

CSEAS



# NEWSLETTER

Center for Southeast Asian Studies  
Kyoto University

NO.73 | SPRING 2016



50th Anniversary of CSEAS	SEASIA 2015	Memoir of Professor Benedict Anderson
<p>Looking Back over 50 Years Kono Yasuyuki</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>003</b></p>	<p>The SEASIA 2015 Conference: A Watershed in Southeast Asian Studies Janus Isaac V. Nolasco</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>026</b></p>	<p>Three Cheers for the Hare that Did Not Stop Running to Take a Nap: In Celebration of the Life of Benedict Anderson (1936–2015) Kato Tsuyoshi</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>038</b></p>
<p>CSEAS Celebrates 50th Anniversary Hayami Yoko</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>004</b></p>		<p>Interview with Late Professor Benedict Anderson (1936–2015) Southeast Asian Scholars at the Edge Loh Kah Seng</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>043</b></p>
<p>Commemorative Speech for the Ceremony Celebrating the 50th Anniversary of CSEAS The Life of a Research Institute (<i>Kenkyu-sho no Inochi</i>) Tachimoto Narifumi</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>005</b></p>	<p>Keynote Speech at SEASIA 2015 Towards a Region of New Nations Wang Gungwu</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>029</b></p>	
<p>Interview with Former Director Ichimura Shinichi Looking to the Past, Inspiring the Future Mieno Fumiharu</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>010</b></p>	<p>Keynote Speech at SEASIA 2015 Region and Academe in Turbulent Times Pasuk Phongpaichit</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>034</b></p>	

Front cover: Professor Emeritus Benedict Anderson at Siam Square, Bangkok, January 2015 (Photo by Courtesy of Anan Krudphet)

## Editorial

In 2015, the Center for Southeast Asian Studies (CSEAS) witnessed a number of milestones in its history. The first was the 50th anniversary of the founding of CSEAS. The second was the fruition of several years of work that culminated in the first international conference of the Consortium for Southeast Asian Studies in Asia (SEASIA) in December 2015. These two events ran back to back, were attended by present and past faculty, colleagues, and friends and presented an unprecedented opportunity for scholars of Southeast Asia to meet in Kyoto. They also allowed CSEAS to cement its position as one of the major research institutes for Southeast Asian Studies not just in the region, but globally. This special newsletter issue pulls together keynote speeches and interviews from past directors, Professors Tachimoto Narifumi and Ichimura Shinichi. It also offers two keynote speeches from our conference by Dr. Wang Gungwu and Dr. Pasuk Phongpaichit. On the second day of our conference (December 13, 2015), many were saddened to learn that Professor Emeritus Benedict Richard O’Gorman Anderson passed away (1936–2015). A much loved and respected scholar of Southeast Asia, Professor Kato Tsuyoshi offers us a final reflection on his long friendship with Ben. Associate Professor Loh Kah Seng also provides us with a posthumous interview with Ben on historical research in Southeast Asia.

## The Editors



# Looking Back over 50 Years

**Kono Yasuyuki**     Director, CSEAS



This year marks the 50th anniversary of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies (CSEAS), which was established in 1965 as the first national level research center attached to a university. During the last half-century, the center has achieved numerous successes in its mission to promote interdisciplinary research on Southeast Asia, which have received high praise both in Japan and internationally. Today, the center serves as a hub for Southeast Asian studies and has earned the respect of researchers around the world. The center is the result of the extraordinary efforts of our predecessors and faculty, made possible through long-standing support from the university, relevant departments, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS), and both the Japanese and international research community. Here, I would like to again express my heartfelt gratitude to all who have contributed to the success of the research center.

Fifty years is a long tenure for a research institute. During this time, CSEAS has persisted in its mission as a research institute set up by the university to open up new frontiers of scholarly research. Over the last half century, CSEAS, focusing on the diversity and dynamism of Southeast Asian nature and society, has worked diligently to identify the central issues of Southeast Asian studies and appropriate approaches to challenge them through interacting

deeply and persistently in region through multiple perspectives.

According to our predecessors, in the first half of the center's 50-year history, from the 1960s to the 1980s, CSEAS was full of passion and enthusiasm. At a time when scholarly overseas research was still not common, each overseas trip for fieldwork yielded new ways of thinking and the presentation of countless research results.

In the 1990s, MEXT began to offer full-fledged support to large-scale research projects. CSEAS was proactive in applying for such support and played a leading role in a project titled "Toward an Integrated Approach to Global Area Studies: In Search of a Paradigm for a Harmonized Relationship between the World and Its Areas" (FY1993–96) and a project titled "Making Regions: Proto-Areas, Transformations and New Formations in Asia and Africa" (FY1998–2002). The results of these various research projects were collectively designated "Southeast Asian Studies," and a substantial effort was made to develop theoretical and conceptual frameworks for this new discipline, leading to the publication of the *Lecture Series: Southeast Asian Studies* (Koubundou, 1990–92) and the *Encyclopedia of Southeast Asia* (Koubundou, 1997). These developments at the end of the 20th century were evidence of CSEAS's steadfast progress towards its goal of interdisciplinary Southeast Asian area studies.

What has pushed us to grow even further now that we have entered the 21st century is the evolution of Southeast Asian society itself.

In the early part of the 21st century, we have seen the rise of numerous problems that threaten the very existence of human society: these include degradation of the global environment, the expansion of economic disparities and poverty, religious and cultural conflicts, the spread of infectious diseases, and natural disasters. These issues are interrelated and, as such, efforts aimed at addressing only a single issue have limited impact. We have reached a point where it is necessary to rethink the idea of development of human society based on abundant resources, a stable environment, and a robust social order that supported the development of human society in the 20th century. Southeast Asian society, on the one hand, is following aspects of the 20th-century pattern of societal development, but is also developing a pluralistic society in which many dif-

ferent groups coexist, supported by resilient and soft governance, a flexibly structured society based on mutual prosperity and mutual aid, and circulatory use of the environment and resources. In addition, it is striving to achieve the harmonious coexistence of diverse groups and religions and to carry out economic development in a manner that reduces economic disparities.

This growth in Southeast Asia highlights the importance of presenting the efforts of Southeast Asian societies to the rest of the world. Human society of the future will not be based solely on the knowledge and experience fostered by a part of the world including Western countries and Japan but, will progress towards a truly diverse society that is in harmony with nature when the experiences, challenges, and wisdom of different regions around the world are brought together. It is with this in mind that the Consortium for Southeast Asian Studies in Asia (SEASIA) was established in 2013 in order to facilitate closer collaboration between researchers based in Southeast and East Asian countries on studies related to the development of Southeast Asian society. Furthermore, in the Global COE Program that began in 2007, under the banner of research on the sustainable humanosphere, we have focused on the identification and theorization of development paths based on the rich nature and flexible societies of the tropics. We are also working to promote linkages between CSEAS research and cutting-edge science and technology research and to facilitate cross-over with area studies research of other regions around the world.

The Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Economic Community (AEC), with a population of 620 million and an annual gross domestic product (GDP) of 2.57 trillion USD, was established in December, 2015. With this development, Southeast Asia's presence in the international community will increase dramatically. Scholarly research on ASEAN has expanded rapidly at universities in Southeast Asia. In response to these changes, our goal at CSEAS is to further develop our core strengths and to continue to carry out interdisciplinary research that integrates science and the humanities while working with collaborators beyond the academic community for an international audience.



## CSEAS Celebrates 50th Anniversary

**Hayami Yoko** Professor, CSEAS

The Center for Southeast Asian Studies was officially founded in 1965. On December 11th, 2015, we celebrated its 50th anniversary at the International Science Innovation Building on the Main Campus.

In his opening address, our Director Kono Yasuyuki expressed gratitude towards our predecessors and others to whom we owe for their support and cooperation over the decades, and introduced how our research evolved over the last 50 years. He then referred to the global threat to the sustainability of human society, and what Southeast Asian studies has to offer in the face of this. Finally, he pronounced our aspiration towards the future. With the rising profile of Southeast Asia in the world, we will enhance our cooperation within Asia seeking a trans-disciplinary approach to strengthen our presence. Then, representing the president of Kyoto University, Executive Vice-President Minato Nagahiro gave a speech in which he first explained the developing position of CSEAS on Kyoto University campus over the five decades. Then, he expressed the expectations towards our Center in contributing towards President Yamagiwa's policy of internationalization and promoting innovation studies, and cooperation with the Kyoto University ASEAN Center in Bangkok.

We received speeches from four distinguished guests. First, Director Ushio Norifumi of the Scientific Research Institutes Division, Research Promotion Bureau, Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) referred to the role of CSEAS in the face of the founding of ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and expressed high expectation towards our Center, to further enhance the interdisciplinary character of our research (via a written message read by his Division's Deputy Director Okamoto Kazuhisa). Dr. Shirokizawa Yoshiko, Executive Director of the Japan Science and Technology Agency (JST) introduced the new program led by our Center on "Japan-ASEAN Science and Technology Innovation Platform: Promotion of Sustainable Development Research." She expressed expectation towards our Center's wide international network in promoting science and technology innovation towards social contribution. Thirdly, Professor Tsuda Toshitaka,

Representative of the Council for Research Institutes and Centers of Japanese National Universities mentioned the severe situation faced by academic institutions of the humanities and social sciences today, and how collaboration between the natural sciences and humanities/social sciences is truly urgent in solving problems such as peace construction and global environment, and our Center's expected role in this collaborative endeavor. Finally, Director Iizuka Masato of the Research Institute for Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies (TUFS) referred to the 50th anniversary of his own institute in the previous year, and how, as research institutions of area studies, we have together evolved over the half century in cooperation, and how he looks forward to further cooperation in the future.

Then, Professor Tachimoto Narifumi, President of the National Institutes for the Humanities (NIHU), and former director of CSEAS gave a memorial lecture titled "The Life of a Research Institute." He expounded on the "Life" of CSEAS as a research institute in past and future, explicating its characteristics, and how it has held as its object of research, Southeast Asia as a region, or some form of "totality" and expressed his pride in the Center's achievements. Yet at the same time, he encouraged us towards further invention or metamorphosis into the future. This, he said, should involve firstly, a shift in our research paradigm, and secondly, some action towards structural reform. Finally, he concluded that the research paradigm is not the ends but the means towards enriching humanity as the goal of any academic endeavor.

The ceremony was successfully concluded by our former Director, Shimizu Hiromu as master of ceremony. Then, there was a performance of celebratory Balinese dance on stage, adding to the festive mood.

The ceremony was followed by reception in the foyer. Professor Aoyama Toru, President of the Japan Society for Southeast Asian Studies gave a speech celebrating the Center's 50th anniversary and spoke about his own experiences as a scholar of history at the Center. Then, Professor Sunait Chutintaranond, Chairperson of the Governing Board of the Consortium for Southeast Asian Studies

(SEASIA) spoke in appreciation of the Center's role in initiating the consortium and sponsoring the first SEASIA conference. Professor Inaba Kayo, Executive Vice-President of Kyoto University gave the toast, speaking of her own recent adventures in Southeast Asia, and her expectations towards our Center.

The participants enjoyed both company and conversation. During the reception, video messages from past visiting fellows and other friends of the Center were played on a screen, as well as a slide show introducing the Center's 50 years, and there were panels introducing our current research and activities.

There were 230 participants for the ceremony and reception, almost full to capacity in the hall and foyer. The 50th anniversary booklets, prepared for this occasion, one in English and one in Japanese, were handed to all the participants and the celebration was successfully concluded.





Commemorative Speech for the Ceremony  
Celebrating the 50th Anniversary of CSEAS

December 11, 2015 at the Kyoto University  
International Science Innovation Building

## The Life of a Research Institute (*Kenkyu-sho no Inochi*)

**Tachimoto Narifumi**

President, National Institutes for the Humanities  
Former Director of CSEAS (1998–2002)

### Introduction<sup>1)</sup>

In commemoration of CSEAS, which has existed now for half a century, I would like to talk about the “Life of a Research Institute.” The Japanese word “*inochi*” (roughly translated as “life”) has various meanings and can be used in various ways. One interpretation can be the “repetition of every living moment in sustained tension.” While objectively *inochi* is finite, subjectively, it is understood as being continuous and without end. Observed objectively from the outside, there may be many research institutes that could be written off as approaching their date of expiration, or having generally outlived their usefulness. Looking at the title of the speech today, one might get the impression that I am going to talk about the life span of CSEAS. However, I don’t intend to imply the sense of “life-span” by the use of the word “life” in the title. Rather, I use it in the sense of “driving force, vitality” or “something more important, quintessential.” In this sense, I want to invoke the phrase *inochi atte no monodane* (where there is life, there is hope). The phrase is normally used in the sense of “live, as it is all over if you die.” But here, I emphasize a more fundamental sense of life as “sustained tension perceived as a repetition of every living moment,” or the “quintessential is crucial.”

Life is something that dwells inside each individual, human or creature. However, I hope this talk will be understood not as an effort to discuss something noble, like the idea of scholarship or a personal stance toward scholarly research, but rather as

a reflection on the life of an organization known as a “research institute.” While we cannot deny the reality that the life of every being is discontinuous and awaiting death, life itself—the actuality of life—never dies, and continues as long as living creatures exist.

### I Research on Southeast Asia (*barabara de issbo=unity in diversity*)

I would like to start this talk with the idea of collapsing the diverse region called “Southeast Asia” into a form that can be a subject of research. The Tonan Ajia Kenkyu-jo (Institute for Southeast Asian Studies) or the former Tonan Ajia Kenkyu Senta (Center for Southeast Asian Studies) (both referred to in English as CSEAS) was established 50 years ago. We need to understand this in the historical context.<sup>2)</sup> With the end of the World War II in 1945, former colonies started to emerge as independent states and began to follow their aspirations to form nation states. In 1955, the Asia-Africa Conference was convened in Bandung, Indonesia. This year marks the 60th anniversary of this momentous gathering. In the last few years, we’ve also observed the 50th anniversaries of the founding of the Institute of Developing Economies, as well as the Research Institute for Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa at Tokyo University of Foreign Studies. Before CSEAS was officially founded, there was already a system for sending students to Southeast Asia, towards developing human resources.

Thankfully, I was able to study at the University of Malaya and had the chance to experience in person the day in 1965 on which the current Republic of Singapore achieved independence from Malaysia.

There are many other research institutes in Japan which hold geographical regions as their targets of research, such as the Slavic-Eurasian Research Center of Hokkaido University, the Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia (for East Asian Studies) of University of Tokyo, and the Institute for Research in Humanities of Kyoto University (which had been divided into departments covering China, Japan, and the West) to name just a few. However, CSEAS was the only one that declared to comprehensively cover the humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences in order to understand the region as an object of “Area Studies.” In all senses, it can be said that the establishment of CSEAS was ahead of the times.

The concept of Southeast Asia as a unit had stemmed from the idea of binding the region as a geographical division, as observed from the outside. However, the region started to emerge as a subjective regional community, presumably when ASEAN-10 was founded in 1999. After 16 years since then, the so-called ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) is about to be agreed upon at the end of this year. The intent is to achieve an ASEAN community by 2020, united under the slogan “One Vision, One Idea, One Community.” Not only does the regional community called Southeast Asia exist as a reality, but the designers of this vision are try-

ing to demonstrate how active it is as an actuality. Will the myth of the modern nation-state—independent states based on the premise of territories—be overtaken by the founding myth of the new community? Or, can multiple myths coexist across different levels of society and geography? To keep our finger on this pulse, we need to keep our eyes on Southeast Asia from a global perspective. Indeed, our subject “Southeast Asia” has transformed itself from diverse multiple objects to a unity.

Much the same is true of the situation surrounding researchers involved in Southeast Asian studies. When you take a look at what each of those scholars is doing, you will notice that most of them are not necessarily interested in “Southeast Asia as a unity.” With partial interests, such as on the delta, the islands, earthquake, geology, rice cultivation, agriculture, economy, lifestyle, religion, or language, and so much more, as required by their own fields of specialization, they have, however, come to gather as a group. I suppose that these people came together not to study “Southeast Asia” but simply because the object of research driven by their disciplinary interests happened to be in Southeast Asia.

The fact is, however, that CSEAS has regarded joint research as the primary mode of research from the very beginning. Through interchange and communication between scholars of different disciplines, and above all, through the experience of collectively relating to Southeast Asia as a region through fieldwork, they have been able to achieve the momentum needed to assume the unit of Southeast Asia as a research object.

Nonetheless, integrating the totality of Southeast Asia and regarding the region as a research object remains challenging. This is because the totality was not there from the beginning, and one is first faced with the difficulty of defining the range of that totality. There is also a methodological issue concerning which aspects and elements should be integrated. At the same time, one must explain what can be revealed by the integrated perspective. Thus the following question can be asked. Even if the all the parts can be integrated as a whole, what value is produced by observing this integrated whole?

