the coup, itself (Freedom of Expression Documentation Centre 2015).

Although Thailand's dwindling numbers of democratic stalwarts are attempting to retain some sense of conviction in making the case for a swift return to democratic norms—to those who are still prepared to listen, or entertain such notions—it is a dawning reality that Thais, in their millions, are becoming increasingly accepting of the resort to authoritarian approaches, in attempting to resolve the Thai social-political impasse. Moreover, because many of the latter have already emerged as avowed advocates for authoritarianism over democratization, whilst the remaining voices for democracy are now necessarily prudent in their seeming diffidence, in general, this foreshadows the likelihood of a continued worsening outlook for Thailand.

The Junta, and their Constitution Drafting Committee (or CDC), had been hoping that their August 2015 draft proposal for a 20th Thai constitution—since the "Siamese coup d'état" (or "Siamese Revolution") of 1932 brought Thailand from the status of "absolute monarchy," to that of "constitutional monarchy"—would lead to the installation of what is being referred to as "Thai-style" democracy.

However, this draft was considered so profoundly undemocratic by many millions of Thais—perhaps, most especially, because the new constitution would have established the National Strategic Reform and Reconciliation Committee (or NSRRC), which was to consist of top bureaucrats and military officials, by appointment—that it was ultimately blocked by the National Reform Council (or NRC), in September. This only further delayed any apparent progress towards more democratic structures. Despite this apparent, albeit temporary, setback for the Junta, many Thais sneakingly suspect that the NSRRC, or a variant thereof will ultimately be put into place, one way or another.

Notwithstanding the various behind-the-scenes, and more overt strategic maneuverings, there are many millions of other Thais who remain quite in agreement with the intention for Thailand to establish an NSRRC-type of body. This suggests that open military involvement in Thai politics can gain a significant amount of public support, regardless of the oft-repeated arguments that such forms of interventionism are reflective of a nefarious desire to illegitimately coerce and influence society, and likely future outcomes. Thus, the question arises as to whether there can be a realistic prospect for internationally established and recognized democratic principles within such a Thailand.

Although they must, for the foreseeable future, remain on the sidelines of the debate, the two major political parties—namely, the Democrat Party and the Pheu Thai Party—were for disparate strategic reasons, both clear in publicly stating that they would not accept the revised draft of the CDC. In addition, Suthep Thaugsuban, the President of the People's Democratic Reform Foundation (or PDRF, which was formerly known as the People's Democratic Reform Committee, or PDRC), was quick to officially endorse

what became a failed draft, and he continues to publicly advocate for a national referendum on the issue. On the other hand, despite still sharply divided public opinion, to publicly criticize a mere draft proposal is to risk the ire of the Junta.

In attempting to better contend with the phenomenon of Thai authoritarianism, it should be understood that Thais are certainly well aware of its various pernicious effects, as it continues to operate not only in overseeing Thai society from the top, but also because of the ways in which it imbues society at a more mundane day-to-day level. This has been a historical problem which informs Thai societal dynamics at almost all levels, and it has manifested itself in a number of ways.

From various approaches to Thai Buddhism, children's education, and the family, as well as in relation to the structures of the developing nation state, most of this is subtly (or not so subtly) influenced by a long-established and pervasive Thai patronage system. It predates societal problems that may otherwise be ostensibly regarded as newly emergent and its consequential myriad compound effects that historians have been attempting to fathom, with regard to the past several hundred years, and more of Thailand's perennial misadventures and travails.

In terms of the relatively recent historical periods of overt authoritarian control, the eras of Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkhram (Prime Minister of Thailand between 1938 and 1944), Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (Prime Minister of Thailand between 1958 and 1963), and Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn (Prime Minister of Thailand between 1963 and 1973), are some of the more notorious, and these as well as other similarly testing times certainly left their mark on the wounded, and now highly susceptible Thai psyche.

What are the consequences? All too many Thais reflexively believe that in order to get things done the ends very often really do justify the means. But only for so long, of course, as this accords with their own will and desire. Ultimately, this is a mentality that will only lead to yet further violence and chaos. The solution to this predicament will almost inevitably be an intensified pursuance of autocratic and often egregiously implemented statist solutions, in relation to which Thais are already so well accustomed.

Concurrently, this is also a time when an increasingly large number of Thais are looking to the Chinese political model, as they begin to believe that western-identified democratic values may not be the answer. This is a challenging time for the democratic movement within Thailand, because the language of democracy has become ever less convincing within this ever-divided land.

In such an overall context, the notion of "democracy" in itself risks merely becoming a vaguely hoped for aspiration or ideal, and as something which can be forever sidelined in favor of the practical realities that pertain to any given immediate social-political concern—especially with Thailand seemingly ever lurching from latest crisis, to the next. Moreover, if the Junta and its civilian executives can make sufficient, if disagreeable "progress" over the next few years, then what case would there be left for democracy in what may come to be otherwise regarded as an unmanageable and irredeemable society?

When the promise of democratic progress was still a sufficiently tenable notion, then those who had been historically sidelined and marginalized by the state, and by relatively privileged Thais, could believe in democratic means as long as they could also believe that it would bring them full state recognition, and with it and increased regard of the more advantaged demographics.

This hopeful sense of optimism was perhaps felt most keenly by the otherwise forgotten and vulnerable rural poor who have lived an often marginal existence in North and Northeast Thailand. They had been repeatedly discounted by government after government, and also, by generations of increasingly affluent urbanized Thais. Their well-documented developing relationship with Mr. Thaksin Shinawatra, who was Prime Minister of Thailand between 2001 and 2006, reflected, despite very real and continuing problems with Thai democracy, the probable highwater mark for any reasonable belief in it—and with this latest coup, its possible death knell.

Sustained political upheaval has significantly undermined the prognosis for an already unsettled Thai economy. Nearly 20 years have passed since the Asian financial crisis of 1997, when Thailand lost its status as a potential contender that could hope to tie in with the leading "Asian Tiger" economies, and the path that they had forged. In the intervening years, Thailand has continued to discover new ways to prove to the wider world just how much of an illusion that ambition really was—and so the flagrant disregard for democratic values now being witnessed, only acts to reinforce such perceptions. When we also consider that the global economic outlook remains quite uncertain for so many countries, not least, with the recent corrections to the Chinese, and then the wider Asian stock market indices, then Thailand can hardly afford the indulgence of further compounding obstacles to progress.

It does not appear that 2015 will be a promising year for a Thai economy that is increasingly reliant on tourism and therefore on a positive image abroad. The August 2015 Bangkok bombing at the Erawan Shrine, in the key commercial district of Ratchaprasong, made the world's headlines and in the fallout,

the Thai tourist industry has been directly affected at least for the time being.

According to the Bank of Thailand, in July 2015, economic growth across all the major sectors of the Thai economy had evidenced a slowing down (as compared to July 2014), with the exception of the tourist industry and public spending (although the effect of the bombing will not be accounted for within these figures). It will therefore also be of a significant concern to the Junta that in July 2015, Thai exports actually declined by 3.1 percent (Bank of Thailand 2015).

The Junta has anticipated many of the questions that are now being raised in relation to the aforementioned and has put into place a number of new policy mechanisms that are intended to at least mitigate the severity of the potential problem of lower than anticipated governmental revenue from tourism. Indeed, there is now a general consensus that the Junta should act to ensure that the tourist industry will continue to enjoy a level of growth which can help to keep the Thai economy afloat.

Nevertheless, there is rather less that the Junta can do to convince the international markets that Thailand is a place to be investing in these uncertain times. This will be, to a significant extent, out of their hands. Although the tourism policy mechanisms are not in themselves significantly affecting overall governmental spending, without continually healthy foreign inputs from tourism, foreign direct investment, and international finance, the attempt to moderate the situation through further state intervention and indebtedness, would seem to be inevitable.

It is uncertain whether such indebtedness is limited to the short to medium term or becomes an unavoidable long-term quandary. However should it be the case that over the next few months Thailand's social-political-economic position continues to worsen, then this could provide a shock to the Thai economy that can only be realistically contended through a furtherance of the role of the state. This would, almost assuredly only further the pretext for the Thai authoritarian statist imperative.

Thailand's economic problems will more than likely have been a significant contributing factor in the decision of the Junta to reconsider the policies that were originally introduced by Thaksin Shinawatra. At the time of their original implementation, these policies were contentiously contested by Thaksin Shinawatra's critics who now overwhelmingly constitute the very same demographics in support of authoritarianism as the means by which to implement what amounts, in practice, to the very same policies. These include the "Village Fund" policy, and One Village One Product (or OTOP), as part of the latest urgent policy proposal for a stimulus plan to reenergize the Thai economy. The contradiction is glaring.

The alliance between Thaksin Shinawatra and the rural poor had, in certain respects, helped to bring a greater semblance of legitimacy to Thai democracy. This included a way in which to begin to rectify historical injustices. Although their alliance was strongly resisted by their critics throughout the period during which either Thaksin Shinawatra or his surrogates were in office, when democracy threatened to finally shift Thailand into an era of truly widespread progress, then it was really only a matter of time before the inevitable.

Admittedly, the effort to subvert this alliance resulted in a protracted battle, by way of Thailand's democratic structures at first, and when that failed, by way of the public stage of the PDRC, and the rabble-rousers of the Bangkok street protests of 2013 and 2014. Then finally, with the alliance remaining resolute and undeterred, the cracked facade of Thai democracy would finally crumble, only for the coup to explicitly reveal—to both Thai citizens and to the world, and with it the evident public criticisms from much of the international community—the often implicitly understood reality of the Thai state structure.

And now that the once grudgingly accepted Thai social-democratic contract has been so categorically rescinded, an underlying historical truth has been revealed. Thais who have been relatively advantaged by the all-too-often rigged and corrupt social-political-economic dynamics of Thailand and therefore consider themselves either well established, or on the rise, will only concede to a semblance of democracy for so long as they are guaranteed not to be sidelined or otherwise disadvantaged.

The Thais that share this essential mindset are, to a greater or lesser extent, the very same demographics that previously argued for a coup, and who advocate for authoritarian solutions today. So much for "democracy" then, "Thai-style" or otherwise. Both the months long lead up to the coup, and the months since, already indicate the fading chances for a once more widely held Thai ambition.

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Thailand: A Year After

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Even though Thailand has already had 17 coups in the past 81 years (1932–early 2014), when the 18th strike took place on May 22, 2014, the world seemed to be sinking deeper into more pondering rather than being surprised. It was a surprise for many people when the coup took place on September 19, 2006 after Thaksin Shinawatra led his Thai Rak Thai Party to set an unprecedented four records in Thai politics: the first elected leader to complete a 4-year term in office; the first to win re-election; the first to win two consecutive big victories, especially the second; and the first to form a one-party government.

In fact, these four characteristics have made the establishment worry and fear the possibility of a strong and stable democratic regime and further changes which would undermine the status quo. Thus, a coup was carried out and an elected and hugely popular government was overthrown by the military power forcing Thaksin to live in exile. However, Thaksin's successors continued to win two following general elections, one in December 2007 and the other in July 2011. Instead of calmly accepting defeat and seeking ways to improve themselves for the next election, the conservative plotted another coup. So the latest military junta overthrew another elected government on May 22, 2014. Whether it was another surprise or an experience that left one with a heavy heart depended very much on how one looks at it.

The 18th military coup in Thailand in May 2014 was, by Thai standards, well planned and quickly executed. Suthep Thuagsuban, vice chairman of the Democrat Party (DP), resigned from his post and party to lead an anti-Yingluck government, called the People's Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC). They seized several intersections for demonstrations sites and the Government House, clashed with the police with weapons, prevented voters from going to vote, and along the way led the cries for a military coup. The political turmoil lasted from late November 2013 to mid-May 2014. Finally, the military enacted martial law on May 20, 2014 forbidding any political gatherings and two days later staged a coup, citing the necessity to save the nation from deteriorating national disunity, crisis, and demise. Within one hour of the coup, pro-democracy Redshirt leaders all over the country were arrested and detained in military camps.

Unlike the coup in 2006, in which the coup leader gave power to an appointed government shortly afterwards, the military junta remained in power and established four more organizations to form five "major currents of power." These are namely, the military-dominated cabinet with the junta leader as premier; the NLA (National Legislative Assembly); the NRC (National Reform Council); and the CDC (Constitution Drafting Committee). All have been appointed by the junta and obviously played a role in overthrowing an elected government.

After detention in military camps for one week, all members of the Yingluck cabinet and over 500 Redshirt leaders nationwide had to sign an agreement not to initiate or take part in any more political activities and were released. Some who refused to report themselves to the military had to go to a military court and the hearings and reporting have dragged on until now. In the meantime, hundreds fled to neighboring countries and scores of them have now secured or sought political asylum status in Europe, Australia, Japan, and the U.S. In the U.S., the New Free Thai Movement for democracy led by Dr. Jarupong Ruangsuwan, Pheu Thai Party leader and Dr. Sunai Julpongsatorn, prominent Pheu Thai MP, was set up urging the end of a military rule. Groups of Thai citizens around the world have many times demonstrated their opposition against a military regime in their country.

In Thailand, a number of opposition campaigns against the coup took place in different forms and areas. The examples included wearing redshirts, writing on public buildings, showing a three-finger sign, and a group reading of George Orwell's famous "1984" in public. Several arrests of university students were made in an open opposition movement. Their release followed after the military did not want to create any greater tension, but they moved on to conduct psychological war against students' parents and teachers. Most alarming, however, appears to be the cases of lèse-majesté. Over the past 12 months, at least 40 people have been arrested, charged, and sentenced in violating sec-

tion 112 of the Thai criminal code. Several of the indicted have faced up to 20–60 years of imprisonment and the punishment rate has increased under military court control. The increase of these political conflicts has led the UN Office of Human Rights to voice concern and call for a halt on harsh punishment.[1]

International pressure on Thailand to return to a democratic regime has appeared to be a constant problem for the Prayut government. Apart from an open criticism against a backward regime and the calls for a return to democracy, Western governments including Australia have forbidden the coup leaders to enter their territories and have adopted different methods to pressure Thailand. These range from, a reduction of military exercises between the U.S. and Thailand, EU and the U.S., pressure on the Thai government to solve the problem of illegal workers in the fishing industry, to requests to improve the quality of Thai Airways flights to meet international standards. Increasingly friendly relations between the Thai government and China, seen by remarks from the military junta leader and several visits to Thailand by high-ranking Chinese officials, include an attempt from the Thai side to purchase three submarines and a fast train project. These all point towards a cooling of relations between Thailand and the U.S. for the first time in six decades.

The sending back of 109 China's Uighur people to China in early July has also drawn strong criticism not only from the U.S. government but also from groups of Muslims in Turkey who have opposed the Chinese government's treatment of ethnic groups in Xinjiang Province. There were hundreds of Uighur people in Xinjiang who fled into Thai territory and would like to seek refuge in Turkey. Upon the Chinese government's request and against a plea from the Turkish government, the Thai government sent them back to the Chinese authorities. The action of the Thai junta-government sent a clear message to Washington how well the Thai leaders have responded to the requests of the Chinese government. In addition, many have worried that Thailand could be another target of international conflicts with regard to the mishandling of human rights in Muslim-related issues.

As the military regime now moves on into its second year of rule, three major problems have emerged and are likely to remain for some time. First, the economy is slowing down and the junta government's treatment of rice and rubber producers has been negative. There has also been a decrease in tourism and the flight of foreign investment due to both the coup situation and/or investment privileges in "developing economies" like Vietnam and Myanmar. Thailand for the first time has seen her eco-

nomic growth rate drop to 1–2%. At the same time, more and more complaints have been heard concerning people's low purchasing power and an economic slump in almost all areas of life. General Prayut appointed Somkid Jatusripitak, Thaksin's deputy prime minister, to head a new economic team, who has already announced a major plan to revive the economy by increasing the income of the lower classes. However, it remains to be seen whether the national economy can be stimulated based on Thaksinomic approaches amidst international calls for an open political system and the government's refusal to listen.

The second is the political crisis concerning the draft of the constitution. On September 6, 2015, the National Reform Council (NRC) made a surprise vote to reject the draft by 135 to 105. Most scholars and NGO leaders voted to accept it. Yet almost all military and police officers voted no, indicating a new move by the coup leaders. The draft fully advocates a weak political party system, a powerful appointed senate, an outside prime minister, and a powerfully appointed and strategic committee to control over the elected government, ironically labeled by some academics as the "constitutionalization of coups." However, both the Democrat Party and Pheu Thai Party have opposed the draft. So the coup leaders knew that if the draft were approved by the NRC, it would be very likely that the new constitution would be rejected by a national referendum. Heated debates over the new constitution would allow more people to be politicized and turn against the military regime. The rejection of the draft by the referendum will cause a huge embarrassment to the junta. On the contrary, the no vote at the NRC will not only eliminate all political conflicts that may arise before and during the referendum, but also allow the military government to hold on to power for at least another 18 months.