With regard to the matter of totality, I recall an episode of several visually impaired people getting together to understand the identity of the famous huge animal—the elephant—, using only their individual senses of touch. This story may have several interpretations, but I would like to take it as an analogy for total and partial recognition. I consider that one implication of this episode is a very common misrecognition that we make—the misunderstanding in which you take only the part you know as the entire entity. The problem faced is not just a problem of being visually impaired; the misrecognitions of people in general, not to mention scholars, is pervasive. We tend to forget that Southeast Asia is not already there as a reality, like the elephant. There is no one who is visually “un-impaired,” who can see the total reality and correct misrecognitions.

Setting aside the question of whether or not we should regard the Southeast Asian region as a totality, or if it is even feasible to grasp it as such, I think there have been two continuous undercurrents, or two complementary streams, in our approach to research in CSEAS. These are the integration of the totality and analysis of the parts. These two streams represent different research styles, that of “analyzing the region,” and that of “searching for an integral image of the region.” With regards to these two approaches, I refer to three essays<sup>3)</sup> on Southeast Asia which appeared together in the *Gakushi-kai Kaiho* (学生会報: Newsletter of Gakushi-kai) this summer. The first one was trying to grasp the totality, while the second was an “orthodox” research paper of individual analysis, which could also have been done outside of Area Studies. In the third, the theory of the small population world was rejecting the simplistic dichotomy between the previous two. These three papers symbolize the two streams mentioned above very well.

## II Tracking the 50 Years of Analyzing Regions

The question whether to dissect the region and analyze and understand issues within it, or, to bind the region together and weave and integrate a totality, has been an earnest search for the identity of a research institute of area studies.

CSEAS was initially founded as a center. At that time, all research centers were attached to faculties and research institutions had to be legally ordained. Nevertheless, Kyoto University had established a research center, a virtual institute, detached from faculties but located in the university, without going through a legal change. Since then, many research centers have been established.

Our ardent wish from the very beginning, to secure a mechanism for cultivating human resources of the next generation was achieved with the inauguration of the Graduate School of Asian and African Area Studies (ASAFAS/大学院アジア・アフリカ地域研究研究科) in 1998. The word “*kenkyu* (research)” repeated twice in the Japanese title, trumpets Area Studies. The degree conferred by this graduate school is the degree “in Area Studies” (“Ph.D. in Area Studies”).

In general, faculties are the main vehicles for cre-

ating and delivering graduate education and training. However, the case of ASAFAS is groundbreaking because there is no other example of a research center playing a central role in the educational activities, as CSEAS and the Center for African Area Studies do here.

In April 2004, the Center was turned into a research institute affiliated with the university and its name was changed to the Institute for Southeast Asian Studies. This change occurred alongside the corporatization of national universities. However, as the English name “Center” for Southeast Asian Studies was already established and internationally recognized, we did not touch the English name, choosing instead to maintain the word “Center” with the acronym CSEAS. This sends the message that our tradition has continued from our founding until now, even though the Japanese name has been changed to “Institute.”

Into the 21st century, in addition to our change of status to an institute, we played a role in bringing in an external organization (Japan Center for Area Studies) to establish the Center for Integrated Area Studies (CIAS) in Kyoto University in 2006. This change was also a declaration of intent that Kyoto University would be claiming Area Studies as a leading field of the university.

As already mentioned, in its advocacy of Area Studies, CSEAS has had various characteristics in its research style from the outset of its establishment. In a word, the premise of interdisciplinary research it performs is integration and analysis from multiple perspectives. Our second Director Iwamura Shinobu defined the three axes of research as “on the spot (On-site, field-based research),” “contemporary,” and “integrative.” Although the words in this expression have changed, I think this spirit has been handed down to this day. Perhaps this is the destiny inherent to the field of Area Studies.

Even though we characterize it by multiple perspectives of analysis and integration, depending on the questions raised and the framing of it, Area Studies can be divided between a discipline-based regional analysis on the one hand, and, a comprehensive research with a bird’s-eye view of the region as totality, on the other. When I say divided, I do not mean to say that there is a dichotomy, with polar opposites. Between the two, there should be a





continuous spectrum of research styles. However, if you stand firm on the ground of analysis, the framework of Area Studies is no longer necessary. So long as we advocate Area Studies, there should be integration towards totality, otherwise, the undertaking will no longer be scholarship.

A bird's-eye view<sup>4)</sup> normally means that a complex totality is viewed from above, like a bird. In this case, we refer to a systematic perspective that conceives a totality and confirms its perfection and adequacy.

To think that Area Studies was carried out internationally since the time when the exchange rate was 360 yen to the dollar, and considering the budget allocation for Humanities and Social Science at the time, it was indeed a veritable "money-eater." From the preparatory stage of its establishment, with the system of Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (Kaken) yet to be consolidated, the Center accepted donations from the Ford Foundation and sought matching funds from domestic industry. It was thanks to the tireless efforts of our predecessors (including former Director Ichimura Shinichi, who is here today), we managed to carry out and continue our operations. If not for this, I think CSEAS would not be what it is today.

Along with the consolidation of Kaken research funds, the Center acquired external funds such as large-scale Kaken, and was able to construct a tradition of collaborative research, extending its networks outwardly into and beyond the region. I believe this was more than just steadily confirming its *raison-d'être* as an organization, but demonstrating itself as a model of how a research institution should be.

During the 1970s, the Center acquired large-scale Kaken subsidies, under the framework of international research. After the 1990s, it has continuously obtained large-scale Kaken, from Priority Areas Research, the COE program, the 21st Century COE, and the Global COE program, based on the idea that Area Studies would bring about breakthroughs in the humanities and social sciences.

International collaborative research, emphasized from the very beginning, is another area of contribution being made by CSEAS. This has been done primarily by operating "the International Program of Collaborative Research" (IPCR), established within the university as Joint Use/Research Centers for universities nationwide.

These efforts have culminated in the establishment of a "Consortium for Southeast Asian Studies in Asia" (SEASIA) in 2013. This research network brings together 10 institutions in the leading Asian Universities and other organizations in Southeast Asia. I am looking forward to seeing this consortium at work in the SEASIA symposium on Dec 12–13, 2015.

In this sense, despite being small and located in a university, we can say that the activities carried out by CSEAS since the time of its foundation, are entirely comparable to those at inter-university research institutes like the National Museum of

Ethnology.

The achievements of CSEAS are something to be proud of, and I expect that many more activities will flow out of SEASIA. However, some believe the common-sense life expectancy of research institutes to be 30 to 50 years. This is, perhaps, because in Japan there were times when research centers were designed to be revised or even abolished every 10 years. Even today, national university corporations are going through processes of revising their aims and objectives every six years.

As is the case with education, we should challenge the idea that there is a life limit for research institutions. This is particularly so if we consider the field of research, that is humans and human society. At the same time, a research institution should always be in a process of invention (creation and inventiveness) of traditions that will last as long as human beings continue to exist. If we simply sing out the self-righteous message that the humanities and social science are the base of all academic studies, we may relegate ourselves to irrelevance. We must continuously present proof of transformations that demonstrate how we are "living better" and not just "alive."

In retrospect, though we were probably unaware of this in the beginning, CSEAS seems to have gone through changes in a cycle of about 10 years. Through conscious and unconscious efforts in these cycles, CSEAS has continued to grow through the revitalization of its life energy. Moreover, as indicated in the title of the 50th anniversary publication, *Southeast Asian Studies in the 21st Century* (21世紀の東南アジア研究), there may be some developments of great significance that go hand-in-hand with the milestone transformation from a research center to an institute.

Personally, I have high hopes that CSEAS will not just go through a small- or middle-scale revision, but it will accomplish a grand metamorphosis<sup>5)</sup> (transformation) or rebirth (*samsara*), by inventing new traditions on this milestone occasion of the 50th Anniversary. I believe this is an opportunity to fundamentally assess the health of Southeast Asia or Area Studies. As the accumulation of knowledge on Southeast Asia becomes increasingly detailed and precise, there may be future voices arguing that individual sciences or a multi-disciplinary approaches are sufficient, that there is no need for a regional framework in order to understand our research objects. Perhaps this is considered by some to be an inevitable outcome of scientific progress, which would deny the need for research defined by regional issues to exist. The potential for this type of criticism was already well understood by the first generation of founders, as they left the ports of disciplines without knowing where the ship is heading. The destination of Area Studies was never a clear point on the horizon; it was always in journey.



### III Expectations towards a Metamorphosis

Now, I would like to move on to talk about the metamorphosis of CSEAS, which I am expecting, or in other words, it is about the renewal or incarnation of the life of CSEAS.

It has already been several years since the University Reform Implementation Plan and National University Reform Plan have been implemented, and the third mid-term target and mid-term plan with a cycle of six years will be starting from the year 2016. In accordance with the reform plans forced from outside, I assume you have already formulated the strategic objectives under the new vision for the third mid-term target and mid-term plan, rather on your own initiative than urged by external requirements. I am aware that there might be some overlaps, but please allow me to make some remarks on this as an outsider describing it as two challenges.

The first challenge is a paradigm shift.<sup>6)</sup> When I mentioned the two research approaches—analysis and integration—, I discussed how the assumption that the region “Southeast Asia,” is a reality to be integrated as a totality. This is in itself a fiction or a fabrication. Rather, the question of what constitutes a totality should be at the forefront of questions. This means it is impossible to designate certain areas and name them a totality from the outset, but it can be considered (tentatively) as such. Therefore, we must constantly relativize what we consider as a total “region.” This means there is a need for CSEAS, as an institute, to shift from the region as the “paradigm of place,” to, “region” as a paradigm of fluidity, cyclicality, linkages, flows, and networks. As can be seen in an old adage, “Human culture is developed by transportation” (Miyazaki Ichisada), region is about transportation, mobility, and migration. In terms of systems, we are referring to a shift from a static to a dynamic and fluctuating system.<sup>7)</sup> Yet regardless of electronic media, the phenomenon of mobilities is now an indispensable point of view in all aspects of our life. Cultural aspects such as the drifts of meanings or ideas, as well as transfers and changes that accompany, them should not be overlooked. More importantly, this means a mobilities paradigm<sup>8)</sup> that would inevitably include the axes of time and space and play an integral role. By referring to the axes of time, I do not mean it is possible to instantly analyze long-term waves and cycles through this paradigm.

There are various points to be overcome in the mobilities paradigm and by confirming these and concentrating on the paradigm itself, we might be able to deal with conflicts within globalization, nationalism, and localization. At the same time, we hope that this paradigm will offer us a way to criticize a civilization that brings about conveniences, while utilizing the conveniences that have arisen via the super modern and postmodern.

Focusing on relations, flows, and trends also requires a shift in research styles. One of them is the necessity of a kind of mobility that goes beyond the academic disciplines, stretching out into society. It

is not “interdisciplinarity”—one centered on collaboration and cooperation between different disciplines—, but in the sense of transcending disciplines and at times, academism, that can properly be described as a transdisciplinary orientation.<sup>9)</sup> A science that benefits humanity; a science for humanity; one serves the reconstruction of the systems of knowledge. This is not simply academism as praxis, but unification of knowledge and praxis, backed by academic scholarship. Incidentally, the word “trans-” contains the meaning of mobility and movement and includes the nuances of “going beyond” or “transcending bounds.” Nothing is accomplished by withdrawing oneself into an individual discipline. We must hope we can transcend fusions and move toward meta-knowledge.

I do not intend to deny Area Studies by shifting the paradigm from “place” to “mobilities.” Rather, this shift will invigorate Area Studies. Amid the increasing voices of globalism, it can also allow us to demonstrate why area studies as a transdisciplinary study of place carries us into the future.

The second challenge is voluntary structural reform to correspond to and support the above paradigm shift. As with a pupa that transforms into a butterfly, it is an organizational metamorphosis that is needed (changing the original form).

Of course, CSEAS should properly make use of Kyoto University’s university-wide organizational reform, but it needs to internally re-orient itself and pave its way for the metamorphosis. In other words, it needs to share the paradigm shift first within the institute and then to transform itself into an organizational body that can make it possible. In a sense, it is the voluntary structural reform of the organization.

If we talk about the visibility of CSEAS, though internal reorganizing alone might seem insufficient, changing the most visible signboard, i.e. the name, requires deliberation. Along with reorganization and integration within Kyoto University, there might emerge a need to change names. There will be a significant difference, depending on whether it focuses on Area Studies or Southeast Asia.

There might be the possibility of changing the name according to the subject area: “Asia,” “Oceania,” “Asia-Africa,” “Asia-Oceania,” or “Global.” This is something we have been discussing for a great number of years. Setting Southeast Asian Studies at the core and adding the areas of focus for comparison to Asia, Eurasia, Africa, the New Continent, and the World is another possible strategy. There could be other classifications such as the tropics. Even if we clung to the name of the area as “Southeast Asia,” there will be an increasing need for the research framework to relativize both Japan, the country where researchers belong, as well as Southeast Asia, the selected area of focus.

On the other hand, it is also entirely possible to seek a new name that transcends the concept of “Area,” such as Southeast Asia, or to put it another way, one that recognizes “the paradigm shift from Place to Mobilities.”

Putting aside the name issue, Area Studies is an

academic domain, in which various science disciplines, especially the humanities and social sciences should be based, and generally speaking, it is vital not only for future security, but also for human security and for the future of Japan. When dealing with organizational reform, we should pay due consideration to these issues and the spirit of Area Studies should be at the core of the reform.

### Concluding Remarks

CSEAS and the concept of area will both be framed by a “story,” the motif of which is the paradigm.

In association with “*Inochi atte no mono dane*” (where there is life, there is hope), which I mentioned in the beginning, the “seed” (*tanel dane*) of the new story will be the redefinition of CSEAS’ philosophy and the paradigm shift. It might also be equivalent to the invention of new traditions. As the fate of culture for the sake of human lives; tradition, innovation, and the creation of culture will be never-ending tasks. For academic practice situated in society, it is of the utmost importance to apprehend the spirit of an epoch or better said epochality (and simultaneously, epoch-making-ness). The alleged demand towards scholarship today is, challenge, comprehensiveness, internationalization, and multi-disciplinarity. My hope is that CSEAS will, while critically assessing the epochality of such demands, regenerate itself like a phoenix by advocating a paradigm shift accompanied by a newly formulated trans-disciplinary research style.

What is most important is this. In order to fully convince people outside that we have changed, there is no other way than to show them the results as firm proof. However, before transforming the exterior such as philosophy, method, and name, if people inside do not change themselves CSEAS will be nothing more than a pie in the sky. The most important thing when people change, will be the “*Kokoro*” (heart, spirit or mind), aspiration of everyone in the organization. “*Kokoro*” refers to a vision, and the way to realize it will be the paradigm shift.

I have emphasized a paradigm shift, but paradigm itself is nothing but a method and it is not a purpose. We must always keep our focus on our original purpose. I assume that the purpose of a research institute is to devote itself towards resolving the fundamental agency of human phenomena and simultaneously to make use of those findings to nourish appropriate developments in science and technology; to show economic effects, political stabilities, and the wealth of life.

Though not mentioned today, please try not to forget the essence of academism, science, and the edifice of the human intellect. Education and research are two sides of a coin. It is my hope that CSEAS will continue to engage in the role of activating education, while demonstrating uniqueness as a research organization, and conclude my remarks on this occasion of the 50th anniversary of CSEAS.



## Notes

- 1) Citation from *Shin-Meikai Kokugo Jiten* 『新明解国語辞典』 [New-clear-understanding Japanese dictionary], 5th edition (1997). Concerning eternal life, Reality/Actuality, refer to Kimura (2015). As for sections I and II, refer to CSEAS 50th anniversary publication (in Japanese), *Southeast Asian Studies in the 21st Century* (2015).
- 2) The timeline for the historical background of Southeast Asian Studies and changes in the region can be summarized as:  
Colonization and the emerging concept of “Southeast Asia,” “Nanshin-ron (Japan’s advance and invasion of the southern regions)”  
End of WWII, 1945 (the time of emerging independent states, towards nation states)  
Asia Africa Conference 1955 (modernization, decolonization)  
Founding of various research institutes for Asian research  
Institute of Developing Economies 1960  
Research Institute for Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa at Tokyo University of Foreign Studies 1964  
Official founding of CSEAS 1965  
ASEAN (five countries) 1967 (developmental dictatorship, democratization, decentralization)  
End of Vietnam War 1975; Cold War (1945–89) and its end  
ASEAN-10 1999; AEC 2015 (globalization)
- 3) The three essays appeared in a recent issue of a Japanese journal *Gakushi-kai Kaiho* 『学会会報』 [Newsletter], No. 914 (2015-V).  
Shiraishi Takashi 白石隆, Tonan Ajia no Genjo to Tembo, Tairiku-bu/Tosho-bu 東南アジアの現状と展望 (大陸部/島嶼部) [Status and prospects of SEA, continent areas/island areas].  
Tsubouchi Yoshihiro 坪内良博, Tonan Ajia no Shakai, Shojinko Shakai 東南アジアの社会 (小人口世界) [Southeast Asian society, small population world].  
Kato Kumiko 加藤久美子, 1873 Nen no Kudeta: Mekongawa Churyuiki no Taizoku Kokka Shipusompanna no Oi Keisho Arasoi 1837年のクーデター——メコン河中流域のタイ族国家シブソンパンナーの王位継承争い [The 1837 coup: The struggle over royal succession in the Tai State of Sipsong Panna in the mid-stream Mekong Region].
- 4) “Bird’s-eye View Approach” was first mentioned by Yoshikawa Hiroyuki from the standpoint of General Engineering in explanation for an anal-

ogy of Group Theory in the mid-1990s. Nowadays, engineers of University of Tokyo have established the Bird’s-eye View Engineering Institute, and even the word “Fukan-gaku (俯瞰学: Bird’s-eye View Studies)” exists.