The third involved the recent August 17 bombing at the Erawan Shrine that caused the deaths and injuries of many foreign tourists and Thais. The clean-up of the scene within 16 hours after the tragic event surprised many people especially in terms of forensic evidence search. One source casts doubt over the arrest of "middle eastern" looking people in Bangkok with regard to the bombing. Confessions can be made, but how much can they be authenticated? The situation is more complicated when other factors are taken into account: the conflict between the pro-election side and pro-coup side, the struggle for power among the pro-coup factions, the conflict over the military appointments, the conflict between the Thai government and the Muslim forces over the Uighur problem, and the violent conflict in the South of the country.

Thus, the transition towards democracy in Thailand will not just be a long road, but also difficult one which requires us to understand the nature of all actors within an ongoing and rapidly developing context.

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Protesters photographed leaving a protest in front of the Office of the Governor of the Province of Ubon Ratchathani, December 9, 2013. Photo: Titipol Phakdeewanich

"Constituting" the Nation: Modern-day Thai-style Dictatorship

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It is inevitable that the dictator tends toward megalomania as the entire structure of power focuses upward to the one individual in charge. The dictator is the regime, the human face that becomes essentially the sole symbol of dictatorship. The "cabinet" is merely an expression of the dictator; the "parliament" is a facet of the dictator; other bodies created by the regime are also just aspects of the dictator. It really doesn't matter if the dictator is a "team player" who works on the basis of some sort of "consensus" with these various other bodies, or whether he (or she) is a "take charge" kind of leader. Anyone in these bodies can be summarily dismissed and so they are at the end of the day irrelevant. Under dictatorship, everyone else is a bit player.

The politicians are remnants of the overthrown government. They, like everyone else, are legally banned from criticizing the regime. They are allowed to kick up a little dust now and again, but they are carefully monitored and kept from mounting any sort of opposition. The people have been cowed. Those who don't get in line with the regime (or at least stay silent) are politely harassed, called in for attitude adjustments, pressured by their bosses. The names of persistent offenders are removed from committees, boards, directorships. It is communicated to them that not only will there be no institutional support for them if they run into trouble, but that the institution will collaborate fully with the regime to isolate and intimidate them. Other than perhaps symbolic support by, say, signing a public letter of concern, no one will stand up in the name of those persecuted by the regime as a matter of principle. There are no principles under dictatorship properly defined. It's all about emotion, faith, a glorious future. In such a coerced silence, the dictator keeps dictating, a single voice that speaks for a nation.

Over time, the dictator forgets the opposition has been silenced and starts believing the regime's own propaganda. The dictator forgets that he was "elected" as prime minister by a group of people carefully hand-picked by the regime. The dictator is touched by polls that tell him he is admired and that the people want him to serve longer, perhaps forever. Petulance is unbecoming but inevitable for dictators, especially for the ones who believed they came to the position reluctantly. The dictator is irritated when the word "dictatorship" is used or implied, or when someone says that the regime came to power through a coup. The dictator wants—he needs—to believe that power was seized with the consent of the people. The dictator always affirms his own sincerity and believes with all his heart that he is loved by the nation. As he is sincere, displays of opposition must be the result of a misunderstanding (fixable with an attitude adjustment), or the result of an ill-intentioned group whose nefarious impact must be reduced or eliminated.

The dictator ever speaks of the importance of rule of law. "Everyone must follow the law," says the dictator, forgetting perhaps that it was he who overthrew the existing law and constitution, forgetting that he has said time and again that it is he who now makes the law. No matter: everyone must follow the law.

The dictator is right to recognize that democracy is under siege everywhere these days. He sees himself perhaps as a kind of fighter for democracy. Yet what the regime is peddling has very little resemblance to the range of ideas surrounding democracy outside of Thailand. The regime has focused most of it "reconciliation" efforts on teaching Thai people about true democracy. The military intervention last year was not for the military to seize power but to build up democracy. True democracy does not come from elections but from a duly appointed government that saves the people from the dirty business of politics. That's the core proposition of military-style reconciliation: people have to reconcile themselves to a true democracy that ends any hope of popular sovereignty.

The dictator was wrong to think, though, that a "democratic" coup would open doors to foreign governments. It has been a hard go. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs seems to have had a single purpose since the coup: explain to the world why the coup was necessary and how everything has returned to normal. Repeatedly hurt, the regime has attacked statements made by other governments about the state of Thailand. The dictator "prime minister" has only been received by ASEAN governments and

China. It has moved closer to, not without irony, North Korea.

The lifeblood of dictatorship is to be taken seriously on its own terms, to have people forget how the power was gotten. It thrives when people start talking about details or implications of this or that policy, of this or that constitutional provision, the merits of this or that law. Once the population gets involved in the nitty-gritty of activities the regime has brought about, it legitimizes indirectly but powerfully the core illegality of the regime.

* * *

Thailand has been a captive subject to a gross absurdity since the military seized power in 2014. It has all been a ridiculous spectacle, a ludicrous drama. The cruelest episode has been about the draft constitution. The regime handpicks legal "experts" who draft a constitution that is plainly undemocratic, perhaps intentionally so. The constitution is passed on for approval to another handpicked body, the National Reform Council. If passed, the junta could stay in power indefinitely, albeit less directly. But as it turns out, the junta itself lobbied to have the draft constitution voted down, perhaps fearing it would fail to pass in a promised nationwide referendum. Then the junta appoints a new constitution-drafting committee, and the farce begins again.

The regime controlled all the factors going into the constitutional drafting and should be held solely responsible. That the constitution didn't pass the National Reform Council, that the junta sought to bring it down, should have been a repudiation of the regime and ought to have brought jeering crowds out into the streets. Out of good sportsmanship, the junta should have stepped down. But the dictator will not step down. He and his motley production will absurdly go on and on.

An anonymous satirical rendering of the leader of the junta in "glorious leader" style floated on Facebook six months after the coup. The words read: "Congratulations to Gen. Prayud Chan-o-cha." On the flag it says, "Returning Happiness to [your] Followers."

And this seems to be a function of Thai-style dictatorship following a polite coup: overwhelm and exhaust the captive audience with an onslaught of daily absurdities. The opposition began in anger following the coup, but that was followed with frustration and sometimes even mocking amusement. But after some time, there arose a feeling of bewilderment, then boredom, and finally now it is silence. To look upon this absurd spectacle after 15 months can physically sicken and psychologically cripple. The political folly that is Thailand has gone beyond the merely absurd or ludicrous. It has now become utterly grotesque.

Even writing this hurts. Maybe I'll return to my silence.

Understanding Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation Mechanism in Cambodia

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Background of Cambodia

Cambodia is located in mainland Southeast Asia. It covers an area of 181,035 km^2 and is divided into 25 provinces. The population in 2013 was 15.14 million (WB 2015). Cambodia shares a border with three countries (Fig. 1) and the mainland is divided into three main parts (the middle, the mountains, and the coast). The flat areas are in the middle of the country around Tonle Sap Lake, which are the main areas for rice cultivation. The country is surrounded by plateau and mountainous areas, which are mostly located in the north and northeast of the country including the Dangrek, Cardamom, and the Elephant mountain ranges. These areas are useful for agro-industrial crops such as rubber, cassava, cashews, and so on. The third region is the coastal zone located in the southwest of the country, which is beneficial for some kinds of agro-industrial crops particularly oil palm. Some parts of this coastal area are covered by mangrove forest (Nguyen and Shaw 2010; RGC 2001; UNDP 2013a).

As a tropical country, Cambodia has sunshine almost all the year with high average temperatures, and has two distinct seasons namely the dry and the rainy seasons. The rainy season lasts for six months from May to October, with south-westerly winds accompanying clouds that bring around 75% to 80% of the annual rainfall, often in spectacular intense bursts for an hour at a time with fantastic lightening displays. The other half of the year is the dry season, which runs from November to April where average temperatures range from 27 to 40°C. The most comfortable and coolest period in the country is between October and January (Nguyen and Shaw 2010; RGC 2001).

Cambodia is known as a developing country, which experienced a long civil war and "dark age" (Pol Pot regime between 1975–79). It is also an agrarian country where more than 80% of the total population live in rural areas with about 52% living in the central plains and 30% around the Tonle Sap Lake.

**Fig. 1** Administrative Map of Cambodia
Source: Nationasonline.org

Fig. 2 Cambodian Land Cover Change between 2004–13
Data Source: OpenDevelopment Cambodia

Due to the substantial destruction of the country's physical infrastructure during the civil war, Cambodia still faces many social and economic issues as its continues to develop (Nguyen and Shaw 2010; RGC 2001; UNDP 2013a).

In term of economic factors, UNDP (2013a) has demonstrated that Cambodia has experienced strong growth rates during the last decade. The Cambodian economy is estimated to have increased by 7.6% in 2013. According to the Ministry of Economics and Finance (MEF) cited by UNDP (2013a), the current annual GDP per capita is US$1,036 compared to around US$200 in 1992. This growth will help Cambodia to become a lower-middle income nation in the near future.

Along with growth and the process of national restoration, many natural resources have been used leading to significant changes in term of land used during the last decade. In 2004, for instance, forest areas largely covered Cambodia, but those areas have gradually declined and been replaced by agricultural and barren land (Fig. 2).

Contemporary Climate Related Issues in Cambodia

Cambodia is one of the least developed countries in the region and is more vulnerable to climate change impacts due to its limited adaptive capacity (UNDP 2013b; Yusuf and Francisco 2010). Cambodia is affected by climate changes in four ways: an increase in temperature; a change in rainfall patterns; a high prevalence of floods and droughts; and

a rise in sea levels (Nang *et al.* 2014). According to Baran *et al.* (2009) the temperature of Cambodia is expected to increase between 0.3 to 0.6°C by 2025. McSweeney *et al.* (2008) has similarly confirmed that average temperature of Cambodia is projected to increase between 0.7 to 2.7°C by 2060, and between 1.4 to 4.3°C by 2090 (Fig. 3).

Cambodian rainfall has not shown any consistent increase or decrease since 1960s (Fig. 4), but this is projected to increase on a magnitude of one-day and five-day rainfalls of up to 54 mm and 84 mm respectively by 2090 (*ibid.*).

However, Diepart (2014) contended that even though there is no significant variation in terms of the amount of rainfall, there are changes in relation to rainfall patterns. He argued that before 1930s rain started falling down in May and increased to its peak in July, then declined until November. But later in the 1980s, less rain started falling in May and continued increasing to its peak in September, before declining in November (Fig. 5). Changes in the rainfall period can lead to the failure of agricultural crops due to a lack of water supply with more loss and damage due to heavy rain during the late crop calendar in September.

Although there are no clear statistics that indicate the current impacts of rising sea levels on coastal areas of Cambodia, there are lots of concerns regarding this problem. McSweeney *et al.* (2008) have claimed that sea-levels in the region are projected to increase between 21 to 52 cm by 2090. With this significant increase, it will bring about more risks of severe flooding, and effects on fresh water

Fig. 3 The Projection of Temperature in Cambodia
Source: McSweeney *et al.* (2008)

Fig. 4 The Projection of Cambodian Precipitation
Source: McSweeney *et al.* (2008)

Fig. 5 Change in Rainfall Patterns: Chrey Bak (Kg Chhnang Province)
Source: Diepart (2014)

quality in the coastal zones.

Cambodia has experienced more extreme floods and droughts during the last decades. According to the National Committee for Disaster Management (NCDM) cited by Heng (2014), flood intensity trends have increased between 2000 and 2013. In 2013, for example, 20 of 25 provinces of Cambodia were affected by floods (Fig. 6).

Consequently, lives and crops were lost and people were seriously affected by vector born diseases. The trend of drought frequency has also increased in the same period (*ibid.*). In 2012, for instance, 14 of 25 provinces of Cambodia were affected by drought (Fig. 7), which lead to crop failure and land degradation.

In relation to losses and damages, NCDM (2013) confirmed that between 1996–2013, 2,050 people were killed due to disasters. About 1.7 million ha (accounting for 67% of total losses) of paddy field were damaged by floods, while around 0.77 million ha (31%) were devastated by droughts. Physical infrastructure included 45,372 house, 194 hospitals, schools, roads, and irrigation systems which were also affected. Average annual economic loss of Cambodia was $16.1 million from floods affects and $7 million from drought (UNISDR and WB 2010).

This current situation means that Cambodia is confronting many potential climate related hazards including floods, drought, windstorms, landslides, and diseases. Due to the greater frequency and intensity of these climate risks, the livelihood of communities have been severely affected and are at high risk (CDRI 2012; Nguyen and Shaw 2010; RGC 2013; Sreng 2013). In particular, the impacts of climate change affect the livelihood of poor communities leading to serious problems relating to food security, ill health, and a loss of livelihoods activities. Simultaneously, there is an added burden on the government to achieve its goals of poverty eradication and sustainable development.

Fig. 6 Flood Situation and Its Intensity in Cambodia
Source: NCDM (2013)

Fig. 7 Drought Situation and Its Intensity in Cambodia
Source: NCDM (2013)

Table 1 Key National Policies

Policies/ Strategies	Description	Goals
National Adaptation Program of Action (NAPA) -2006	39 priority projects (focus on improving agriculture, water resource management, coastal protection and human health)	Development of Cambodia towards a green, low carbon, climate resilient, equitable and sustainable society
Cambodia Climate Change Strategic Plan (CCCSP)-2013	Overall strategic plan comprising inputs from 9 different ministries	
Strategic National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction	Strengthening the disaster management system in Cambodia	
Decentralization and Deconcentration (D&D)-2002	Empower local government	
National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP)	Overall national development and poverty reduction	
Rectangular Strategies-2004	Growth, Employment, Efficiency and Equity	
Cambodian Climate Change Alliance (involvement of NGOs and development partners)	Climate change projects have been integrated into development programs.	

National Policies and Mechanism for Climate Change

In response to these issues, the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) developed its climate change adaptation policy (CCAP), which aims to increase the roles and responsibilities of relevant ministries and institutions from a national to grassroot level (CDRI 2012; RGC 2006; Sreng 2013). The establishment of these policies, strategic plans and framework is a commitment of the RGC that aims at assisting communities to better adapt to climate related hazards and contribute to fulfilling global targets in addressing climate change issues (RGC 2013). Key national polices related to climate change adaptation are included in Table 1.

Even though these national policies and frameworks have been established, the number of communities, which are affected annually by the issues of climate change, has proliferated leading to more concerns about future impacts (D'Agostino and Sovacool 2011; Ros *et al.* 2011).

Way Forward

In order to minimize the negative impacts of climate change, strengthening adaptive capacity of individual and institution is a key. By way of conclusion, to achieve this long-term goal, I suggest that the following potential areas be taken into account and put into action:

1. Encourage more studies on climate change related topics. Empirical findings should be available in Khmer language and be distributed to all relevant stakeholders.
2. Change communities' perceptions/attitude through enhancing their knowledge and understanding about climate change impacts. This can help them to be more aware and cautious about contemporary issues related to climate change.
3. Enhance community-based natural resource management through providing communities with full authority, support, and incentives to protect their livelihood dependent resources in a sustainable way. Policy legislation needs to be strictly enforced without any discrimination.
4. Provide farmers with irrigation systems, water resource management tools, and introduce them to more climate resilient crops. Local seed improvement should be promoted.
5. Disseminate climate change policies to the general public and highly consider community's input in policy establishment and adjustment.

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Researching the Indonesia's 1965 Tragedy Today: A View from within

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Fifty years have passed, but the so-called 1965 tragedy in Indonesia remains an unsolved puzzle, making it one of the darkest spots in the country's contemporary history. Today, the challenges to researching the tragedy have emanated as much from ideological as from psychological questions.

In this essay, I attempt to portray the collective mental state that some of my fellow Indonesian citizens have continued to hold in regards to the 1965 tragedy and hence to show the gaps in the ways the Indonesian general public and (foreign) scholars have perceived the tragedy. I argue that, while both the general public and scholars have suggested an approach they assume to be the "right one" as to voice out what they respectively believe to be "the truth" about the tragedy, an inclusive middle way is necessary. Researching the Indonesia's 1965 tragedy today requires an understanding of the overall psychological setting of the Indonesian people in the long-term aftermath of the event. It is crucial to employ a methodology that is considerate and proportional of different perspectives, for example by taking balanced coverage of both preceding and following historical events and factors involved, and by re-defining some of the so-far taken-for-granted

terms, such as "victims" and "perpetrators."

The so-called 1965 tragedy in Indonesia was a series of bloody events that resulted from ideological and political contestation during the 1960s. Existing studies refer to the tragedy as a series of killings of thousands of people—some claim a total of 500,000—as an impact of power contestation between the Indonesian Communists on the one hand, and the Liberals and the Army on the other hand. The pretext to the mass killing was the murder of six Indonesian Army generals by the presidential armed guards, who allegedly operated under the auspices of the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) in the cities of Jakarta and Yogyakarta on the night of September 30, 1965. The Indonesian Army under the command of Lieutenant General Soeharto saw this murder as an attempt to carry out a coup d'etat and immediately launched a military counter-attack against the insurgent armed forces. However, the Army's conquest of the rebelling military on October 5, 1965 was not the end of the bloody drama. In the years that followed, retaliation was paid back against the Communists by different groups of people who allegedly moved under the commands of the Army. Hundreds of thousands of the members, sympathizers, and leaders of the PKI were reportedly killed or imprisoned without being tried between October 1965 and 1966 (Schonhardt 2012; Cribb and Ford 2010).