- 5) “Metamorphosis”: 1) from Ovid’s *Metamorphosis* in Greece; 2) In the modern period, biology—a profound change in form from one stage to the next in the life history of an organism; geology—the process by which metamorphic rocks are formed; 3) Goethe introduced the concepts “metamorphosis” and “prototype” to innovate plant morphology; 4) (Tachimoto’s usage) When the essence or the fundamental phenomenon (*inochi*, life) is unchanging, but the outward modification, leap/progress, evolution is apparent, that is metamorphosis.
- 6) “Paradigm” exemplum or common framework of thinking (Tachimoto’s usage) especially a framework that is shared among a community of researchers, and becomes a guiding principle in research.
- 7) This is not about a system of structural/functional analyses, but a perspective of focusing on the process, like in Sociology of Process advocated by Nöbert Elias.
- 8) “Mobilities” movement and transition, mobility and change in a person, thing, information or idea (Urry 2015; Lefebvre 2000; Greenblatt 2010).
- 9) “Transdisciplinary”: Human science that integratively apprehends a phenomenon with something like inductive deduction at the level of practice-norm-value. “Trans” includes the meaning not only of creation of a new discipline that transcends disciplinary areas, but of further pursuing a new mode of academism that “transcends academism.” Knowledge of facts presupposes knowledge of value. There emerges a stance (trans-science) that starts from academism but transcends it towards society. This was translated as “*cho-gakusai-sei*” 超学際性 for the first time in

the Japanese edition of Edgar Morin in 1985. In English, there was an entry in the *Oxford English Dictionary*, 2nd edition (1987), but the term first appeared in 1972. Similar terms include inter-disciplinary, cross-disciplinary, or multi-disciplinary, among others. Since “trans” means transcendence, it has totally different connotation from simply multiplying or connecting disciplines. As in “transhumance” which refers to the seasonal movement of a herd, trans- implies movement, or moving across to the other side (Cf. Nicolescu 2002; Tachimoto 2013).

## References

- Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University  
京都大学東南アジア研究所. 2015. *Nijyu-Issei ki no Tonan Ajia Kenkyu: Chiiki Shakai beno Hassin* 21世紀の東南アジア研究——地域社会への発信 [Southeast Asia in the 21st century]. Kyoto: CSEAS.
- Greenblatt, Stephen. 2010. *Cultural Mobility: A Manifesto*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kimura Bin 木村 敏. 2015. *Karada, Kokoro, Seimei* からだ・こころ・生命. Kodansha Gakujutsu Bunko.
- Lefebvre, Henry. 2000. *The Production of Space*, translated by Hideharu Saito in Japanese. Tokyo: Aoki Shoten Publishing Co.
- Nicolescu, Basarab. 2002. *Manifesto of Transdisciplinarity*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Tachimoto Narifumi 立本成文, ed. 2013. *Ningen-kagaku toshiteno Chikyukankyogaku: Hito to Tsunagaru Shizen/Shizen to Tsunagaru Hito* 人間科学としての地球環境学——人とつながる自然・自然とつながる人 [Global environmental studies as humanics]. Kyoto: Kyoto Tsushin.
- Urry, John. 2015. *Mobilitis: Sociology of Transportation*, translated by Naoki Yoshihara and Hiroataka Ito in Japanese. Tokyo: Sakuhin-sha.





Interview with Former Director ICHIMURA SHINICHI

## Looking to the Past, Inspiring the Future

Interviewer: **Mieno Fumiharu** (Professor, CSEAS)

February 18, 2015 at Gakushi Kaikan in Tokyo

Professor Ichimura Shinichi joined the Center for Southeast Asian Studies (CSEAS) in 1968 and from 1969, for a period of 10 years, he devoted his time to strengthening the research foundations of CSEAS on many fronts. Professor Ichimura was one of the first generation of Japanese scholars to travel to the U.S. and receive a PhD (MIT) in the post-war period. After producing a remarkable body of work on dynamic growth models and macroeconomic models of the Japanese economy, he participated in the founding of CSEAS. While dedicating himself to both the fields of economics and social science, he was, in a broad perspective, at the forefront of creating the research foundations for multidisciplinary Southeast Asian Studies. These efforts formed one origin of Southeast Asian Studies in Japan, and moreover produced mutual exchanges between Japan and the U.S. as well as between countries in Southeast Asia.

In celebration of the 50th year of the founding of CSEAS, Professor Mieno Fumiharu interviews Professor Emeritus Ichimura Shinichi on the early days, the hardships, and different episodes as well as his connection with the region. Professor Ichimura shares his views on the past and present. This interview is accompanied by a list of his life works (up to 2015).

**Mieno:** You assumed your post in 1968, right after the establishment of CSEAS and worked as a director for 10 years, between April 1969 to March 1979. To begin with how did you came to pursue Southeast Asian Studies?

**Ichimura:** My academic career started as an ordinary economist with greater interest in economic theory when I graduated in 1949 from the faculty of economics at Kyoto University and found a job as a research associate at Wakayama University. In the same year, I passed the examination for the GARIOA fellowship of the US government, so in the following year, 1950, I was able to pursue graduate studies at Columbia University and further at MIT with other fellowships to obtain my PhD degree in 1953. My dissertation was on Nonlinear Theories of Business Cycles. Clearly my interest remained in mathematical economic theory. Then I returned home to teach at Wakayama University. In 1956, I moved to Osaka University, occupying a position in the Faculty of Economics, which a few years later was expanded to the Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) under the leadership of Professor Takata Yasuma (1883–1972).

During those 12 years at ISER, my professional interest gradually shifted to

empirical studies of the Japanese economy. I was fortunate in participating in and guiding a government Project of the Interindustrial Table in Japan from the very beginning and published its applications: *The Structure of Japanese Economy* (Ichimura 1957). Soon with the support of the Kansai Economic Federation, I headed another project to pioneer in producing an authentic Inter-regional Input-Output Table in Japan and published its applications for regional analysis as the *Japanese Economy and Regional Economy* (Ichimura 1958). In 1959–60 I was invited to lecture on mathematical economics at Johns Hopkins University. When I came home, ISER had been given a research grant by the Rockefeller Foundation to invite any outstanding economists from abroad. I proposed to invite Professor Lawrence R. Klein (1920–2013) and under his guidance we started a big project to construct an Osaka ISER Model of Japanese Economy. As it turned out, the construction of a large macro-econometric model of a national economy was very difficult and time-consuming in data collection and computation of equations even with the best computers available in Japan and the U.S. back then. In 1961, I was elected as a fellow of the Econometric Society and became a professor next year. In the early 1960s I devoted my entire energy to nothing but the construction and estimation of important blocks of this ISER



model, competing with the Brookings Model in the U.S. In 1967–68 I was invited to the University of California, Berkeley to teach mathematical economics and econometrics, and in 1968–69 to the University of Pennsylvania, as Prof. Klein kindly told me, mainly to complete the Osaka ISER Model. In Berkeley I finished the construction of the monetary sector and completed the entire ISER model. In Philadelphia, I tested, over and over again, the workability of the Model as a whole, modifying many parts of our system of equations. It was a tedious and attentive process of hard-work, particularly because I had to linearize all the non-linear endogenous variables and produce a matrix to be converted. I completed this process with the best computer at the University of Pennsylvania and made our dynamic multipliers of Osaka ISER Model available in Working Papers of Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates (WEFA), University of Pennsylvania and ISER, Osaka U. They are available now in *Macroeconometric Modeling of Japan* (Ichimura and Klein 2010).

Early June 1967, I came home after two years abroad, when Professor Iwamura Shinobu (Mongol History; 1905–88) of the Institute for Research in Humanities and Professor Inoki Masamichi (Political Science; 1914–2012) of the Faculty of Law at Kyoto University came to see me. They told me about a plan at Kyoto University to establish a new institute for Asian Studies and asked me to become its director. They enthusiastically explained that while the institutes of Asian Studies in Western countries predominantly focused on political and economic problems, scholars at Kyoto University were conceiving a different approach to Asian Studies in aiming at a more comprehensive Area Research including the studies of the region's natural environment, eco-system, and culture as well as its political economy. They seemed hopefully to cover social, natural, and medical sciences as well, so far as they are relevant to the development of the region.

Naturally I asked why they chose me for this challenging position to direct the research institute. They mentioned three reasons; firstly, I was a graduate from the department of Malay Language, Osaka College of Foreign Languages (now the Faculty of Foreign Languages, Osaka University). Secondly, I had already published an article of development economics as an Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) Monograph so that I might be interested in development economics. Thirdly, my international experiences were very suitable to guide this internationally oriented institute. Nobody else was more suitable for the position.

However, I told them that my knowledge of Indonesian had deteriorated so much that I could not even read the newspaper without a dictionary. My knowledge of development economics was just at the level of standard text books. I may be known as an economic theorist and econometrician but not as an expert on Asian Studies. My international association and experiences may be very useful for the new institute. As such, I asked to be given some time to think it over. True, soon after I came back from the University of Pennsylvania, I told some close friends that I might become more interested in Asian underdeveloped economies rather than Japan. This was because Japan in the late 60s appeared to have already become very prosperous, and I felt that economics could make greater contributions by studying other Asian economies.

As a matter of fact, my motivation to choose economics as my life's work at the age of 21 was to contribute something to save Japan from postwar poverty, so my concern with the issue of North-South problems was very deep in my heart. Nevertheless, until then I had specialized in economic theory and applied econometrics under given circumstances. Therefore, even before the visit of Prof. Iwamura and Prof. Inoki, I was feeling somewhat uneasy in continuing a standard trajectory as an economist, while being satisfied with good publications in economic theory, Input Output analysis and macro econometric modeling of

Japan before any comparable models in the U.S. In fact, I was contemplating to switch the area of my own research from Japan to Asian countries after accomplishing one more work on Japanese business cycles, particularly inventory cycles. As soon as I came home in 1967, I began a re-estimation of inventories in the government statistics. Then all of a sudden came the offer from Kyoto. Had its timing been after the research of inventory cycles was completed, I would have accepted the offer with little hesitation.

Moreover, I thought of the heavy obligation at the age of 43 to take on the post of director of an interdisciplinary research center. Obviously I expected also the strong objection from my colleagues at Osaka University such as Director Yasui Takuma (1909–95) and Professors Nikaido Fukukane (1923–2001), Tatemoto Masahiro (1924–97), and Hatanaka Michio.

Meanwhile, I learned about an increasing trend in the West and Japan toward establishing institutions for Asian Studies and recognized North-South issues as one of the most challenging problems of the late 20th century. I would have tackled it someday. However, that someday came too early. It took me a little more than a month to make up my mind and in the end I decided to accept the offer. The prime reason was a voice from within telling me: “if I do not take it now, there might be no next time for some top university in Japan to tackle contemporary Asian Studies,” and “if you are willing to undertake it, do it from the beginning and realize what you really want to do.” I deeply regret, though, that my decision was a heavy blow to my best friends at ISER.

**Mieno:** Would you please tell us how CSEAS came about to be established at Kyoto University and what was the background to its establishment?

**Ichimura:** The key architect in designing the concept of this Center for Southeast Asian Studies (CSEAS) was Professor Iwamura Shinobu. He was a rare specialist on the socio-economic history of Mongolia and an experienced field researcher on such dry regions as Persia and Mongolia. However, before I share his contributions, I must talk about a special circumstance at Kyoto University back then. That was the students' and some leftist faculty members' movements sweeping the campus of major universities in Japan. They opposed the confirmation in 1970 of the U.S.-Japan Security Pact and the U.S.' continuation of the Vietnam War. At Kyoto University they took up also the Ford Foundation's grant for CSEAS as an additional target to object to. For Kyoto University to establish a new research institute, the plan must be approved by the University Council. Fortunately, the majority of faculty deans and institute directors' professors supported the Center's establishment. The central figure who took on the role of resolving this controversy at the university council was Professor Okuda Azuma (1905–99), dean of the Faculty of Agriculture then. He soon became the President of Kyoto University and pushed the plan to create CSEAS officially and establish it with the approval of the Ministry of Education in 1965.



Prof. Iwamura cooperated with Prof. Inoki in designing the direction of research plans of CSEAS at the formative stage. They were familiar with Western scholars' research projects in underdeveloped countries. At that time, academic circles in the West were discussing "area research" or "area study" as a new research field. Leading researchers were, however, those who had been involved in Oriental Studies or associated with the training of colonial officials in the East before WWII. Due to meeting the needs of the time, their area study was intended to organize knowledge for policies for postwar Asia. The government and foundations in the U.S. also approved large budgets to support such research institutes as Cornell University and others. Central to their research was political science.

In Japan, however, the situation was very different. As for Asian Studies before and during WWII, the Research Department of Manchurian Railway Co. was the most authoritative and had been conducting a full-scale research on China, while collecting large amounts of documents and materials. Just before Japan's surrender, important materials and documents were shipped back to Japan and dispersed to Yamaguchi, Kyushu, and other Universities. Their staff were also transferred to those institutions. These and other streams of researchers, who had recognized the importance of Asian Studies, served as a driving force for the government to create the Institute of Developing Economies (Ajia Keizai Kenkyusho) in Tokyo in 1960.

In academic circles, the University of Tokyo had the Institute for Oriental Cultures (after 2009, the Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia), and Kyoto University had the Institute for Research in Humanities. Both have emphasized Chinese Studies. Kyoto University added another department of Occidental Studies. The research in both universities remained with an emphasis on historical studies. I heard that at the University of Tokyo there was another area-oriented stream in the College of Liberal Arts. Its language teachers of English, German, French, and others did not only study literature but also history, society, and culture. I also heard of some professors planning to form organizations of Area Studies by language groups. I do not know what happened to the plans later.

The interest in Asia at Kyoto University was more widespread including many faculties and it was comprehensive. In Medical Science, for instance, there were researchers of Tropical Diseases, just like in Taipei Imperial University. Among them was Professor Nishiura Mitsugu (1920–85) and his group who devoted themselves to research on leprosy, which was found quite common in Burma since WWII. In the Faculty of Engineering, there were specialists on black ore, a kind of ironstone peculiar to Akita prefecture in Japan and Indonesia. The Faculty of Agriculture had many researchers, who had conducted Tropical Agriculture and Forestry in Indonesia, Thai, and the Philippines during WWII, regarded Asian Studies as essential to their work. The Faculty of Science was in charge of Geography and their great scholars had a strong orientation toward fieldwork. They had thoroughly explored and travelled different regions of the Asian Continent up to the Himalayas since WWII and in the postwar periods. They were well known as a group who assembled to embark on Antarctic Exploration. They are also the ones to have established the Institute of Ethnology Science (Minzokugaku Kenkyusho) later. One famous leader, Professor Umesao Tadao (1920–2010) argued for a unique "Ecology of Cultures" or "Ecological View of History." He had already been practicing fieldwork all over Asia during the war. Everyone was sure that if those brilliant scholars or their disciples could be mobilized, we could expect outstanding Asian Studies. However, the problem was where to start from. Since China was still in a state of civil war, Southeast Asia appeared as the only opening. As a measure to explore any possibility, the university council decided in 1963 to set up a "committee for Southeast Asian Studies." I heard that they initially had a wider Asian region in mind. Just at that time the Ford Foundation suggested establishing a research center related to Asia. The University of Tokyo and Kyoto University were the first to be called on. I do not know if any other universities received the same request. I heard that the University of Tokyo turned it down in view of the expected backlash from leftist students and some faculty members who had already started the anti-Vietnam war movement. (President Kennedy dispatched the US forces to South Vietnam in 1960.)

At Kyoto University, however, many professors shared the opinion that they might ignore such international political affairs in connection with establishing a

research center, because Asian Studies were long-lasting activities and should be considered as more important than politics. We thought that political economy required due attention, but our interests in Southeast Asia and China were much broader and long-lasting. Thus, Prof. Iwamura summarized the views of leading scholars at Kyoto University to guide the direction of research at CSEAS under three principles, namely;

1. We combine the area studies of human and social sciences with those of natural ecology.
2. We emphasize contemporary studies.
3. We emphasize field surveys rather than textual reading.

When I came to CSEAS and learned about these principles, I whole-heartedly agreed.

**Mieno:** Would you please tell us about the challenges you faced when you assumed your post and how you tackled them during the 10 years of your service as director?

**Ichimura:** The greatest challenge at first was fostering capable specialists. In Japan then were very few specialists available working on Southeast Asia. Thus, my first task was to contemplate the adequate composition of specialized fields for CSEAS and in what order we could realize this. Needless to say, we hardly had a fixed plan. I decided to sail out with the uncertain hope of training future core academics in several essential fields such as agronomy, ecology, sociology, anthropology, economics, and political science. We publicly solicited postgraduate students not only from Kyoto University but also from all over Japan with the promise of fellowships for doctoral courses in the best universities. Simultaneously I asked my friends to recommend young staff to study abroad and work on Southeast Asia later.

However, I required every student who passed the first test to visit Southeast Asian countries; tour around for a short period of time; and report what he/she observed to me. This was an adequacy test for candidates. During this period, I did inspections to see how they lived and what they studied. I met their teachers and asked about their impressions of our students. It was to show them the reality of less-developed countries in Asia and to see if they could adjust themselves to the tough environments of Southeast Asia and carry out research work. We sent only those who passed the exam to postgraduate schools in the West. They all became great scholars. We asked those who failed in the exam to abandon Southeast Asian Study. Among this generation, Professors Tsubouchi Yoshihiro and Tachimoto Narifumi later assumed the post of director.

We never applied this attitude uniformly to everyone. Before I took office, there were Professor Motooka Takeshi (1915–82) and Associate Professor Ishii Yoneo (1929–2010). Some younger staff were recruited with graduate training at Kyoto University. Even for those I tried to find some European University for their further learning and international experiences or some universities to visit for similar purposes. In the case of Prof. Motooka, we permitted his long-term leave, right after the start of CSEAS, to Indonesian government and the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations), judging that it would be of great benefit to CSEAS in the long run. Although Assoc. Prof. Ishii was very proficient in Thai language and an authority on Buddhism and politics in Thailand, we told him that so long as he was aspiring to be an academic, he would greatly benefit by having an opportunity to interact with important European scholars in the early stage of his career. As he agreed, I consulted with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo and made a decision to admit his two-year leave to SOAS (School of Oriental and African Studies) in London University as a local researcher of the Ministry. Research associates Fukui Hayao (young agronomist on rice growing in Thailand) and Tsuchiya Kenji (1942–95, working on the nationalist movement in Indonesia) went to study at National Agricultural College, Wageningen (now Wageningen University) and Leiden University respectively in the Netherlands. There are many other similar cases with other staff. I tried to do my best in giving the similar chances to my colleagues until around 1975. Then, Tsubouchi came back from the University of Michigan, Tachimoto from the University of Chicago with PhDs. Many others became full-fledged scholars and returned home one



after another. With the presence of about 10 splendid scholars, the atmosphere in research conversations at the center completely changed. Even when foreigners were invited, they could carry out discussions in English. It provided a comfortable environment for those foreigners as well. People from Southeast Asia, who had attained their PhD and returned home, were also happy to come to CSEAS even for three months. Having seen international academic exchange getting on track, I thought my work was almost done.

**Mieno:** I have heard that in the 1960s setting up local offices overseas in Bangkok and Jakarta was the first of its kind as a national university and was not easy to realize.

**Ichimura:** The difficulties are two-fold: financial and legal. The Bangkok office had already been set up before I assumed the post. The expenses were provided by the Ford Foundation's grant. In Thailand, there were no regulations for a foreign university to set up its local office. However, in Indonesia, I was told that they had not given legal permission to build a branch office to any foreign university. The Ford Foundation was the only one that had been granted the permit for a certain period of time. I held several discussions with universities and government authorities and finally went further to obtain consent from a minister to rent a residential house as a non-official Jakarta liaison office for CSEAS. However, there were some more difficulties in setting it up.


To lease a house, it was customary to make the two-year advanced rent payment. How could we possibly handle it with our annual budget system in Japan? Next was our transportation for daily living and field research. We needed a jeep. But it was very expensive, because the import tax was 100 percent. What you could buy with one million yen in Japan would cost more than two million. We had no such budget. Moreover, due to the foreign exchange control, at the time we could not send foreign currency from Japan. Searching for a way to solve this problem, I consulted with a Toyota Tokyo branch office manager. Our deal was to pay at the Tokyo office and get the car delivered in Jakarta.

It was also difficult to employ a housekeeper and a driver. The Japanese Ministry of Education could not spare any of their budget for this purpose legally to let us use it outside Japan. I held talks with the Director General of the university department, Ministry of Education. Finally thanks to his wise decision, it worked out by applying the rule *mutatis mutandis* for special institutes like the Disaster Prevention Research Institute to be allowed for spending outside Kyoto or their domestic observatory facilities.

**Mieno:** I heard that the grant we received from the Ford Foundation right after the establishment was suspended due to trouble on campus. What was the role of external funds?

**Ichimura:** CSEAS received Ford Foundation's grants twice; first \$350,000—right after establishment, and second, \$300,000 in 1968. The trouble with the opposition groups was about the second grant after I became director. In the case of the first grant, there was some objections as I already mentioned, but they were overcome, as CSEAS was much less politicized, covering science and medical studies, so that it had little ideological opposition. When members of the Ford Foundation visited Kyoto to meet Professors Okuda, Iwamura, and Inoki, the discussion were friendly and they came to the conclusion that they would receive a grant over a three-year period. We utilized the funds as an initial endowment mainly for fostering Southeast Asian specialists as I described.

Soon after we received the second grant from Ford Foundation, however, the campus of Kyoto University was thrown into utter disorder by radical student groups and extremely leftist faculty members, to the extent that many classrooms were prevented from teaching in and university council meetings had to be held outside the campus. Even the deans of many faculties became at least temporarily compromising with anti-American discourses. Thus, the university council itself made a blunder of violating its own the long-established rule: "never discuss the same matter again" (*Ichiji fusaigi no gensoku*). Thus, President Okuda, having approved and received once the second grant of the Ford Foundation with the agreement of University Council, had to return the remaining amount of about



\$200,000. As a director, I was furious and extremely sorry about the whole process and protested bitterly to the University Council and President Okuda, who personally expressed his deepest regret and promised me to do his best in compensating this great loss of CSEAS.

CSEAS was already in the full swing training young staff and carrying out research projects in Southeast Asia. How could I stop all of these and call them back as the director? The only way out I could think of was, under my own responsibility and without involving Kyoto University at all, to petition a Japanese foundation and Ford Foundation to share half and half a donation for Southeast Asian Studies. Luckily the Kansai Economic Research Center (KERC a non-profit foundation in Osaka which had supported ISER, Osaka University and the managing director Kato Yoshio and Chairman of Board, Ashihara Yoshishige [1901–2003]) readily agreed and wrote a proposal letter to the Ford Foundation. They sent a representative to confirm the proposal and negotiate the details of a grant to KERC. Thus, we restored the lost research funds of \$200,000 to fully continue our original plan with no changes. You can imagine how grateful we all were. I would say that thanks to this additional support of both foundations, we were able to swiftly lay the foundations of CSEAS.

I would like to add a few words about the strict accounting of those external donations. Japanese Ministry accounting was strictly managed and accurately reported as “Trust Accounts” (*Inin Keirikin*) every year by CSEAS’s accounting section head. I myself prepared reports in English all by myself and sent them to the Ford Foundation and KERC every year, as I had promised. Both foundations were very respectable and never complained about my reports, except for a polite letters saying “Thank you for sending your accurate accounting reports.” We repeat our hearty appreciation for their generosity.

**Mieno:** The 1970s was a time when CSEAS underwent a rapid expansion of research chairs and staff. Were there any difficulties with this?

**Ichimura:** I had a hard time figuring out the composition of research chairs and their priority to materialize. For instance, my first request was a chair for population research, since no national university had the chair. It was given immediately. As we increased our chairs to the fifth then sixth, our justification for additional chairs became increasingly competitive with other universities.

Soon I discovered that few institutions overseas like Cornell University did not serve as a model. I had a series of discussions on Area Studies within CSEAS and researchers abroad, but that is still a challenge for successors.

A composition of chairs in a certain institute is important, originally due to the balancing of research fields and education as well as integrating special research outcomes. This is similar to the composition of courses in teaching faculties. Since “area study” was a new field, its appropriate methodology had been argued abroad and I also wrote several articles on the subject. For the reason of a lack of better integration, I felt some kind of encyclopedic approach could be a compromise. When I was a director, I paid due attention to this problem to balance various research fields. In reality, however, balance was maintained often through the restructuring process of Kyoto University after my retirement in 1988. That is what it seems to me.

For the realignment of research fields at CSEAS, leadership will be required. Without having a leader, who had properly pursued his learning, and with some directors switching every few years, it may be difficult to create a strong institution.

Furthermore, an institute is not a place where individual researchers or small groups can work, following their own individual interests. The institute has its own objectives and missions. How to achieve a collaborative mission should be fully acknowledged among the professors before conducting their own research. If a part of them would simply carry out their individual research, without gaining approval from other scholars, it could lead to the self-destruction of the institute. Organizing a special research project that joins faculties and institutes can be advised. Our institute requires a comprehensive vision to focus on the issues that lie in Southeast Asia. Our institute exists for this sake.

**Mieno:** During the last 20 years, Southeast Asia has seen a great transformation

in its society and economy, which are the subject of much research. What is your opinion about relations between changes in time and the mission of our institute?

**Ichimura:** I think that an institute is not something that should pursue the same field forever. Once research in a certain field has made considerable progress, then we can say enough is enough and switch to pursuing other fields. Although research on Southeast Asia was originally about underdevelopment study, reality has changed. As the nature of regional issues change, our research approach must do so too.

At an extreme, if there arises a situation in which regular political scientists and economists are studying in their faculties on this, then we can stop operating as an institute of Southeast Asia. With Natural Sciences, for instance, there had once been a laboratory on the radar at MIT but they also stopped operating, saying there were private enterprises studying the same thing. The same is true with Food Science. I think that is the way it should be. In that sense too, a research institute is not a place where individuals are allowed to conduct their research on their own. When they find the mission of the institute no longer suitable to their personal interests, then that should basically be the time for them to quit. Still, if the institute would not be able to introduce them to another laboratory, which they could move on to, this could create a sensitive situation. This often happens in the area of Natural Sciences which experience rapid changes. There might be fewer cases like this in the field of Social Science and Humanities, while Area Studies might fall in the middle.

**Mieno:** Thank you very much for sharing your serious thoughts on the future of the institute. Though we are celebrating our 50th anniversary, you are the one of the people who worked as a director from the time of its establishment for a period of 10 years. I hope that we can continue to turn to you for your continuous favor and kind guidance for the future.

## References

- Ichimura Shinichi 市村真一. 1957. *Nihon Keizai no Kozo: Sangyo Renkan Bunseki* 日本経済の構造——産業連関分析 [The structure of Japanese economy]. Tokyo: Sobunsha.
- . 1958. *Nihon Keizai to Chiiki Keizai: Kinki Chiiki Sangyo Renkan Bunseki* 日本経済と地域経済——近畿地域産業連関分析 [Japanese economy and regional economy]. Tokyo: Sobunsha.
- Ichimura, Shinichi; and Klein, Lawrence R., eds. 2010. *Macroeconometric Modeling of Japan*. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co.



# List of Monographs and Collected Papers of Ichimura Shinichi

This is a list of monographs and main articles and essays by Shinichi Ichimura in the area of economics and related sciences on Japanese and Asian issues. In this list the titles in non-English are translated into English. The original languages are indicated after the published year by the signs such as (J): Japanese; (C): Chinese; (F): French, (I): Indonesian, and (S): Spanish. Notes on author column: S-auth = single author = S. Ichimura; Co-auth = with other authors; Ed = edited and written by S. Ichimura; Co-ed = edited and written with others; Sp = supervised. The names of co-author or co-editor are given at the right-hand corner of the title column.

## I. MONOGRAPHS

No	Year	Title	Author	Publisher
1	1951 (J)	<i>(National Income and Resources)</i> (N. Kamakura)	Co-auth	Kobundo
2	1953	<i>An Inquiry into Nonlinear Theories of Economic Fluctuations</i>	S-auth	MIT Dissertation
3	1954 (J)	<i>(The Structure of Economic Circulation)</i>	S-auth	Sobun-sha
4	1957-1 (J)	<i>(The Structure of the Japanese Economy: Input-Output Analysis)</i>	S-auth	Sobun-sha
5	1957-2	<i>The Historical Development of Economic Dynamics</i>	S-auth	Japan Science Council
6	1958-1 (J)	<i>(Japanese Economy and Regional Economy)</i>	Sp	Sobun-sha
7	1958-2 (J)	<i>(Applications of Interindustrial Study)</i>	Ed	Yuhikaku
8	1960-1 (J)	<i>(The Future of Japanese Economy)</i>	Sp	Yuhikaku
9	1960-2 (J)	<i>(The Future of Okayama Prefecture)</i>	Sp	Okayama Pref.
10	1960-3	<i>Programming Techniques for Development</i> (J. Tinbergen <i>et al.</i> )	Co-auth	ECAFE
11	1962 (J)	<i>(Missions of Educators)</i>	Ed	Japan Education Association
12	1964 (J)	<i>(Euro-American Education and Japanese Education)</i>	S-auth	Sobun-sha
13	1965 (J)	<i>(The Japanese Economy in the World)</i>	S-auth	Chuokoron-sha
14	1968-1 (J)	<i>(Books Recommended for Contemporary Students)</i> (Aida; Nagai; and Uno)	Co-ed	Kodan-sha
15	1968-2 (J)	<i>(Management Methods in Computer Age)</i> (Translation)	Sp	Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha
16	1969 (J)	<i>(Twenty Recommendations for University Reform)</i> (M. Kohsaka; and T. Yoshida)	Co-ed	Sobun-sha
17	1970 -1 (J)	<i>(How to Comprehend the Contemporary World?)</i>	S-auth	Kodan-sha
18	1970-2 (J)	<i>(Economic Power on Trial)</i>	S-auth	Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha
19	1970-3 (J)	<i>(Readings in Econometric Models of Japanese Economy)</i> (M. Tatamoto)	Co-ed	Toyokeizai Shimpō
20	1973 (J)	<i>(Thinking of Southeast Asia)</i>	Ed	Sobun-sha
21	1974-1 (J)	<i>(Southeast Asia: Nature, Society and Development)</i> Tr ← {28}	Ed	Sobun-sha
22	1974-2 (J)	<i>(Economic and Political Trends in the Soviet' Bloc)</i> (M. Inoki)	Co-ed	Sobun-sha
23	1975-1 (J)	<i>(The Economic Development of East and Southeast Asia)</i> Tr ← {24}	Ed	Sobun-sha
24	1975-2	<i>The Economic Development of East and Southeast Asia</i>	Ed	U of Hawaii Press
25	1975-3	<i>The Regional Economic Survey of the Province of South Sumatra, 1970-71</i> (K. Thee)	Co-auth	LIPI, Jakarta; and CSEAS
26	1975-4 (I)	<i>(Indonesia: Various Issues and Events)</i> (Koentjoroningrat)	Co-ed	Obor, Jakarta
27	1976 (J)	<i>(In the Stream of History)</i>	S-auth	Sobun-sha
28	1977-1	<i>Southeast Asia: Nature, Society and Development</i>	Ed	U of Hawaii Press
29	1977-2	<i>An Econometric Analysis of the Japanese Economy</i> (L. R. Klein <i>et al.</i> )	Co-ed	Japanese Society for Asian Study
30	1978	<i>Econometric Models of Asian Countries I</i>	Ed	Association of Development Research Institutes in the Pacific and Asia
31	1979 (J)	<i>(Economic Development of Communist China)</i> (Translation of ①)	Sp	Sobun-sha
32	1980-1 (J)	<i>(Japanese Firms in Asia)</i>	Ed	Toyokeizai Shimpō