This very last episode of mass killings that came after the crush of the PKI by the Army on October 5, 1965 is, however, excluded by Indonesian official history. It remains a subject of intense study exclusively by foreign scholars and few Indonesian historians alike. The series of killings itself has spurred various theories about the persons, plots, purposes, and periodization involved. Scholarly attention to study the topic in academia outside of Indonesia has progressed from void historiography (see Cribb 1990) to various kinds of scholarly analyses including encyclopedia entries (McGregor 2009) to a model that is more popular and engaging such as semi-documentary films (for example, Lemelson 2007; Oppenheimer 2012; 2014). However in Indonesia, efforts to re-examine the tragedy cannot yet free researchers from clumsy reactions, intimidation, and even terror.

Reactionary Vigilantes and the Silent General Public

In the past couple of years, cases of suppression, intimidation and attacks by vigilantes in Indonesia have become more and more intense against those who either held a discussion, carried out advocacy projects, or conducted research on the issues related to the 1965 tragedy. Although counter-reactions have started to occur among university students recently (see, for example, Solidaritas.net, March 11, 2015), public opinions about such attacks and intimidation generally remain ambivalent.

Two of the most recent cases of intimidation by vigilantes took place on 23 and 24 of February 2015, respectively. A number of people forcefully renounced and revoked two public seminars on the topics related to the 1965 tragedy that were held in two different Indonesian towns: in Solo, Central Java, and in Bukittinggi, West Sumatra. In Solo, the seminar was organized by what calls itself "Joint Secretariat for the 1965 Victims in Surakarta," and aimed to discuss a health service program for mental and physical rehabilitation of the elderly (Tempo.co.id, February 24, 2015). In Bukitttinggi, the dispersed seminar was held by an organization called "Foundation of the Murder Victim Researchers," which aimed to present research on the life of the people who survived the mass killings and imprisonment 30 years after 1965 (Tempo.co.id, February 23, 2015). In both cases, the spokesmen of local police defended the vigilantes' violent attacks by emphasizing that the seminar organizers did not have a permit for organizing the events.

In previous cases, attacks and intimidations also led to the cancellation of a number of gathering, discussions, and seminars organized by some community groups and university students in Java. In October 2014, the screening of British cineaste Joshua Oppenheimer's semi documentary "The Look of Silence" at the Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta had to be called off because of "threats of enforced intrusion from vigilantes from outside of the campus," according to a university internal security officer. Several months earlier, also in Yogyakarta, a rotary meeting of people who called themselves "families of the victims of 1965 massacre" was crushed by a vigilante group, who argued that the meeting could "stimulate the re-rise of Communism in Indonesia." Meanwhile, in the cities of Malang and Surabaya, both in East Java, authorities of several universities repudiated the screening of Oppenheimer's documentaries and the seminars on Dutch historian Harry Poeze's Indonesian-edition book on a West-Sumatra born socialist thinker and activist of the early twenti-

eth century, Tan Malaka. Many more examples of attacks and intimidation can be presented, but all in all they shared several points in common.

First, identification by the media of the vigilantes who crushed university forums on the 1965 tragedy often only addressed the point that they had operated under the banner of Islamic radical groups, but no such identification was ever definite. Even if naming of such organizations as Front Pembela Islam (FPI, Islam Defender Front) and Forum Umat Islam (FUI, Islam People's Forum) did occasionally take place, no further details and official statements were ever publicized. Moreover, the concerned attacks can hardly be found in the next days' news, making them a one-time media blow, mostly on-line.

Second, official statements issued by local police on such attacks always pointed to the failure of the organizers of the seminars or gatherings to present written permits to hold such assemblies. It is common that the official statements gave no word on the attacks or the attackers. Given the tone of the statements, one might assume that it was actually the police themselves who had backed up the attacks and the vigilantes.

Third, generally, university authorities remained silent about limiting the freedom of speech of their *civitas academica*. In the case of the attack at Gadjah Mada University Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, the rector of the university immediately issued a condemning statement, which did not seem to go beyond the campus walls. In another case, at Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University, the rector of the university himself attempted to prevent students from screening the documentary while arguing that the movie "had not got a license for public screening from the government." Activists of the student organizations who administered the screening argued back by saying that the Indonesian Human Rights Commission "had endorsed the film." They said the rector's attempt to disperse the forum had resulted from intimidation by vigilantes under the FUI banner who, guarded by police officers, had crowded just outside of the campus auditorium hall where the event was to take place (Solidaritas.net, *op.cit.*).

Shared Resentment

Generally speaking, these cases of attacks, intrusion, and intimidation show a degree of reluctance by the university and state authorities to take an active role in protecting the freedom of speech of citizens especially when freedom was to be used in relation with issues that dealt with the 1965 tragedy. However, the silence and reluctance are not exclusively attributive to any authority group in particular. Rather, it is the general public. It is just a common

fact that no reactions from public figures, political or religious leaders are heard that condemn the attacks and intimidation on those who work on the 1965 topic today. As in the case Bukittinggi, West Sumatra, only human rights activists took legal measures against such attacks although what happened after that is not known to the public. Therefore, beyond the resentment of university authorities and the police's official statements that tend to defend attackers and blame forum organizers, I notice there is a shared feeling of resentment of the general Indonesian public when dealing with the 1965 issues. I suggest that it is the feeling of collective fright of (imposed) impact of the 1965 tragedy, be it on the "victims" or on the "perpetrators." For some, it is also the feeling of collective self-defense of the political movements that many seemed to be conscious enough of the meaning and consequences only very recently, not during the time period of the event.

I also observe a shared feeling of resentment in some details in different cases. First of all, there are elements inside the universities and Indonesian society at large that do not want the 1965 tragedy to be discussed, researched, or "revived" in the public discourse today for reasons relating to "social harmony." In the recent cases of attacks and intimidation, thus rumors have it, some individuals in the campus faculties and internal security themselves texted a message to the local police commanders and the leaders of vigilantes informing them about the events of the 1965 tragedy that were to be organized in the campus. In another case, a young colleague who was presenting a research project that aims to investigate the involvement of several prominent university professors in the 1965 tragedy, received very sharp *ad hominem* comments from a senior staff member who, while questioning the young colleague's religious orientation (*sic*!), expressed his concern about "the threat to harmony and unity" should the issue be raised again today. Still in another different case, a senior professor, who experienced the period of the tragedy in the late 1960s as a teenager, told me that the mass killings were what history was supposed to be because "the choice was to kill or be killed by the Communists."

During my doctoral research on the history of schoolteacher training, I received clumsy reactions from several informants whom I wanted to interview. In Bandung, an elderly male informant struck me right at opening his house door by a high-toned remark: "No interview about the PKI!" while I had come for his schooling experience at the Hollands Inlandse Kweekschool (HIK) in the 1930s. In Ungaran, Central Java, a woman informant waited for her husband's nods every time when I queried details of her youth experience as a student of the Female

Teachers' Training School in their 1960s, just to make sure that I did not lead her to talk about the 1965 tragedy. In Jakarta, instead of asking me for an off-the-record interview, a male informant wasted my 90-minute recording cassette before telling his harsh experience as head of the teachers' bureau at the split Department of Basic Education during the tumultuous 1960s. The feeling of reluctance of the general public in Indonesia to touch upon again the topic of the 1965 tragedy is thus rooted in different individual reasons. Yet, I observe one thing in common: some people do not seem to understand why it is necessary to deal again with the dark past they themselves had not expected to happen while now they want to move on. Some others just cannot admit that the comfortable country as they perceive it can be ruined by "land of might-have-been" realities.

It seems to me that the feeling of resentment is deeply embedded and widely spread among people of different social and ideological backgrounds. It encompasses the three categories of social groups Robert Cribb identifies as having taken an active role in spreading hatred against the Communists, i.e. the Army, orthodox Islam, and "the conservative wing of the secular Indonesian Nationalist Party"—which is there no more (Cribb 2009, 289–291). The feeling of resentment today concerns not only those who were in power or politically involved during the 1960s but also the "nobody commoners" who passed through the years knowing hardly anything about what was going on but having to experience impact of the series of events both prior and after the September 30, 1965 murder drama. The feeling of resentment is indeed overwhelming.