No	Year	Title	Author	Publisher
33	1980-2	<i>Econometric Models of Asian Countries II</i>	Ed	Association of Development Research Institutes in the Pacific and Asia
34	1981 (J)	<i>(Japanese Education: Ideals and Sufferings)</i>	Ed	Sobun-sha
35	1985-1(J)	<i>(Wishing to Normalize Japanese Education)</i>	S-auth	Sobun-sha
36	1985-2 (J)	<i>(Searching for the Course of Japanese Economy)</i>	S-auth	Sobun-sha
37	1985-3	<i>Econometric Models of Asian Link</i> (M. Ezaki)	Co-ed	Springer Verlag
38	1988-1 (J)	<i>(Japanese Style Management Rooting in Asia)</i>	Ed	Toyokeizai Shimpō
39	1988-2	<i>The Challenges of Asian Developing Countries</i>	Ed	Asian Productivity Org.
40	1988-3	<i>Indonesian Economic Development</i>	Ed	JICA
41	1988-4 (J)	<i>(The Political Economy of Contemporary Japan)</i> (M. Kosaka)	Co-ed	PHP Inst.
42	1989-1 (I)	<i>(Indonesian Economic Development)</i> Indonesian Tr ← [40] (S. Odano)	Co-ed	U of Indonesia Press
43	1989-2	<i>The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy</i> (Urrutia; and Yukawa)	Co-ed	UN University Press
44	1993-1	<i>The Role of Japan in Asia</i>	S-auth	ICS Press
45	1993-2	<i>Econometric Models of Asian-Pacific Countries</i> (Y. Matsumoto)	Co-ed	Springer-Verlag
46	1994-1 (C)	<i>(Japanese Economy, Development and International Relations)</i> (Se Wen, ed /trans.)	S-auth	Beijing UP
47	1994-2 (J)	<i>(Transitional Economies in Asia)</i> (K. Miyamoto)	Co-ed	OIU
48	1998-1	<i>Political Economy of Japanese and Asian Development</i>	S-auth	Springer-Verlag
49	1998-2 (J)	<i>(Japanese Style Management in China)</i>	Ed	Toyokeizai Shimpō
50	1999-1	<i>East Asian Economic Development</i> (F. G. Adams)	Co-ed	Praeger Pub.
51	2000	<i>Econometric Modeling of China</i> (L. R. Klein)	Co-ed	WSPC
52	2001-1 (J)	<i>(Foundation of Economics)</i> (2001-04 text editions)	S-auth	Sobun-sha
53	2003-1	<i>Interregional Input-Output Analysis of Chinese Economy</i> (H. J. Wang)	Co-ed	WSPC
54	2003-2 (J)	<i>(Political Economy of Japanese and Asian Development)</i> Tr ← {48} (tr. by S. Nagao)	S-auth	Sobun-sha
55	2003-3 (J)	<i>(Economics of Harbors and Regions)</i> (M. Doi, ed.)	Sp	Taga Shuppan
56	2004-1 (J)	<i>(Interregional Input-Output Analysis of Chinese Economy)</i> Tr ← {53}	Co-ed	Sobun-sha
57	2004-2 (J)	<i>(Asian Development and Decentralization)</i> Tr ← {58} (R. Bahl)	Ed	Kitakyushu City
58	2004-3	<i>Development and Decentralization in Asia</i>	Ed	Kitakyushu City
59	2004-4 (J)	<i>(Who Has Defended the Japanese Education)</i>	S-auth	Sobun-sha
60	2005-1 (J)	<i>(Asian Automobile Industry and China's Challenge)</i> (Yoshimatsu; Liu; and Findley)	Sp	Sobun-sha
61	2005-2 (C)	<i>(Interregional IO Analysis of Chinese Eco.)</i> (Chinese tr. by Li Shantong)	Co-ed	Zai-Kei, Beijing
62	2006-1 (J)	<i>(Econometric Modeling of China)</i> Tr ← {51}	Co-ed	Sobun-sha
63	2006-2 (J)	<i>(My Postwar 60 Years)</i>	S-auth	Naigai News
64	2008-1 (J)	<i>(Revised Fundamental Law of Education and Teachers Attitude)</i>	S-auth	Kogakkan U Press
65	2008-2	<i>Decentralization Policies in Asian Development</i> (R. Bahl)	Co-ed	WSPC
66	2009	<i>Transition from Socialist to Market Economies</i> (T. Sato; W. and James)	Co-ed	Palgrave-Mcmillan
67	2010	<i>Macroeconometric Modeling of Japan</i> (L. R. Klein)	Co-d	WSPC
68	2011 (J)	<i>(Macroeconometric Modeling of Japan)</i> Tr ← {67}	Co-ed	Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha
69	2012-1 (J)	<i>(Japan's Two Problems: Royal Law and the Long Recession)</i>	S-auth	Kokumin-kaikan
70	2012-2 (J)	<i>(Unless Royal Family Law Is Revised, No Prince Will be)</i>	S-auth	Fujiwara Shoten
71	2015	<i>Japan and Asia: Economic Development and Nation Building</i>	S-auth	WSPC
72	2016 (J)	<i>(Benevolent Teachers and Beneficial Friends)</i> (in prep)	S-auth	Sobun-sha

① Liu, T. C.; Eckstein, A.; and Galenson, W. (eds.), *Economic Trends of Communist China*, Aldine, Chicago, 1969.



## II. ARTICLES AND ESSAYS

### 1949 and 50s

No	Year	Titles of Articles	Published Places
1	1949 (J)	(Hicks' Theory of the Firm)	<i>Studies in Modern Economic Theory</i> , 1
2	1951-1	A Critical Note on the Definition of Related Goods	<i>Review of Economic Studies</i>
3	1951-2 (J)	(Changes in Taste and Demand: J.R. Hicks vs O. Lange)	<i>The Economic Review</i> , 67-4/5 (May)
4	1951-3 (J)	(The Multiplier Analysis of Changing Process)	<i>The Economic Review</i> , 68-1/2/3 (September)
5	1953-1	A Note on the Concept of Consumers' Surplus	<i>Econometrica</i> , 21-3(July)
6	1953-2	A Tentative Non-linear Theory of Economic Fluctuations in the Purely Competitive Economic System I, II	<i>The Economic Review</i> (Oct. 1953 and Apr. 1954)
7	1954-1	Toward a General Nonlinear Dynamic Theory of Economic Fluctuations	Published in ①
8	1954-2 (J)	(From Analyzing Dependence on Trade to Non-linear Programming)	<i>The Economic Review</i> , 5-2 (April)
9	1954-3 (J)	(The Determination of National Income Level Reconsidered)	<i>The Economic Theory</i> , No. 19 (May)
10	1954-4 (J)	(Three Note on Non-linear Cycle Theory)	<i>Economic Studies Quarterly</i> , 5-1/2 (Jun)
11	1954-5 (J)	(Economic Growth Theory: Introduction)	Published in ②
12	1954-6 (J)	(On Economic Growth Theory)	<i>The Economic Theory</i> , No. 21(May)
13	1954-7 (J)	Fundamental Disequilibrium of the Japanese Economy and the Structure of World Trade	<i>Economic Analysis</i> (MITI), 16
14	1955-1	Notes on Non-linear Business Cycle Theories	<i>Osaka Economic Papers</i> , March
15	1955-2 (J)	(A Critical Note on Hicksian Business Cycle Theory)	<i>Economic Theory</i> , No. 25 (May)
16	1955-3 (J)	(Three Notes on Input-Output Analysis)	<i>Economic Studies Quarterly</i> , 6-1/2 (December)
17	1956-1 (J)	(Some Calculated Findings of IO Analysis of Japanese Economy)	The Statistical Research Association
18	1956-2 (J)	(Shortage of Resources and Nation's Capacity)	<i>The Economic Theory</i> , No. 33
19	1956-3 (F)	(Expansion Economique et Cycles)	Published in ③
20	1957-1 (J)	(Economic Growth and Business Cycles)	Published in ④ (August)
21	1957-2 (J)	(An Analysis of Reinvestment Cycles)	<i>Osaka U Economics</i> , 7-3 (November)
22	1959	Factors Proportions and Foreign Trade: The Case of Japan (M. Tatamoto)	<i>Review of Economics and Statistics</i>

Notes: Most departments of economics in Japanese Universities publish the journals of their own: Kyoto U : *The Economic Review*; Wakayama U: *The Economic Theory* and so on.

① Kurihara, K. (ed.), *Post-Keynesian Economics*, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 1954.

② Takata, Y. (ed.) (J), *Studies of Economic Growth*, Vol. I, Yuhi-kaku, Tokyo, 1954.

③ CNRS (ed.) (F), *Les Modeles Dynamiques en Econometrie*, Paris, 1957.

④ Takata, Y. (ed.) (J), *Studies of Economic Growth: Growth and Stability*, Vol. III, Yuhi-kaku, Tokyo, 1957.

### 1960s

No	Year	Titles of Articles	Published Places
23	1960-1	The Structure and Growth of the Japanese Economy (S. Miyano)	ISER Discussion Paper, Osaka U
24	1960-2 (J)	(The Structure and Growth of the Japanese Economy)	Published in ①
25	1962 (J)	(Demand and Supply Functions of Money)	<i>Economic Studies Quarterly</i> , 12-2
26	1963-1	A Dynamic I-O Model of Japanese Economy	ISER Discussion Paper, Osaka U
27	1963-2 (J)	(To Improve the Long-Term Forecast of Japanese Economy)	Published in ②
28	1964-1	A Quarterly Econometric Model of Postwar Japanese Economy: 1951-59*	<i>Osaka Economic Papers</i> (March and July)
29	1964-2 (J)	(Japanese Export Functions: 1952-59) (E. Eguchi)	<i>Economic Studies Quarterly</i> , 14-2
30	1964-3 (J)	(On Identities in the Monetary Sector)	<i>Economic Studies Quarterly</i> , 14-2
31	1964-4	A Quarterly Econometric Model of Postwar Japanese Economy: 1952-61*	<i>Osaka Economic Papers</i> (July)
32	1964-5 (J)	An Estimation of the Demand for Water in Tokyo (Y. Shinakai)	Sangyo Keikaku Kaigi (September)
33	1964-6 (J)	(Fundamental Problems of Economic Growth)	Published in ③
34	1964-7 (J)	(The Interwar Period of the World Economy and Analysis)	Published in ④

35	1965	A Model of Regional Planning	Published in ⑤
36	1966-1	An Econometric Model of Domestic Migration and Regional Economy	<i>The Regional Science A. Papers</i>
37	1966-2 (J)	(A Comment on the Relations between Price and Money Wages)	Published in ⑥
38	1967	Dynamic Properties of the Osaka Econometric Model of Postwar Japanese Economy: 1952-61 (L. Klein)	ISER Discussion Paper (June)
39	1968	Factors for Rapid Economic Growth	Published in ⑦
40	1969-1 (J)	(A Comment of Ono's Measurement of Philipp's C.)	Published in ⑧
41	1969-2	An Econometric Analysis of Postwar Japanese Economy-III: Detailed Discussion of the Osaka Model	CSEAS Discussion Paper, No. 4
42	1969-3	An Econometric Analysis of Postwar Japanese Economy-II: Outline of Osaka Model	CSEAS Discussion Paper, No. 6
43	1969-4	An Econometric Analysis of Postwar Japanese Economy-VI: Compilation of Data*	CSEAS Discussion Paper, No. 7

\* All these papers are the products of a joint project, co-authors are L.R. Klein, S. Koizumi, K. Sato and S. Shinkai.

① Morishima; Shinohara; and Uchida (eds.) (J), *New Economic Analysis*, Sobun-sha, Tokyo, 1960.

② Shinohara; and Uchida (eds.) (J), *Explorations of Japanese Economic Policies*, Toyokeizai Shimpō-sha, Tokyo, 1963.

③ Kumagai; Yasui; and Nishiyama (eds.) (J), *Lectures on Modern Economics*, Sobun-sha, Tokyo, 1964.

④ *Studies in Distribution Theory: Takata Memory Volume* (J), Yuhikaku, Tokyo, 1964.

⑤ *Papers & Proceedings of Regional Science Association*, Vol. 1, U of Tokyo Press, Tokyo, 1965.

⑥ Tachi; and Watanabe (eds.) (J), *Economic Growth and Finance*, Iwanami, Tokyo, 1967.

⑦ Klein, L. R.; and Ohkawa, K. (eds.), *Economic Growth*, Irwin, New York, 1968.

⑧ Niida; and Ono (eds.) (J), *Japanese Industrial Organization*, Iwanami, Tokyo, 1969.

## 1970s

No	Year	Titles of Articles	Published Places
44	1970	The Challenge of the Rising Sun	<i>Quadrant</i> , 14-6
45	1972-1	The Present State of Research on Urbanization and Its Effects on Cultural Changes in ASPAC Countries: A Bibliographic Survey (T. Fukuchi; and N. Sakashita)	<i>ASPAC Journal</i> *
46	1972-2 (J)	(An Economic Survey of South Sumatra Province)	<i>Southeast Asian Studies</i> , 10-3
47	1973	Japan's Stake in Asia	Published in ①
48	1974-1 (J)	(Problems with Japanese External Policies)	Published in ②
49	1974-2	The Socio-Economic Behavior of Peasants in Java and Central Thailand (K. Mizuno; Y. Tsubouchi, <i>et al.</i> )	<i>Southeast Asian Studies</i> , 12-3
50	1974-3	Japanese Entrepreneurship in the Early Stage of Economic Development	<i>Asian Profile</i> , 2-1
51	1974-4	Japan: The Rising Sun or the Sinking Ship: The Energy Problem and the Food Shortage	CSEAS Discussion Paper, No. 74
52	1974-5	Books on Japan: An Assorted Bibliography (T. Yano)	The Japan Foundation
53	1975-1	Interdisciplinary Research and Area Studies	<i>Journal of SEA Studies</i> , 6-2
54	1975-2	The Future Pattern of Japanese Economic and Political Relations with Southeast Asia (T. Yano)	CSEAS Discussion Paper, No. 81
55	1977-1	An Econometric Analysis of Japanese Exports and Imports	Published in ③
56	1977-2	A List of Quantitative Models of the National Economies in Asian Countries (M. Ezaki)	<i>ADIPA Inf. Service</i> , No. 17
57	1978-1 (J)	(The Image of Japan in the History Texts in Asia)	ESSO Oil Grant
58	1978-2	Multinational Corporations and Development Financing	Published in ④
59	1978-3	Argentine Economy and the World Food Market, Especially the Asian Market, Ten Year's Perspectives	CSEAS Discussion Paper, No. 102
60	1979-1 (J)	(Social Development and Agriculture in Asia)	<i>Southeast Asian Studies</i> , 17-2
61	1979-2 (J)	(Japanese Economy)	<i>International Encyclopedia Britannica</i>
62	1979-3	Econometric Models of East Asian Developing Economies and Asian Link Model	<i>Southeast Asian Studies</i> , 17-2

\* *Asia Pacific Quarterly of Cultural and Social Affairs* was published by Asia Pacific Center in Seoul.

① Taylor, A. (ed.), *Perspectives on US-Japan Economic Relations*, Ballinger, 1973.

② Kaizuka; and Yasuba (eds.) (J), *International Environment and Economic Policy*, Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, Tokyo, 1974.

③ Kosobud; and Minami (eds.), *Models of the Japanese Economy*, 1977.

④ ECPD, *National Financing of Economic Developing*, Beograd, 1978.



## 1980s

No	Year	Titles of Articles	Published Places
63	1980-1	Southeast and East Asia in 1980	<i>News Week</i> ; CSEAS Discussion Paper, No. 108
64	1980-2	On Linking National Econometric Models of Japan, US and Southeast Asian Countries	<i>Southeast Asian Studies</i> , 17-4
65	1980-3	Institutional Factors and Government Policies for Appropriate Technologies in Southeast Asia	ILO Working Paper, September
66	1980-4	Japan and Southeast Asia	<i>Asian Survey</i> , 20-7
67	1980-5 (J)	(Japanese Economy, 1979)	<i>Encyclopedia Britannica</i> , 1980
68	1980-6	The East and Southeast Asian Economies in 1980-1981	<i>Business Week</i> , October
69	1980-7	The Impact of Climatic Change on Human Society	WMO Conf. in Guangzhou
70	1980-8 (J)	(Problems of Developing Countries)	<i>Economics Encyclopedia</i> , Toyokeizai
71	1980-9 (J)	(Economic Security)	Published in ①
72	1980-10 (J)	(A Study on the Cultural Communication with Asia)	Report to Osaka Prefecture Government
73	1980-11 (J)	(Cooperate with Human Capital Accumulation)	<i>The JERC Monthly</i> , May
74	1980-12 (J)	(Oil-Energy Problems and Japanese Security)	Inst. for Security and Peace; Published in {36}
75	1980-13 (J)	(Transfer of Appropriate Technological and Institutional and Cultural Factors)	Published in ②
76	1981-1	Japanese Industrial Restructuring Policies, 1945-1979	CSEAS Discussion Paper, No. 106
77	1981-2	A Comparative Study of Green Revolution and Rural Development in Asia	<i>Southeast Asian Studies</i> , 18-4
78	1981-3 (S)	Economic Growth, Savings and Housing Finance in Japan	Conf. at Cartagena, Colombia
79	1981-4	Economic Growth, Savings and Housing Finance in Japan	<i>The Journal of Economic Studies</i> , 8-3
80	1981-5	Japanese Firms in Asia	<i>Japanese Economic Studies</i> , 10-1
81	1982-1	Debt Accumulation, Oil Crisis and International Financing	Published in ③
82	1982-2	The Global Energy Problems and Japanese Crisis Management Policies	Published in ④
83	1982-3	Moving up the Market: Transformation of Industrial Structure and Economic Policies	CSEAS Discussion Paper, No. 113
84	1983-1 (J)	(Indonesian Economic Development and Its Relations with Japan)	Kansai Economic Research Center
85	1983-2 (J)	(Japan JV's' Management and Labor Relations)	Kansai Economic Research Center
86	1983-3 (J)	(An Interim Report on French-Japan Trade Conflicts)	Kansai Economic Research Center
87	1983-4	Institutional Factors and Government Policies for Appropriate Technologies: Survey Findings in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines	ILO World Employment Program Working Paper, No. 110
88	1983-5	US-Japan Economic Problems	US-Japan Security Conf. on Asia and the Pacific, Marina del Rey
89	1983-6	Competition and Cooperation among Western Pacific Basin Countries	<i>The Korean Journal of International Studies</i> , 14-3
90	1983-7	An Econometric Analysis of the Philippine Economy: Policy Simulation (W. Manalac)	<i>Southeast Asian Studies</i> , 21-2
91	1983-8	Comments on Kaya-Onishi's Project and the Future of ESCAP LDC	Published in ⑤
92	1983-9	Industrial Policy in Japan (F. G. Adams)	Published in ⑥
93	1984-1 (J)	(How to Go beyond the Breton Woods)	Published in ⑦
94	1984-2 (J)	(Second Interim Report on French-Japan Conflicts)	Kansai Economic Research Center
95	1984-3	Economic Growth, Competition and Cooperation in Asian Countries	CSEAS Discussion Paper, No. 118
96	1984-4	Debt Problems and the World Economy: Perspectives in the 1980s	<i>Dinar (Kuwait)</i> , 1-4
97	1984-5	Debt Problems of Developing Countries: The Asian Perspectives	<i>Pacific Economic Papers</i> , ANU, November
98	1984-6	An Econometric Link System for the East and Southeast Asian Countries, Japan and the US (M. Ezaki and M. Shibayama)	<i>Southeast Asian Studies</i> , 22-3
99	1985-1	Japanese Management in Southeast Asia: Introd.	<i>Southeast Asian Studies</i> , 22-4
100	1985-2	Debt Accumulation Problems in Developing Countries	CSEAS Discussion Papers, No. 119
101	1986-1 (J)	(Debt Accumulation in Asian Countries)	Kansai Economic Research Center
102	1986-2 (J)	(The Present and the Future of Japanese Style Management)	Kansai Economic Research Center

103	1986-3 (J)	(Characteristics of Asian Economic Development)	Published in ⑧
104	1986-4	Japanese Management in Indonesia	<i>Southeast Asian Studies</i> , 23-1
105	1987-1 (J)	(Factors Changing the World Economy, 1)	<i>TORay Economic Letters</i> , 3
106	1987-2 (J)	(Factors Changing the World Economy, 2)	<i>TORay Economic Letters</i> , 4
107	1987-3 (J)	(The Issues in the Fourth National Dev. Plan for Osaka)	Speech at the Kansai ERCenter
108	1987-4 (J)	An Economic Overview of East Asia	KERC; Published in ⑨
109	1988-1 (J)	(Japan and the World in the 20th Century)	Published in {42}
110	1988-2 (J)	(Management and Labor Relations in Japanese Firms in Asia)	Kansai Econ Research Center
111	1988-3 (J)	(Our Request for National Land-Use Plan: Past and Future)	Speech for Subaru Forum
112	1988-4	The Pattern and Process of Asian Economic Development	Published in {39}
113	1988-5	Development Strategic Study for Wu Xi Region	Published in ⑩ UNCRD (September)
114	1989-1 (J)	(Integrated Computer Program for US-Japan Modeling) (Sugiura, Ezaki, and Shibayama)	Published in ⑪ to MOE
115	1989-2 (J)	(Problems for Economic Cooperation in the 90s)	<i>International Cooperation Study</i> , 5-2
116	1989-3	Japan's Role in Asian Economic Development	OIU Working Paper, No. 1
117	1989-4	The Choice of Appropriate Technology and Socioeconomic Factors and Government Policies in Southeast Asia	<i>OIU Journal of International Studies</i> 1-1; Published in {48}
118	1989-5	A Conceptual Framework of the Political Economy of Policy Making	Published in {43}

① Eto, S. *et al.* (ed.) (J), *World Peace and Security*, Hara-shobo, Tokyo, 1980.

② Watabe, T. (ed.) (J), *Southeast Asian World*, Sobun-sha, Tokyo, 1980.

③ Ostojic, N. (ed.), *International Financing of Economic Development*, Beograd, 1982.

④ Eichhorn, W. (ed.), *Economic Theory of Natural Resources*, Physica-Verlag, Wurzburg-Wien, 1982.

⑤ Hickman, B. (ed.), *Global International Economic Models*, North-Holland, the Hague, 1983.

⑥ Adams, F. G.; and Klein, L. R. (eds.), *Industrial Policies for Growth and Competitiveness*, Lexington Books, Lexington, 1983.

⑦ Okita, S. (ed.) (J), *North-South Problems*, Chuokoron-sha, Tokyo, 1984.

⑧ Ishi, Y. (ed.) (J), *Structure and Change of the SEA World*, Sobun-sha, Tokyo, 1986.

⑨ Ellison, H. J. (ed.), *Japan and the Pacific Quadrille: The Major Powers in East Asia*, Westview Press, Boulder, 1987.

⑩ Report to Wu Xi City and Enterprise Management Association by UN Center of Regional Development, 1988.

⑪ Report of Research Project to Ministry of Education (with Sugiura, Ezaki, Sadamichi, and Shibayama), 1989.

## 1990s

No	Year	Titles of Articles	Published Places
119	1990-1	The Role of Japan in Asia and Contributions of Her Private Enterprises	OIU Working Paper, 4
120	1990-2	Economic Development, Education and Technological Progress	IT Conf.; OIU Working Paper, 6
121	1990-3	Institutional Factors and Government Policies for Appropriate Technologies in Southeast Asia	Published in ①
122	1990-4	Kansai's Internationalization Is First with Asia	<i>KANSAI</i> , No. 1
123	1991-1	The Role of Japanese Finance in the Global Economy	Milano Conf. of Italian Financial A.
124	1991-2	Major Development Countries in Asia and OECD	At Banca Nazionale dell'Agricoltura
125	1992-1 (J)	(Some Proposals to Improve the US-Japan Relations)	Kyoto Conf. of US-Japan Leaders
126	1992-2	Some Proposals to Improve the US-Japan Relations	Kyoto Conf. of US-Japan Leaders
127	1992-3	Japanese Financial Markets and Monetary Policies	OIU WP, No. 30; published in ②
128	1992-4	The Pattern of Asian Economic Development and the Role of Japan	Speech at Shaw Coll., HK
129	1992-5	Japan's Economic Growth, Domestic Restructuring and External Relations	Chung-Hua I. Conf. Paper, No. 24
130	1992-6	The Monetary Policy in Japan	Published in ②
131	1992-7	Japanese and Asian Development	Invited Speech at ADB
132	1992-8	Japanese Investment in Europe: Past, Present, and Future	Banca Nazionale dell'Agricoltura
133	1992-9	Modeling and Development Economies	PEO Report
134	1992-10	Japanese Style Management in East Asian Economies	Kansai Economic Research Center
135	1992-11	Korea's Role in an Emerging Pacific-Asia Era and Her Relations with the US and Japan	HK Conf. of the Asia Society
136	1992-12	Process of Technology Transfer in Some Developing Countries	ILO Report



137	1992-13	Is the Japanese Financial Market in Crisis?	Banca Nazionale dell'Agricoltura
138	1992-14	A Proposal for Improving US-Japan Relations	Kyoto Conf. of US- Japan leaders
139	1993-1 (J)	(Urgent Is Dissolving the North-South Problems)	Published in ③
140	1993-2	Comment on Globalization and Regional Development	UNCTAD Conf. on Multilateral Coop for Development in the 21st Century
141	1993-3	Policies for Economic Development	<i>Asian Productivity Journal</i> , 1-1
142	1993-4	The Evolution of Taiwan in the New World Order	At an International Conf. in Taipei
143	1993-5	Regional Integration Issues in Asia	4th US-Korea Conf. AFTA after NAFTA
144	1993-6	Varieties of Asian Growth and Political Change	Published in ④
145	1993-7	Regional Development Policies	Regional Development Conf. in Beijing
146	1993-8	Role of the US and Japan in a Newly Emerging Asia-Pacific Era	Conf. on Korea's New Economic Diplomacy
147	1993-9	A More Professional Approach	Contribution to Asia Foundation
148	1993-10	Comments on Fubei Province' Report	Fubei Conf. on Regional Development
149	1994-1 (J)	(My View; The China Problem in Asia)	<i>Issues and Research</i> , 23-7
150	1994-2 (J)	(Trends in World Order: Regional Integration and Japan)	Published in ⑤
151	1994-3 (J)	(NAFTA <i>versus</i> AFTA)	<i>World Economic Review</i>
152	1994-4	Regional Differences in Industrial Structures and Potential Gaps in Chinese Economy	Conf. of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
153	1994-5	Cooperation and Security of Northeast Asian Nations	KIEP Conf. on Economic Cooperation and Security
154	1994-6	On the Japanese Recession and Bank's Un-repaid Credits	For Banca Nazionale dell'Agricoltura
155	1994-7	Japanese Strategies in East Asia: Economic Prosperity and Political Stability	Taipei Conf. on Asia-Pacific Collective Security
156	1995-1 (J)	(Japanese Economy and Business)	<i>International Encyclopedia Britannica</i>
157	1995-2 (J)	(Political Economy of Present Pacific-Basin)	<i>Kansai Teachers and Friends</i>
158	1995-3	Is APEC Good for Asia?	<i>Look Japan</i> , May
159	1995-4	A Comment on D. Gallik's Trends in World Arms Trade, Spending and Their Implications	Published in ⑥
160	1995-5	Why Doesn't Econometric Models Perform as Well as Before?	ICSEAD Workshop on Asian Link
161	1995-6	Pacific Rim Trade and Development: Historical Environment and Future Prospects	<i>Contemporary Economic Policy</i> , Western Economic Association
162	1995-7	Economic Cooperation and Political Rivalry among Northeast Asian Nations in the 21st Century	Inchon U Conf., ICSEAD Working Paper 95-4
163	1995-8	A Theory of Economic Take-Off	<i>The Nepal Times</i>
164	1996-1 (J)	(Make International Cooperation Our National Strategy)	<i>Development Technology</i> , 2
165	1996-2 (J)	(Management of Japanese Firms in China)	<i>Viewpoint to East Asia</i> , 96-6
166	1996-3 (J)	(Conditions for Take-Off)	<i>National Economic Review</i> , * 174-4
167	1996-4 (J)	(The China Problems in Asia)	<i>Nihon</i> , January
168	1996-5	Development Policies and Institutional Changes in Stages: Pathos and Logos of Development	CEG, ICRIER, AID Conf. in New Delhi: Structural Reform in India
169	1996-6	Some Forces Shaping the Coming 25 Years: Prospects for Productivity Growth	Presented at ⑦
170	1996-7	Agriculture, Industrialization and Trade in Economic Development: A Great Contribution of Professors Liang and Lee	Memorial Speech for Prof. Liang Kuo-siu, in Taipei August 16-18
171	1996-8	Address for the Fifth Convention of East Asian Econ Ass, Bangkok	The 5th EAEA Convention in Bangkok
172	1996-9	Management Style of Japanese Multi-National Co's in China	<i>EAEP</i> (ICSEAD), Vol 8
173	1997-1 (J)	(Development of East Asia Is Not a Miracle)	<i>Development Journal</i> , 97-5
174	1997-2 (J)	(The View-Points of Asian Nation-Builders)	<i>Mito History Journal</i> 46 (May)
175	1997-3	Business is APEC's Business	<i>The Japan Times</i> , December 24

176	1997-4	Comments on General Report on Pollution Problems in the Kantong Province, China	UNDP Conf. in Beijing; Pollution of Yellow River Delta & Sustainable Development
177	1997-5	East Asia in the 21st Century: Economic Cooperation and Political Rivalry	The 111th Inauguration Conf. of Ewha Woman U.
178	1997-6	East Asia in the 21st Century: Economic Cooperation and Political Rivalry	International Studies Review, 1-1
179	1997-7	Can Asians Share the Common Ideals in Their Religions?	Talk at New Education Ass. Osaka
180	1998-1 (J)	(Analysis and Prospect of Asian Financial Crisis)	<i>Viewpoint to East Asia</i> , 98-6
181	1998-2	On the Financial Crisis in East Asia	<i>The Asia Pacific Journal of Economic and Business</i> , 98-6
182	1998-3	The Varieties of Asia-Pacific Experiences (J. Morley)	Published in ⑧
183	1999-1 (J)	(A Passage to Asian Union)	<i>Seiko</i> , 651
184	1999-2 (J)	(From Inter-city to Economic Exchange)	<i>Viewpoint to East Asia</i> , 10-special
185	1999-3 (J)	(Prospect of East Asian Economy)	<i>Viewpoint to East Asia</i> , 10-2
186	1999-4 (J)	(The Value of Monarchy in Asian Crises)	<i>Viewpoint to East Asia</i> , 10-3
187	1999-5 (J)	(10 Years of ICSEAD)	<i>Viewpoint to East Asia</i> , 10-4
188	1999-6 (J)	(Environmental Issues and Inter-City Cooperation with Indonesia)	<i>Viewpoint to East Asia</i> , 10-4
189	1999-7 (J)	(Review Article: <i>Clashes of Civilizations or Clashes of Nations</i> )	<i>AURORA</i> , Vol. 15 (Spring)

\* *National Economic Review* is published by the economics department of Kobe University, Japan.

① Chatterji, M. (ed.), *Technology Transfer in the Developing Countries*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 1990.

② Frattiani, M.; and Salvatore, D. (eds.), *Handbook of Monetary Policy in the World*, West Press, NY, 1992.

③ Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha (ed.) (J), *My Capitalism*, Tokyo, 1993.

④ Morley, J. (ed.), *Driven by Growth*, M.E. Sharpe, NY, 1993.

⑤ Japan Forum for the 21st Century (ed.) (J), *The Political Economy of the World in Convulsion*, Sagano-shoten, 1994.

⑥ Klein, L. R.; Lo, F-C. et al. (eds.), *Arms Reduction: Economic Implications in the Post-Cold War Era*, UN University Press, Tokyo, 1995.

⑦ OECD Conf.; Globalization and Linkages to 2020: Challenges and Opportunities for OECD, 1998.

⑧ Morley, J. (ed.), *Driven by Growth*, 2nd ed., The Sharp, 1998.