The Researchers' Challenges

What is all this supposed to imply? I argue that the recent cases of attacks, forced intrusion, and clumsy reactions were not necessarily State-driven although the Decree No. XXV of the Indonesian Temporary Parliament of 1966 on the banning of the PKI and the Communist ideology did still play effective (TAP MPRS No. XXV/MPRS 1966) and the Indonesian National Archive (ANRI) still puts off releasing 50-year old classified documents on the 1965 case (Merdeka.com, March 11, 2015), so does the Gadjah Mada University Archive Bureau (interview with former head of UGM Archive Bureau, March 2015). I also argue that although orthodox Islam has historically stood in the front line of refusal to deal with the 1965 tragedy (Cribb 2009, 290), and although Islamic organizations (such as Forum Umat Islam [FUI] and Front Pembela Islam [FPI]) involved in recent attacks and intimidations against human

rights activists must have shared the ideological undertones for the banning of Communism and related issues, the public feeling of resentment at dealing with 1965 today does not exclusively have to do with them. Rather, the silent general public, reluctant university intellectuals and the ambivalent media are indeed reflecting on an overall mental state of the Indonesian nation, which has its own historical rationale and explanation of the 1965 tragedy, which shares an equal place of importance to be counted in any narrative about the tragedy.

Saskia E. Wieringa rightly says that "[a]lmost all people [. . .] in Indonesia have a story to tell about the [1965] period" (Wieringa 2014, 3). This statement is important to be kept in mind when we aim to hear a plurality of voices. As the 1965 tragedy refers to the bloody dynamics related to ideological contestation of the 1960s, in order to present the different voices of 1965 tragedy, studies should explore the entirety of events preceding and following the September 30 murder of Army generals, not just the killings in the aftermath. The concept of "victim," for example, needs to be defined not only to represent those who experienced the New Order imprisonment or lost family members in the aftermath of the September 30 murder of Army generals, but also those who survived tortures and also lost family members because of the Communists' harsh propaganda in the period before September 30 as some of those who opposed discussions on the 1965 tragedy have indicated.

To present a plurality of voices thus means to create balanced and proportional spaces to understand different versions of experiences and facts from within the inside. Because individual testimonies cannot naturally be free of any bias that mixes between factual experience and personal opinion— I notice some Indonesian researchers even confuse their personal emotion with informants' narratives— to present a plurality of voices also means to do away with judging one particular party while imposing tribunal agendas on the other. Unless a balanced and proportional landscape of historical evidence is achieved and equally shared by both of those who propose and oppose investigations of the tragedy, any agenda for court of justice or reconciliation will remain a political absurdity, which only complicates rather than eases the issues.

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Interview with former head of the Gadjah Mada University Archive Bureau, March 2015.

Youth, Voice, and Methodology: Learning (with) Young Migrants in a "Temporary Shelter Area"

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"Shocking images of drowned Syrian boy show tragic plight of refugees" is a headline of *The Guardian* on September 3, 2015.[1] Reading this news reminded me of my engagements with young migrants along the Thai-Burmese borderland during 2008–11 when I continuously—almost every week—went to work as a researcher, a teacher, and someone who hoped to offer a little help.[2] For three years, I was also teaching in what the Thai state calls a "temporary shelter area" named Blae Koh, as well as conducting research on youth and music therein.[3] It was the plight of those displaced that have driven me to directly learn from them since 2000.[4]

Going back to the borderland again in 2008, one of a few main questions that guided me was: How should one understand the displaced's socialization of the young? I was attempting to come to terms with the intertwining relations between identity, music, and socialization as well as ways in which such relations affect the displaced's conceptions and experiences of "home," especially those of the young Karens in Blae Koh.[5] This short article aims to discuss a methodological conundrum of the nexus between the notions of youth and voice.

Bambi Schieffelin defines socialization as an "interactive process between knowledgeable members and novices (children) who are themselves active contributors to the meanings and outcomes of interactions with others" (1990, 17). But in the case of displaced people, such is not the case; as every-

one, old or young, "are learning how, or are being (re)socialized, to live in a new way."[6] Focusing on the young as parts of an ethnic nationality who were "unhooked from the reinforcing context of 'their' place" (Diehl 2002, 8), my research then aimed to illuminate these "new ways" of the exceptional lives—lives that had been forced to leave home.

The notion of the young is not easily settled, however. Not only did my research agree with Bluebond-Langner and Korbin (2007) that a continued problematization of the nature and development of an individual must be maintained, but also the definitions of the terms *child, youth,* and *childhood* cannot be easily settled.[7] Hence, "youngness" was treated in my research with awareness that there was always a tension between youth as a chronological age as opposed to as a social construct.[8] In effect, the diversities that distinguished one young person from another were "as important and as significant as the commonalities they might share" (James and James 2004, 16). It is critical to retain the tension as an existence called youth encompasses both a physical aspect and cultural codes signified by it. In other words, the young need to be treated "very special" (i.e., need more care and protection) since many of them cannot "take care" of themselves, especially the very young. Because of this physical condition, the young are often considered as the "incomplete" of the grown-up. They are on the way toward adulthood and are measured against "an excessively ide-

alized version of adult autonomy, independence, and maturity." The younger they are, the more innocent they are–in need of protection.[9] Yet, "taking care" is as much a cultural act as—if not more than—it is a physical imperative. But the socialization theory generally relies only on the physiognomy of youth without being adequately cognizant that vulnerability is a cultural meaning. When the young are treated as signifiers of vulnerability without any qualifications, it disregards their potential and ability to be powerful social actors and cultural producers.[10] In other words, vulnerability is a cultural sign that each society enacts and reenacts on the existence of the young. We, therefore, have witnessed many internationally ardent campaigns to protect young people. The young are "constituted as…agent[s] or… catalyst[s] by which the survival of the whole community is secured"; they signify "fragility of human life and its future" and, often, the words they speak "lie encapsulated the innocence and authenticity of the human condition, fast being lost to the adult world."[11] They are the cultural bearers of each ethnicity, society, or nation. "[I]n times of conflict, war, and social upheaval," therefore, "children can become bearers of huge social anxieties" (Dubinsky 2007, 145). The grown-up often forget how much cultural weight children "have to carry on their frail shoulders" (ibid., 144).

Nonetheless, the body of research exploring the young's lives most familiar to anthropologists is, by and large, the literature on socialization. For this body of knowledge, which perceives the young through an adult lens by focusing on the adult's influence on the young "achieving" it, the young's activities are casted as auxiliary or subordinate. For instance, in his "Why don't anthropologists like Children?" Lawrence A. Hirschfeld aptly articulates: "Socialization theory—the idea that adult dispositions are achieved largely through adult interventions in children's lives—… obstructs the appreciation of the contribution children make to the acquisition of cultural sensibilities" (Hirschfeld 2002, 614). As "adults-in-the-making," the young have both been treated, on the one hand, as "culturally incompetent creatures, who are, at their most interesting, simply 'appendages to adult society'" (ibid., 613; Cf. James and Prout 1997). On the other hand, they are perceived as possessing no mastery of their own culture, but in transition to culture—only adults "own" the means of cultural reproduction (Hirschfeld 2002, 614). In this regard, although there has been the need to listen to the young's voices, "all too often those voices are silenced" by images of the young that "cling to the more traditional, developmental discourse" of the young's incompetence, rather than competence, as social actors (James 2007, 266). As a consequence, discussion of the young is "typically transformed into talk about *adults* and the ways they organize the environment" in which the young develop "so as to facilitate the acquisition of the cultural competence appropriate to the society in which they live" (Hirschfeld 2002, 614).

With this kind of awareness, my research was a part of an emerging anthropology of children and childhoods, which not only incorporates children's views and perspectives, but also dovetails well with anthropology's long-standing orientations toward emic view and multivocity—hence, contributing to an attempt to understanding kaleidoscopic landscape of human societies under studied.[12] This, in fact,

My classroom when I was teaching in the camp.

should not come as a surprise, given anthropology's experience of researching, theorizing, and writing about "the other"—when the young, especially the very young, have more often than not been considered as otherness to adults (James 2007, 262). Like a few studies in this regard, my research project on youth and music, in effect, "move[ed] away from relying on statements by adults about children's worlds and experiences and, instead, toward considering statements by children themselves"[13]—surely, not without a lot of obstacles. The act of listening to the young was accompanied by awareness on the social and cultural constraints in operation at the time of listening (Bluebond-Langner and Korbin 2007). Moreover, the study was well aware of three critically interlocking issues when conducting this kind of research—"giving voice to the young": homogenization of "the young" is greatly problematic; readily accessible and apparent voice is impossible; and the young's active collaboration in the research process is, thus a necessity and, highly productive (James 2007).

First, the study did not clump the young together as members of a category and disregarding their races, classes, and ethnicities, among others, so that a singular category was not "made to masquerade for all children" (*ibid.*, 262). Had we homogenized them, we would have not attempted to give them "greater audibility and visibility as social actors inhabiting a variety of different social worlds." Moreover, the young would have simply been disempowered; and "their voices rendered silent once more."[14] Second, because the young's voices and concerns are not immediately accessible and apparent. There are always complexities of the ways in which children's interests are represented: by whom their voices are represented, and for what purposes. I was therefore well aware that as the writer of my text, I, an adult "retain[ed] control over which children's voices" were "given prominence and over which parts of what children have to say" were to be presented (*ibid.*, 265). Or it is, in James Clifford's words, "the ethnographer who in the end assumes an executive, editorial position" (Clifford 1988, 51). Precisely, because of this complexity, the third issue of the young taking part as co-researchers becomes critical. The whole question of "voice" in conducting research assumes, implicitly, the young's active collaboration in the research process: a research is carried out with the young *more* than on the young.[15] This is because, by presenting the young's perspectives, youth research is not only about making the young's voices "heard in this very literal sense," but also about exploring the forms and characteristics that the "voice" gets enunciated. Such forms and characteristics, in turn, constitute the subjectivity of

each young person: "how that voice both shapes and reflects the ways in which…[the young are]… understood, and therefore the discourse within which…[the young]…find themselves within any society" (James 2007, 266).

With all these theoretical and methodological orientations, my study on youth and music in a "temporary shelter area" was open for the so-called unsettling notions: for instances, the young are perceived not only aggressed against, but also as aggressor (e.g., child soldiers [Rosen 2007]); the young are not only acted upon by adults, but are also "agents of political change and cultural interpretation and change" (Bluebond-Langner and Korbin 2007, 242). Such complexity informed the direction of the research project so as to ensure that the young were then ascribed with agency and competency. Acknowledging the young's conscious decisions to participate in all kinds of activities was thus crucial. As "thousands of children and youth caught up in armed warfare who are committing horrible crimes," how should they be seen: "as innocent victims of political circumstance who should be protected and forgiven," or "as moral agents who should be held responsible for their actions?" (Rosen 2007, 304) Hence, by not acknowledging the young's conscious decision to participate in such violence, "with all the attendant positive and negative pressures," we are inclined to fail to respect the young and to recognize their agency.[16]

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Notes

1 September 2, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/02/shocking-image-of-drowned-syrian-boy-shows-tragic-plight-of-refugees. Accessed September 3, 2015.

2 In this article, the Republic of the Union of Myanmar is called "Burma/Myanmar" in order to acknowledge the official name, Myanmar, as well as to emphasize traces of the Burmese junta's attempt to Burmanize the whole social fabric of this land, which has also had a deep impact on both a variety of peoples and spaces along the Thai-Burmese/Myanmar border. Nonetheless, for reason of brevity, the term Thai-Burmese is used rather than the longer formula of Thai-Burmese/Myanmar.

3 See my first research experiences in the "temporary shelter area" during 2000–01 in Decha (2003; 2007). There are two reasons for using quotation marks for the term "temporary shelter area." First, the term temporary negates a reality that

shelter areas along the Thai-Burmese borderland were officially established in 1984 and hence have been in existence for 30 years. An entire generation was born and raised during that time. Hence, the term temporary does not capture this reality, though one could understand that it is the Thai state's intention to emphasize the temporariness of the residence of those staying in these spaces and on Thai soil. Second, people who have come to be involved with these shelter areas call them "camps." In 2001, while I was interviewing the Ministry of Interior's (MOI) personnel who supervised a shelter area, I unconsciously called the shelter "camp" and was corrected by the MOI personnel almost every time I uttered the word "camp." Moreover, since Thailand is not a signatory of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees as well as the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, the term "refugee" is not part of the official lexicon of the Thai state, which designated forcibly displaced peoples from Burma/Myanmar, as "people fleeing fighting." Nonetheless, although the term "refugee camp" is not officially used by the Thai state's apparatuses, it has been used by a variety of people who have come to be involved with these shelter areas (see more details in Decha 2007).

4 See Decha (2003; 2006; 2010a).

5 See Decha (2010b; 2013; 2015).

6 Diehl (2002, 16); Cf. Tefferi (2007) for discussion on tension adolescence encounter during the process of achieving social adulthood simultaneously as gaining assistance through presenting themselves as children.

7 Bluebond-Langner and Korbin (2007, 245). See also other articles in this special volume of *American Anthropologist* 109(2).

8 Cf. e.g., Chatty *et al.* (2005); James (2007); James and Prout (1997).

9 Rosen (2007); see also e.g., Hirschfeld (2002); James (2007); Jenks (1996).

10 See, e.g., Black (1994); Bluebond-Langner and Korbin (2007); Christensen (2000); James (2007); Rosen (2007).

11 Christensen (2000, 42); James (2007, 261); see also Jenks (1996, 73); James and Prout (1997); Cf. Clifford (1988); Clifford and Marcus (1986).

12 See e.g., Bluebond-Langner and Korbin (2007).

13 Bluebond-Langner and Korbin (2007, 243). However, in children's statements, my research project was aware of: "selectivity of representation, uncritical quoting, polyphony of voices, whose point is being made" (e.g., mine or that of the children that I studied), whose agenda is being served (mine, children's, or those of the humanitarian agencies in the "temporary shelter area") (*ibid.*). In other words, I was well aware of the extent to which "the rhetorical power that 'the voice of the child' wields" (James 2007, 268).

14 James (2007): see also James and James (2004). In R. Morgan's research (2005, 183), we learn that the young people interviewed in that study asserted that they wanted to be treated "as individuals, not an age group."

15 Priscilla Alderson (2000) who conducted research on children's rights is one among those in the movement toward regarding children as researchers themselves: "as people who can carry out their own research projects into areas that are pertinent to their everyday lives" (James 2007, 262). Yet, Allison James reminds us of two issues: first, what Clifford Geertz calls "ethnographic ventriloquism: the claim to speak from within," and, second, "text positivism" and "dispersed authorship" which seem to assume that research done by children is an authentic representation of children's voice (*ibid.*; see also Geertz 1988, 145),

16 Bluebond-Langner and Korbin (2007, 243); see also Rosen (2007). Yet, it should be noted as Rosen (*ibid.*) articulates in her study on child soldier that when war is seen as good, greater agency is ascribed to children's participation in war than in times when it is seen as evil. The children are seen as a hero in the former, whereas they are considered as exploited victims in need of protection in the latter.

Modern Islamic Book Collection in Indonesian Language

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LIBRARY

Jakarta has been hosting an "Islamic Book Fair" since 2001 which has become an established annual event. The scale of the event has been growing year by year and there has been an endless number of visitors such as students visiting as part of their school event or groups from various regions. It also involves events such as book reviews and discussions, as well as such corporate booths as shops dealing with veils, Islamic bankings, and Halal cosmetics, which are quite successful. Lately, the book fair started to travel around dozens of suburban cities all over the country. In the beginning, 70 publishers were participating in the fair, however by 2015, the number grew to 92. They display and sell various kinds of publications ranging from treasured dictionaries, books on the ideologies of armed struggle activists to children's books.

The CSEAS Indonesia Islam Collection is composed of Islam related publications that have been in the market over the last few decades. It covers more than 50 publishers, about 2,000 volumes and includes some journals. Inspired by the 900 religious book (Kitab) collection at KITLV (the Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land-en Volkenkunde/Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies), the CSEAS Collection targets publications in Bahasa written in Roman characters (buku), instead of Kitab written in Arabic characters. Due to budgetary restrictions, the collection is yet exhaustive, but the library is trying to collect as large a selection of books as possible. Some books are purchased at book fairs, major nationwide chain stores such as Gramedia, and at Islam specialty bookshops, represented by Walisongo in central Jakarta.

Other titles are directly purchased from the publishers. Most publishers offer some discounts when a direct purchase. More importantly, however, some of the books issued by rural publishers are rarely sold at book fairs and franchise stores.

Let's briefly review the transitions in publication trends, based on years of foundation as well as the names of cities where the publishers in the collection are located. The one who had set a precedent for Islam books (buku Islam) was Alma'arif established in Bandung in 1948, which was then followed by Diponegoro. Famous as Kitab publishers, Karya Toha Putra (Semarang) and Menara Kudus (Kudus), both located in the north coast region of Central Java and have also issued classical books on Islamic jurisprudence in Indonesian language written in Roman characters. They started up publishing the Koran with Indonesian translation as well as booklets for prayer with abstracted lines from the Koran, and played the role of familiarizing general interpretations of Islam for the public.