## 2000s

No	Year	Titles of Articles	Published Places
190	2000-1 (J)	(Difficulty in Asian Long-Term Statistics Project and My Hope)	<i>News Letter: Asian LTSP</i> No. 16 (March)
191	2000-2 (J)	(Prospect of the Japanese Economy)	<i>Viewpoint to East Asia</i> , 11-special
192	2000-3 (J)	(Survey Report of Cargo Transportation in Yellow Sea)	<i>Viewpoint to East Asia</i> , 11-2
193	2000-4 (J)	(Introduction: A Study of Urban Transp. Issues in China)	<i>Viewpoint to East Asia</i> , 11-3
194	2000-5 (J)	(On Low Fertility Rate in Kitakyushu City)	Mayors/Governors Conf., Kitakyushu
195	2000-6	The Success and Failure of Regional Development Policies in Japan	Jungting Conf. on Great West Development; Published in {70}
196	2000-7	Introduction: Survey of Econometric Models of China (L. R. Klein)	Published in {55}
197	2001-1 (J)	(Japanese Constitution in the 21st Century World and Japan)	Congressional Commission on Research Institutions
198	2001-2 (J)	Japanese translation of [171]	<i>Viewpoint to East Asia</i> , 12-1
199	2001-3 (J)	(Economic Development and Nation-Building)	<i>Viewpoint to East Asia</i> , 12-2
200	2001-4	A Post-mortem Diagnosis of Asian Financial Crisis	<i>Viewpoint to East Asia</i> , 12-4
201	2001-5	A Post-mortem Diagnosis of Asian Financial Crisis	Published in {71}
202	2001-6	Capacity Building for Environmental Problems in Kitakyushu	Report for Mayors/Governors Conf.
203	2001-7 (J)	(Difficulties in Asian Research and Education – Inaugural Lecture)	School of Asian Studies, Yamaguchi University, <i>Viewpoint to East Asia</i> , 12-4
204	2001-8 (J)	(Prospect of Japanese Economy)	<i>Viewpoint to East Asia</i> , 12-special
205	2002-1 (J)	(The Problems Facing China)	<i>Nihon</i> , February
206	2002-2 (J)	(Prospect of Japanese Economy)	<i>Viewpoint to East Asia</i> , 13-special
207	2002-3	A Postmortem Diagnosis of Asian Financial Crisis	<i>EAEP</i> , Vol. 12
208	2002-4	Policies to Meet the Challenge of an Aging Society with Declining Fertility: Japan and Other Asian Countries	<i>EAEP</i> , Vol. 13-Special Issue



209	2002-5	Lessons from Indonesia: The First 25 Years of the New Order	Published in ①
210	2002-6	The Japanese Economy in the 1990s	<i>EAEP</i>
211	2002-7 (J)	(How to Observe China: Introduction)	<i>Yamaguchi Monthly Report</i> , November
212	2002-8 (J)	(Attention to Regional Differences in China)	<i>Yamaguchi Monthly Report</i> , December
213	2003-1 (J)	(China and Chung-Kuo in Historic Perspective)	<i>Yamaguchi Monthly Report</i> , January
214	2003-2 (J)	(China is Continental Country; Japan is Oceanic Country)	<i>Yamaguchi Monthly Report</i> , February
215	2003-3 (J)	(The Problems Facing Chinese Economy I)	<i>Yamaguchi Monthly Report</i> , March
216	2003-4 (J)	(The Problems Facing Chinese Economy II)	<i>Yamaguchi Monthly Report</i> , April
217	2003-5 (J)	(The Present State of Chinese Political Economy)	<i>Yamaguchi Monthly Report</i> , May
218	2003-6 (J)	(A Brilliant British Reporter's View on China)	<i>Yamaguchi Monthly Report</i> , June
219	2003-7 (J)	(Hong Kong's Relations to Mainland China)	<i>Yamaguchi Monthly Report</i> , July
220	2003-8 (J)	(Hong Kong as a Step-Stone to China)	<i>Yamaguchi Monthly Report</i> , August
221	2003-9 (J)	(Some Symptoms for China to Change?)	<i>Yamaguchi Monthly Report</i> , September
222	2003-10 (J)	(Historic Problems to China: Yasukuni Shrine Issue)	<i>Yamaguchi Monthly Report</i> , October
223	2003-11 (J)	(We Question the Spiritual Foundation of Chinese Nation)	<i>Yamaguchi Monthly Report</i> , November
224	2003-12 (J)	(National Strategies of China and Japan in Turbulent Asia)	<i>Yamaguchi Monthly Report</i> , December
225	2003-13 (J)	(Can East Asian Union Be Formed?)	<i>Viewpoint to East Asia</i> , 14-5
226	2003-14 (J)	(Politics, History and Religion)	<i>Yasukuni</i>
227	2003-15 (J)	(The Viewpoints of Asian Nation-Builders)	<i>Mito History Journal</i> , No. 46
228	2004-1 (J)	(China's Political Economy before Reform and Open Door)	<i>Yamaguchi Monthly Report</i> , January
229	2004-2 (J)	(Ethnic Minority Problems in China—1)	<i>Yamaguchi Monthly Report</i> , February
230	2004-3 (J)	(Ethnic Minority Problems in China—2)	<i>Yamaguchi Monthly Report</i> , March
231	2004-4 (J)	(Ethnic Minority Problems in China—3)	<i>Yamaguchi Monthly Report</i> , April
232	2004-5 (J)	(Ethnic Minority Problems in China—4 and the Taiwan Issues)	<i>Yamaguchi Monthly Report</i> , May
233	2004-6 (J)	(Economic Development and Nation-Building in China)	<i>Yamaguchi Monthly Report</i> , June
234	2004-7 (J)	(Can China Be a Middle-Income Nation: Nation-Building 2)	<i>Yamaguchi Monthly Report</i> , July
235	2004-8 (J)	(Can China Be an Advanced State: Nation Building 3)	<i>Yamaguchi Monthly Report</i> , September
236	2004-9 (J)	(What Kind of Country Will China Be Nation-Building 4)	<i>Yamaguchi Monthly Report</i> , October
237	2004-10 (J)	(Book Review: Joe Stud Well, <i>The China Dream</i> )	<i>Viewpoint to East Asia</i> , 15-1
238	2004-11 (J)	(The National Strategies of China and Japan in Tumbling Asia)	<i>Viewpoint to East Asia</i> , 15-4
239	2004-12 (J)	(Three Blind Spots in Japanese Education Reform Policies)	<i>Gakushikai Monthly</i>
240	2005-1 (J)	(On the Revision of Japanese Constitution)	Speech at Koshi-Kai, September
241	2005-2 (J)	(I Question the Spiritual Life of Chinese Intellectuals)	<i>Sankei Newspapers</i>
242	2005-3 (J)	(Formation of East Asian Community and Education)	<i>Viewpoint to East Asia</i> , 16-4
243	2005-4 (J)	(Why Did the Level of Japanese Universities Fall So Much?)	<i>Sotsutaku</i>
244	2006-1 (J)	(Rapidly Changing World Circumstances and Japanese National Strategies)	Lecture at Coast Guard College
245	2006-2 (J)	(Education to Revive Bushido Spirits)	Japan Education Association Series
246	2006-3 (J)	(Civilized Knighthood)	Speech at Kokumin Kaikan, Osaka
247	2006-4 (J)	(History Cannot Be the Record of Politicians' Assertions)	<i>Nihon</i>
248	2006-5 (J)	(Why Did Japanese Teaching Capability Weaken So Much?)	<i>Kansai Shiyu</i> , August–November
249	2007-1	The Asian Financial Crisis and Thereafter	Speech at Asian Mayors Conf. April
250	2007-2 (J)	(Monarchy and Two Kinds of the Republic: Problems of Confucianism)	<i>Kansai Shiyu</i> , March
251	2007-3 (J)	(Policies to Reform Elementary, And Higher Education)	<i>Sotsutaku</i>
252	2007-4 (J)	Education: Who Teaches What And How	<i>Nihon</i>
253	2008-1 (J)	(Be More Responsible and Prudent for Free Speech)	<i>Nihon</i> , October
254	2008-2 (J)	(Professor Hideo Aoyama and Professor Yasuma Takata)	<i>Seibeki</i>

255	2009-1 (J)	(Who Is Really Responsible for World Financial Crisis 2008?)	<i>Yamaguchi Monthly Review</i> , January
256	2009-2 (J)	(Seigo Funaoka: <i>Japan in Asia Constellation</i> ) (Michio Okamoto)	Report to M. of Education
257	2009-3 (J)	(Notes On Entrepreneurial Moral)	<i>Kodo</i> , March and April
258	2009-4 (J)	(Notes on Public Morality)	<i>Kodo</i>
259	2009-5 (J)	(Review Article: <i>Decentralization Policies in Asian Development</i> ) ← {65}	<i>Viewpoint to East Asia</i> , 20-2
260	2009-6	(Review Article : <i>Transition from Socialist to Market Economies</i> ) ← {66}	<i>Viewpoint to East Asia</i> , 20-4

① Mohamad Ikhsan; Chris Manning; and Hadi Soesastro (eds.), *Mohamad Sadli at 80 Years: The Indonesian Economy in the New Political Era*, Penerbit Buku Kompas, Jakarta, 2002.

## 2010s

No	Year	Titles of Articles	Published Places
261	2010-1 (J)	(A Survey of Macro-Econometric Modeling of Japan and Asia)	<i>Viewpoint to East Asia</i> , 21-4
262	2010-2	When and How Can Asia Play a Leading Role in World Order?	<i>The Asian Economic Journal</i>
263	2010-3 (J)	(My Study of Indonesian and Research on Indonesian Issues)	<i>Southern Cross</i> , No. 10
264	2010-4 (J)	(We demand PM Hatoyama to Resign and LDP to Reform)	<i>Sankei Newspapers</i> ; <i>Nihon</i> , April
265	2010-5 (J)	Education, Science and Technology Are Essential to Restart a Nation	<i>Nihon</i> , March
266	2010-6 (J)	(Shigeki Nishimura and Economics)	<i>Kodo</i>
267	2010-7 (J)	(When and How Can Asia Play a Leading Role in World Order?)	<i>Viewpoint to East Asia</i> , 22-4
268	2011-1	The Lessons of the Lost Two Decades of Japan to Korea	National Academy of Sc., Korea; Published in ①
269	2011-2	(My Memoire of Professor Wassily Leintief)	<i>Sobun</i>
270	2011-3 (J)	(On the Formation of Japanese Nation and Language)	<i>National Language · Literature</i>
271	2011-4 (J)	(Domestic-Foreign Worries and Economic Weakness of Chinese and Russian)	<i>Nihon</i> , October
272	2012-1(J)	(Meinecke's Book Review; <i>Marianne Weber, Max Weber</i> )	<i>Geirin</i> , No. 61 (April)
273	2012-2 (J)	(On Greater East Asian War) (Michio Okamoto)	<i>Kan</i> , Winter
274	2012-3 (J)	(Difficulties to Revise the Royal Family Law and How to Overcome)	<i>Kan</i> , Winter
275	2012-4 (J)	(My Memories of Association with Mr. Michio Morishima)	<i>Sobun</i> , 5
276	2013-1	Economic Development and Nation Building in Stages	Singapore Economic Review Conf. in Singapore
277	2013-2	Comments on Policies on Fertility Decline	World Demography Conf. in Pusan; Published in {70}
278	2013-3 (J)	Review Sakharov: <i>Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Liberty</i>	<i>Kan</i> , Spring
279	2013-4 (J)	Review Brzezinski: <i>Grand Chess Board</i>	<i>Kan</i> , Summer
280	2013-5 (J)	Review Toynbee: <i>Civilizations on Trial</i>	<i>Kan</i> , Autumn
281	2013-6 (J)	(Anti- or Pro-Japan in Asian Texts: Korean History Text Parts Related to Japan Translated (1))	<i>Nihon</i> , December
282	2014-1 (J)	(Review: P. Kennedy: <i>The Rise and the Fall of Great Powers</i> )	<i>Kan</i> , Winter
283	2014-2 (J)	(Anti- or Pro-Japan in Asian Texts: Korean History Text Parts Related to Japan translated (2)–(5))	<i>Nihon</i> , January–April
284	2014-3 (J)	(The International Conf. Debating the Most Front Global Topics)	Chap. 9 in ②
285	2014-4 (J)	(Obituary and Appraisal Dedicated to Professor Lawrence R. Klein)	<i>Keizai Seminar</i> , February–March
286	2015-1 (J)	(My Memories of Classmate Academician Liu Yuan Zhang)	<i>Sobun</i> , November
287	2015-2 (J)	(Reflections and Opinions on the 70 Years after WWII)	<i>Mito History Journal</i>
288	2016-1 (J)	(Reflections and Opinions on the 70 Years after WWII)	<i>Nihon</i> , January–March

① The National Academy of Sciences, *Stability and Growth of the Korean Economy in the New World Order*, 2011.

② JERC Committee for 50th anniversary (ed.), *Economists' Postwar History*. Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 2014.



# VISUAL DOCUMENTARY PROJECT 2015

短編ドキュメンタリー作品上映・トーク

2016年3月23日(水)

京都大学国際科学イノベーション棟シンポジウムホール  
Kyoto University International Science Innovation Building Symposium Hall

入場無料 予約不要 言語:日本語／英語(通訳あり)  
Admission Free No Reservation Required Language: Japanese / English Translation

## 越境する東南アジア

今回は「越境する東南アジア」をテーマに

東南アジアと日本の12カ国で短編ドキュメンタリー作品を公募し、

約50作品が集まりました。

その中から選ばれた5作品の上映および入選作品の監督と

コメントーターによるトーク・ディスカッションを行います。

## *Human Flows: Movement in Southeast Asia*

Visual Documentary Project は、2012 年度に京都大学東南アジア研究所が開始した  
東南アジアの若手映像作家が制作する短編ドキュメンタリーを募集・上映するプロジェクトです。  
2014年度から国際交流基金アジアセンターも共催者として加わり、  
作品を通して東南アジア地域の現状を捉え、諸問題の解決へとつなげる試みを行っています。

お問い合わせ: 京都大学東南アジア研究所 [vdp@cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp](mailto:vdp@cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp)

主催: 京都大学東南アジア研究所

共催: 国際交流基金アジアセンター





# The SEASIA 2015 Conference: A Watershed in Southeast Asian Studies

**Janus Isaac V. Nolasco**

Managing Editor, *Asian Studies: Journal of Critical Perspectives on Asia*  
Asian Center, University of the Philippines Diliman

The Southeast Asian Studies in Asia Conference 2015 (SEASIA 2015 Conference), which was held on December 12 and 13, 2015 in Kyoto, Japan, represents a watershed in the history of Southeast Asian Studies. There have always been conferences on and in the region, but SEASIA 2015 is arguably the largest region-based academic conference focusing on Southeast Asia.

The SEASIA 2015 Conference embodies the pioneering and collaborative efforts of the Consortium for Southeast Asian Studies in Asia, whose membership includes 10 of the leading area-studies institu-

tions in Northeast and Southeast Asia: the Center for Asia-Pacific Studies (Research Center for Humanities and Social Sciences), Academia Sinica; the Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University; the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI); the Korean Association of Southeast Asian Studies; the Center for Southeast Asian Studies (CSEAS), Kyoto University; School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University; Asia Research Institute (ARI), National University of Singapore; Institute of Asian Studies, Universiti Brunei Darussalam; Asian Center, University of the

Philippines Diliman; and the Taiwan Association of Southeast Asian Studies. Together, they are “building on the imperative to promote region-based Southeast Asian Studies” and aim to facilitate “research collaboration and networking” as well as the sharing of vital information. The Kyoto conference is the first of the biennial SEASIA conferences that will be regularly held in the coming years.

True to the objectives of the Consortium, the SEASIA 2015 Conference drew an impressively large number of participants. The conference’s Call for Proposals attracted some 813 proposals from





268 institutions in 28 countries. The conference itself was attended by 530 participants from all 10 of the member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), along with Timor Leste and 15 other countries in Northeast Asia, the United States of America, and Europe.

Scholars from Southeast Asia formed the majority of paper presenters (40%), followed by Northeast Asia (37%), North America (10%), Europe (9%), and Australia and New Zealand (4%). The conference covered a staggering range of topics discussed in 79 panels and over 250 papers, showcas-

ing the synergistic, inter- and multidisciplinary and comparative approaches in the study of Southeast Asia. Young and senior, leading as well as up-and-coming, scholars gathered to explore and debate a wide array of topics ranging from the reconceptualization of Southeast Asian Studies in Asia to new approaches to history and culture, from issues of mobility, development, and the environment to law and politics, economy, and the evolving regional order.

The conference also hosted exhibits of the publications of partners and members of the Consor-

tium. On sale and display were books and/or journals by the International Institute for Asian Studies (in partnership with Amsterdam University Press); the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University; the Asian Center, University of the Philippines Diliman; and the National University of Singapore, among others. Fifteen video documentaries were also shown during the two-day conference to poignantly illustrate and personalize the issues that Southeast Asian peoples face: labor, environmental and social degradation, land grabbing, gender, the sex industry, among others.



The breadth of this scholarship and participation testifies to the vibrancy of Southeast Asian Studies within the region, and affirms just how far the field has come since its origins during and as part of Cold War geopolitics; the conference provides a snapshot, albeit panoramic, of the present state of the field, fitting enough for a conference held at the Kyoto International Conference Center, which offers a stunning view of mountains north of and around Japan's ancient capital.

At the same time, SEASIA 2015 Conference provided an opportunity to look back into the past and cast a forward glance into the future. In his speech, Guest of Honor Mr. Fukuda Yasuo, former Prime Minister of Japan, identified the challenges posed by the history question, by environmental degradation, and by aging societies to ASEAN and the region more generally, and stressed the need for Southeast Asianists to study the issues carefully and help come up with solutions to prepare the individual countries and the region for the future.

In his keynote speech, "Towards a Region of New Nations," Dr. Wang Gungwu, University Professor of the National University of Singapore, reflected on the origins, significance, and future of Southeast Asia as a region; he traced its development in the aftermath of World War II, moving from the emergence of ASEAN in 1967 to the future of Southeast Asia in the so-called Asian Century. Stressing that "it is important not to forget" the history of the region, he outlined the geopolitical context and importance of Southeast Asia during the Cold War and the "ideological battle between Communism

and Capitalism" and pointed out the endurance of ASEAN as a 48-year-old regional organization. Professor Wang also described the contemporary significance of Southeast Asia as a maritime territory in what he labeled "the New World Order," one that is characterized by globalization, and the rise of China and India. Alongside these reflections on the region were insights into divergent experiences of nation-building of various Southeast Asian states, and the reiteration of the productive tension arising from the fact that the concept of "region" was brought in from outside Southeast Asia. Professor Wang affirmed the potential of Southeast Asian Studies to promote dialogues across civilizations and countries through in-depth analysis and comparisons, and through appreciation of the region's complex, hybrid histories and dynamics.