The Islamic publication market rapidly expanded in 1980s. It was again in Bandung, in which the two publishers, Pustaka and Mizan were established by the graduates of an elite school, Bandung Institute of Technology (Institut Teknologi Bandung). Reflecting the idealism of the emerging Islamic Movements centered on students, both publishers issued translated versions of various philosophical books as well as research books in Arabic or in English. Their publication included a wide range of works by such authors as Ali Shariati, who had received education in France and was an ideologue of the Iranian Revolution, Sayyid Qutb, a militant intellectual of the Mus-

lim Brotherhood in Egypt, Mohammed Arkoun from Algeria, who was influenced by Western postmodernism, and other English research books on Islamic studies. However, as the market began to expand, ideological conflicts also arose. Media Da'wah (Jakarta) is a publishing department of DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia), which served as a channel to receive funds from Saudi Arabia for missionary works in the 1980s. They have published journals and books to attack Shiites and moderates within Indonesia. In recent years, publications and websites of the Salafists and the Jihadists (mentioned below) have criticized by names the publishers, issuing Shiites related books (including Mizan and others in the collection such as Al-Huda).

Those who emerged around the time of democratization in 1998, such as Syaamil (Bandung), Era Intermedia (Solo), and Robanni Press (Jakarta) are run by the members of the current Islamic Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera/PKS) and have mainly issued translated works by the ideologues of the Muslim Brotherhood, which the party models itself on. In recent years however, they have also published a growing number of essays written by party members. With Salafists, who interpret Islamic law in the strictest and most conservative way, there are Al-Qowam and At-Tibyan, both based in the area around Solo in Central Java. Jazeera and Aquwam are the ones belonging to the Jihadists school, who highly regard armed struggles. Ar-Rahmah in Jakarta once drew attention by publishing the personal notes of three criminals, who had actually played a role in the terrorist attack in Bali in 2002, right after their execution. However, they are mostly known as a news site today. HIT Press, also in Jakarta, is a publishing department of the Hizb ut-Tahrir, an international organization aiming to establish the Caliphate.

The late 1980s was a time when the publishing market for general interest books experienced a great expansion not only limited to those dealing with the political ideologies of Islam. The growing presence of an urban middle-class, particularly women emerged as consumer of Islamic books. Religious interpretations corresponding to themes in modern society such as the key to success, family life, and relationships were often referred to. Established in 1986, Gema Insani Press (Jakarta) successfully met those demands and grew to become a major publisher by providing various lineups. Mizan and Syaamil, mentioned above also dealt with a type of business books for relatively upper-class people, novels for young women as well as books for children. Publishers with strong ideological tones mentioned above, are also issuing books on guidelines for society and family life in line with their own religious interpretations. Mizan has published a lot of general interest books and even embarked on film making, but the collection only covers their books on Islamic themes. On the other hand, Islam related publications are also being issued by a media complex, Kompas Gramedia Group which are not in our collection. In addition, the arrangement of the collection is different from other shelves in that they are stored by different publishers. Observing the rise and fall of publishers as well as the repertoire of works within a publisher allows users to overview the transition of the Islamic Movement in Indonesia over the last 40 years and its social positioning. It is hoped that readers will pay a direct visit to CSEAS's open shelves and turn the pages of those books.

Publications

CSEAS Monographs

Kyoto Area Studies on Asia Vol. 24

Ayako Masuhara. Translated by Yuri Kamada

The End of Personal Rule in Indonesia: Golkar and the Transformation of the Suharto Regime

2015. Trans Pacific Press and Kyoto University Press.

Kyoto Area Studies on Asia (in Japanese) Vol. 29

Akiko Morishita

Resources, Politics and Violence: Local Politics in Contemporary Indonesia

2015. Kyoto University Press.

Kyoto CSEAS Series on Asian Studies Vol. 14

Kurniawati Hastuti Dewi

Indonesian Women and Local Politics: Islam, Gender and Networks in Post-Suharto Indonesia

2015. NUS Press and Kyoto University Press.

Kyoto Area Studies on Asia (in Japanese) Vol. 30

Masaaki Okamoto

Politics of Violence and Adaptation: Democratization and Local Politics of Stabilization in Indonesia

2015. Kyoto University Press.

Kyoto Area Studies on Asia (in Japanese) Vol. 28

Hiroyuki Seto

Center-Local Relationship in Lao PDR: Local Administration of Provincial Governor under the Lao People's Revolutionary Party

2015. Kyoto University Press.

CSEAS Journal

Southeast Asian Studies

http://englishkyoto-seas.org/
Southeast Asian Studies, published as an all-English journal in 2012, aims to promote excellent, agenda-setting scholarship and provide a forum for dialogue and collaboration both within and beyond the region. *SEAS* engages in wide-ranging and in-depth discussions that are attuned to the issues, debates, and imperatives within the region, while affirming the importance of learning and sharing ideas on a cross-country, global, and historical scale. An integral part of the journal's mandate is to foster scholarship that is capable of bridging the continuing divide in area studies between the social sciences and humanities on the one hand, and the natural sciences on the other hand.

New Books by Staff

Caroline S. Hau

Recuerdos de Patay and Other Stories

2015. The University of the Philippines Press.

Fumiharu Mieno

Financial Reform and Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Long-term Trends and Corporate Finance (in Japanese)

2015. Keiso Shobo.

Fellows

Visiting Research Scholars, Guest Scholars, and Guest Research Associates at CSEAS

Each year CSEAS accepts applicants about 14 positions for scholars and researchers who work on Southeast Asia, or any one of the countries in that region, to spend 3 to 12 months in Kyoto to conduct research, write, or pursue other scholarly activities in connection with their field of study. Since 1975, more than 340 distinguished scholars have availed themselves of the Center's considerable scholarly resources and enjoyed the invigorating atmosphere of scenic Kyoto, the ancient capital of Japan and the main repository of the country's cultural treasures, to pursue their interests in Southeast Asian area studies. The Center's multi-disciplinary character and the diverse research interests of its faculty offer visiting scholars an ideal opportunity for the exchange of ideas and the cultivation of comparative perspectives. The highly competitive selection process has brought to the Center in recent years researchers from Southeast Asian countries, Bangladesh, China, Korea, and western countries including the United States and France. The visiting fellows represent various basic disciplines in their study of Southeast Asia, and their official posts in their home institutions include teacher, researcher, librarian, journalist, and NGO worker. Information and Technology (IT) experts who conduct research on Southeast Asia are also joining the Center, not only to manage various database systems but also to construct academic networks for area study throughout the world. Successful applicants receive an appropriate stipend to cover international travel, housing, and living expenses in Kyoto. Research funds will also be provided to facilitate his/her work. Funds will also be allocated for domestic travel, subject to government regulations, and a number of other facilities are available to visiting scholars. Fellows will be expected to reside in Kyoto for the duration of their fellowship period. Fellows are normally invited to deliver a public lecture during their term at the Center and encouraged to submit an article for possible publication in the Center's journal, *Southeast Asian Studies* and to contribute to the online journal *Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia*. CSEAS also received researchers, both Japanese and foreign, who visit on their own funds or on external fellowships.

Name	Period	Position/Affiliation	Research Title
Van Thinh Nguyen	2015/3/1–8/30	Librarian, Institute of Social Sciences Information, Vietnam	The Digitalization of Microfilm and Sino Nom Documents
Decha Tangseefa	2015/3/10–9/9	Lecuturer, Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University	Audible Politics & A Zone of Exception: Linguistic Soundscape in a Thai-Myanmar "Temporary Shelter Area"
Amporn Jirattikorn	2015/6/1–11/30	Lecturer, Department of Social Sciences and Development, Faculty of Social Sciences, Chiang Mai University	From "Revolutionary" to "Regret": Shan Resistance in Burma over the Past 50 Years
Khin Lay Swe	2015/6/1–11/30	Special Affiliated Professor, Department of Plant Breeding, Physiology and Ecology, Yezin Agricultural University	Comparative Study on Traditional Application of Resources of SATO in Rural Development in Myanmar and Japan
Ooi Keat Gin	2015/7/15–10/14	Professor, School of Humanities, Universiti Sains Malaysia	Borneo in the Midst of the Cold War, 1950–1970
Eva Hansson	2015/8/1–10/31	Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science, Stockholm University	Inequality, Social Conflict and Political Regime Change in Southeast Asia
Bao Maohong	2015/8/1–2016/1/31	Professor, Department of History, Peking University	The Making of Modern Agriculture in the Philippines and Its Transformation: From the Perspective of Agroecological History

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