In the second keynote address, Dr. Pasuk Phongpaichit, Professor Emeritus of Chulalongkorn University, offered a personal reflection on the history of Southeast Asian Studies. She talked about her development as a scholar from the 1950s to the 1970s, a period that saw her move from a small village in Thailand, to the capital, Bangkok, and into Australia and the United Kingdom for graduate studies in political economy. She then recounted the various social, philosophical, and political trends that affected her and others' intellectual development: the rise of development economics, the emergence of the social sciences as a tool thereof, the wave of democratic popular movements, and the damaging impact of postmodern philosophy on scholarly work. Ajarn Pasuk also

painted a portrait of contemporary changes altering the trajectory of and posing a challenge to scholarship: the end of the Cold War, the eventual dominance of global business and finance, the checkered career of democracy, the growth of inequality, the eruption of violence, and climate change. Faced with these obstacles and "the increasing complexity of our globalized world," scholars, she exhorted, should do "interdisciplinary work," think big, and "be engaged, be sensitive to the time and place, [and] be prepared to explore new avenues." Reminding scholars that knowledge matters and the need to debate should be protected, she urged them to "maintain the optimism that change for the better is possible" and to remember that "your innovative ideas, writing, and agitation—as well as your courage—have never been so much in demand as they are right now."

In bringing together various Southeast Asian scholars, policymakers, and activists across and beyond the region, the SEASIA 2015 Conference featured a festive buffet dinner on Saturday, December 12 that also saw *taiko* performances (Japanese drums) and presentations by *maiko* (apprentice *geiko*), who went around the dining hall to mingle with the conference participants. The next SEASIA Conference has been slated for 2017, and will be hosted in Bangkok by Chulalongkorn University's Institute of Asian Studies, Faculty of Arts and Department of Political Science. Building on the historic success of the inaugural conference, the Consortium hopes to expand and deepen the study of Southeast Asia in Asia.



Keynote Speech at SEASIA 2015

December 12, 2015-at the Kyoto  
International Conference Center

## Towards a Region of New Nations

**Wang Gungwu**

University Professor, National University of Singapore



Thank you, Professor Liu Hong, for your kind introduction. His Excellency Yasuo Fukuda, distinguished guests, my colleagues, and friends, I feel very honored to be invited to Kyoto University (KyoDai), especially to this historic occasion of celebrating the 50th anniversary of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies at KyoDai. I feel particularly honored because this Center was the first major center of Southeast Asian studies in Asia. I had the privilege of visiting it when it was first started and I still recall my meeting with Professor, at that time the Director, Ichimura Shinichi and then the later Directors, Professor Ishii Yoneo (1929–2010), Professor Yano Toru (1936–99), and of course Professor Shiraishi Takashi, all very distinguished scholars of the region and people I have a great admiration for and very proud to have known for a long time.

The president of Kyoto University mentioned the historic contributions of KyoDai to humanities studies. This reminds me that my first visit to Kyoto in 1960 was actually before the Center was established when I called on Professor Yoshikawa Kojiro (1904–80) and his colleagues at the University. Of course I visited KyoDai because the Institute for the Research of the Humanities was very famous for its contributions to East Asian studies, particularly to China studies by scholars like Professors Naito Konan (1866–1934), Shirakawa Shizuka (1910–2006), and Kaizuka Shigeki (1904–87), whose works were already classics of their field. It is an

association with KyoDai that I'm very proud of.

I've not actually worked with the Center itself but it is, of course, extremely well known in the region and we have been beneficiaries of the very deep research which the Center has been conducting for the last 50 years. Let me just recall one particular feature that struck me at the time when the Center was founded. When I visited it for the first time, I was immediately impressed by its coverage. It was not content, like most other centers, with humanities and the classics and the studies of modern society, economy, and politics. The Center went beyond into the field of science, agriculture, engineering, technology, disciplines that to my knowledge no other center for Southeast Asian studies had attempted to do. This is something extremely important. For that reason, it seems to me that it remains one of the most distinguished and clearly unique institutions of its kind, the way it has drawn together such a wide range of scholars to work there.

I regret I didn't have the privilege of studying or doing research there, but let me now congratulate the Center for initiating this Consortium for Southeast Asian Studies in Asia, and especially the organizers for bringing together such a large gathering of Southeast Asian scholars from all over the world. Indeed I believe it is the largest gathering of Southeast Asian scholars in one room that I have ever seen, so I would like also to congratulate the Consortium for their work.

### ASEAN Economic Community Established

Today I am going to talk on a subject arising from the announcement that ASEAN will be an economic community in 2016. People have worked hard for that cause for quite a while. It has finally come to pass and the announcement was made with great pride and expectations. This is a happy moment, the 50th anniversary of the Center, the 48th anniversary of ASEAN and the extraordinary progress for ASEAN to have come this far. The story of that progress has been told elsewhere and there is no need to go over that here. What I thought I should do is to use this opportunity when ASEAN has taken this historic step forward towards a community and Southeast Asian studies at KyoDai celebrates its 50th anniversary to say something about the past, to review the past 50 years and offer some reflections on what it means for the region's future.

In particular, I want to review the word "region." The word is used quite casually today and in many different settings. Because it is used so widely, we almost take for granted that Southeast Asia is a region. But we need to remind ourselves how new this is. The concept of a region that has political, security, economic, and other connotations and ramifications, is completely modern. As far as I know, the word region had previously only been used by geographers and professional scientists, but never had the kind of political connotations that it



has today. There has never been a concept of a region of Southeast Asia in the past. It was only since the end of the Second World War that people started to think in those terms. I was a schoolboy when the word “Southeast Asia” first appeared in 1945, and I remember being struck by its use for the Southeast Asia military command that the British set up in Colombo during the war.

Of course, before that we had other terms, like the Japanese and Chinese use of “Nanyo” and “Nanyang” for the islands to the south of their countries, and the British use of “the Far East” to refer to all territories east of British India. On the other side of the Pacific, the Americans would generally talk about eastern Asia or East Asia. Southeast Asia never quite emerged out of the early discussions before 1945. There were some others as well. The French used Indochina for the states that they had taken over, while other people used “Indochina” to refer to the areas between India and China. And, for a while, the Indians also used “Greater India,” a name that became popular among their historians before the war. Thus there were many terms but not “Southeast Asia.”

By the 1950s, the phrase was already widely used and books and articles began to appear with the title, “Southeast Asia.” The first textbooks, in fields like geography and history, emerged very soon afterwards. Before long, there were courses on the region taught in some universities. As far as I know, the first university that took it seriously and set up a division of Southeast Asian studies was the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) at the University of London.

### Strategic Interests

It is good for us to remember that British strategic thinkers very quickly took up the term Southeast

Asia, soon after the start of the Second World War. Between 1942 and 1945, they had begun to think about the aftermath of the Japanese occupation of the Western colonies. What would they do should they win, when they returned to Southeast Asia? One of the things they anticipated, which in fact happened, was the process of decolonization. Sooner or later, many of them began to realize, the European empires would have to end. The Japanese war had transformed the nature of Asian development and created a new situation whereby all empires have to be wound up. The British reluctantly expected that, and between 1945 and 1950, it became obvious that it wouldn't be very long before all the Western empires departed from Asia.

On the other side of the Pacific, the Americans anticipated that even earlier, not in terms of any kind of regionalism, but in the light of their own conquest of the Spanish Philippines. Not wanting to be imperialists, some of them worked out a timetable to leave and prepare for the day when empires came to an end. As it turned out, the Americans played a role after the war in helping the decolonization of the area. They encouraged the European empires to leave and assisted the setting up of new independent nations in what was to become the region of Southeast Asia. In some cases, like the struggle for Indonesia, that was actually a great help.

Thus the concept of Southeast Asia, the idea that it should be a region, was always linked to the fact that it consisted of a number of small territories between two large and potentially powerful countries. It was widely expected that, after the victory of 1945, China would regain its former position in the world. And when India became independent, as the British knew they would soon be, it would become a major force on the other side. It was well known that China's traditional interest in Nanyang was largely commercial while ancient Indian influences included deep cultural and spiritual ties in most of the territories of the region. Although such past linkages were different in both these cases, they were no less significant for the future. The rise of both powers would provide serious challenges to Britain's ability to protect its extensive interests in Asia.

That was the background to an area that became one of important strategic interest to powers like Britain and the United States after the war. They saw the anti-imperialist forces converging with anti-capitalist movements that threatened their global interests and it was inevitable that the Cold War would spread to Asia. That made the new nations of the region open to a larger ideological struggle and it was soon clear that these nations could not escape being a key part of that War. As a result, with the victory of the communists in China, the war was focused on French Indochina. The Vietnamese sought and received Chinese and Soviet

support to fight for their independence and made it inevitable that war would not be cold, but would become the hottest war anywhere for the next two decades.

With that, the dangers to the whole region were obvious. The predictions by British strategists after 1945, that this area could become a political vacuum when the imperial powers left and that other powers would eye the region with great interest, turned out to be true. As a result, the Cold War divided the region roughly into half. Various leaders of the new states actively attempted to counter that. It is well known that the Afro-Asian meeting in Bandung in 1955 was one of the efforts to engage other global players for that purpose. But when the Vietnam War developed into a deadly life and death struggle between the two sides of the Cold War, those efforts turned out to be rather feeble and ineffective.

### ASEAN Emerges

It was in the midst of all this that ASEAN was founded. We are reminded that ASEAN is 48 years old, and moving now to a new integrated community, at least towards an economic one. This shows the progress the region is making. It is becoming central to the political and economic developments in this part of the world and increasingly pivotal for the whole of Asia. The way the world economy is shifting from its center in the North Atlantic to the Pacific and Indo-Pacific oceans suggests that the strategic importance of Southeast Asia would continue to grow.

What does that mean for the region? There are regions and regions. Without going into elaborate comparisons, let me simply say that there are different kinds of regions and this is a very strange and unique one. Today we think immediately of Europe and the European Community when we talk of the ASEAN community, but ASEAN is not at all like the European Community. And when we look elsewhere at other efforts to identify and activate regional groupings, whether in Northeast Asia, South Asia, parts of Africa or Latin America, we can see that none of them have taken off the way that ASEAN has.

It is actually quite surprising how well ASEAN has done. When it started, it was not the whole of Southeast Asia, only five nations within it. Those five nations came together under very unusual conditions; one might say almost accidental circumstances. One has to say that it had a lot to do with the Vietnam War, the hot Cold War in our neighborhood. But it also had something to do with the great transformation in Indonesia following Gestapu, the 30 September Movement that led to the overthrow of Sukarno. This enabled the military





led by President Suharto to return to power and shape a completely new Indonesia. And that made it possible for the balance of interests, powers, and strategic thinking in the region to shift decisively away from multiple local disputes and conflicts. Thus was Indonesia able to join with Thailand, Philippines, and the new countries of Malaysia and Singapore, to form the Association for Southeast Asian Nations. This history is well known, but it is important not to forget the origins of this regional organization and understand why it is not like any other. Regions are not the same.

This leads me further to stress that nations are also not the same. I say this in the context of an association of nations that began with only five members, and took another 30 years before increasing that membership to the 10 that it is today. This two-stage development of the region should not be neglected. It is an important reminder to us about how this region came together. We need to be reminded how dangerous and delicate the situation was at the time. In the ideological struggle between capitalism and communism, the region was sharply divided into two. It was within that context that ASEAN was formed.

Thus it is not coincidental that the organization had to await the end of the Cold War before it could expand its membership to cover all the states of the region. Brunei had joined when it became independent in 1984, so there were six. The additional four came at the end of the 1990s, almost a decade after the Cold War had come to an end. It was in this way that ASEAN moved from its formation in the face of a common enemy to an organization with common interests, in particular, one with an emphasis on common economic interests. There were, in the background, factors like the rise of China and the potential rise of India, both big countries in the neighborhood. That made it even more important for ASEAN members to realize that it should strive to be a region that speaks with one voice wherever possible. Clearly, only by being an organization able to do that can it be credible and influential. The region has come to a turning point. The expansion of ASEAN from 5, 6 to 10, underlines the strategic importance of Southeast Asia as a region unlike any other.

### What Different Nations

I mentioned that nations are also different. The modern nation is something very new. There was no such concept in the past, particularly in the context of a state, the nation state. This was a totally new experience anywhere in Asia. All the countries in Asia since the nineteenth century, with Japan leading the way, have been adjusting to the building of modern states. Countries already independent,

like Japan, Thailand, and China, started first to think in those terms. Southeast Asian polities were mostly colonies that did not have a chance to do that until after the Second World War.

In that context, what are these nations? Every country in the region gave its highest priority to building the nation within the borders that they inherited after 1945. But they were very different from one another. For example, let me take the one that people often forget because its first effort to build a nation was not successful: the Philippines. It is important to remember that the Philippines was actually the first modern attempt to build a nation in Southeast Asia. Its unique position came from the fact that it was continuously associated with the European West via the Americas. Those deep roots went back to the Spanish takeover in the sixteenth century. That was significant because, by the nineteenth century, generations of Filipinos were studying the changes across the Pacific, including the rebellions that were linked to the decolonization process in the Spanish Empire in Latin America. The early Filipinos were aware of the European turbulence behind that process, from the French Revolution to the German revolutions. They were alerted to the events in Europe that enabled the Latin American states to free themselves from Spanish rule and build their nation states.

Thus the Filipino elites had the earliest knowledge of the modern state. People like Jose Rizal, Andres Bonifacio, Emilio Aguinaldo had a good understanding of what a nation state should be like. The Philippines connections with Mexico were very close. The way Simon Bolivar led the southern American states to independence, followed by Mexico's independence and its efforts to consolidate that nation state, was observed very carefully by the young Philippine leaders. They were the first in Southeast Asia to try to put nation building into practice and create their own nation. The Katipunan that stood up against the Spanish was an extraordinary effort at the time. No other place in Southeast Asia could have done that. Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, there was resistance against European colonizers but that was fought in traditional ways either by rebel groups in places like Burma, Java in Indonesia, on the Malay Peninsula, and in Vietnam. Theirs were traditional groups that fought for very different goals. But the Katipunan stood for the idea of a modern nation state. They were the first to actually think of themselves as a future nation. They were ahead of everyone, but unfortunately they failed. The Americans took over from the Spanish and later offered a different model for nation statehood, the American model instead of the Spanish colonial one, or the Spanish European one. Nevertheless that too was totally new to the region. It was taking shape for several decades

before 1945, and was actually ready to materialize as an independent nation state long before the rest of Southeast Asia.

At the other end, if I may use two extremely different examples, we see Myanmar and Siam. Myanmar was, in 1886, probably the last major kingdom of Southeast Asia to be overwhelmed by Western imperialism. Its people never fully accepted any of the Western political values that the British brought because the British did not even treat it as a separate political unit but made the proud kingdom a mere province of British India. This was a matter of great regret to the Myanmar people. Bearing that in mind, you can see how distant the Myanmar experience was to that of the Philippines.

In between, there is the very special case of Thailand, which was never a colony but sprang from the Kingdom of Siam, a traditional state that sought to become a modern state while responding to the pressures of Western colonial powers. But where did it look for a model? The Siamese kingdom certainly looked to Europe, but it also looked to Japan when it saw Japan successfully leading Asia to build a modern nation state. The Siamese admired the Japanese and wanted to establish something similar for the country. In comparison, their Vietnamese neighbors responded by looking to China as well as to Japan. With leaders like Ho Chi Minh, they looked even further beyond. After his years in France, Ho Chi Minh looked to the Communists and to the Soviet Union. Inspired by the Russian Revolution, he turned to an internationalist model, and this took him to a different kind of nationalist revolution, a nationalism driven by the ideals of a communist international. Here was a very different response altogether from the others.

The Malay archipelagic territories of the Dutch and the British saw something different again. Sukarno in Indonesia looked more inward and provided leadership for what he observed of the anticolonial movements within the Dutch East Indies. His comrade, Mohammad Hatta, however, learnt directly from Europe, with careful reading of Dutch history, how the Netherlands fought for independence from the Spanish Empire. All that fed into the complex Indonesian political arena and inspired its own unique understanding of what its modern nation state should be like.

Notwithstanding the differences between colonies like Indonesia and Myanmar, not much could have been done by either country were it not for the Japanese invasion of Southeast Asia and three and half years of Japanese dominance or occupation. That war provided the opportunity to speed up the departure of the imperialists, but, even more important, provided the opportunity for a young generation of leaders to prepare themselves to build new nation states.

## Old World Renewed

I think I have said enough to remind ourselves how these new nation states began, where their roots were, how far distant they were, and how much they have had to learn about one another when they discovered that they belonged to the same region, something never thought about before. Although the idea came from outside, it highlighted the significance of the struggle for dominance around. Thus combining the states in the region was aimed at giving it a consolidated character, one that would enable it to stand up to major powers like China and India. There was an Anglo-American understanding that led to strong support given to ASEAN in 1967 and this support has continued, now largely led by the Americans. But what is remarkable is the way the nations began by having a common enemy but are now moving towards a set of common interests.

This is another side of the region's story, its changing place in a world order that is essentially post-1945. This world order has been in dispute ever since the Cold War questioned its nature. It was not until the 1990s that a new vision replaced it by installing the United States as the sole global superpower. Since the 1990s, the world has lived with this new order but, in view of developments during the last two decades, it may not last all that long. The world is too big, and the Americans have discovered that it is not their responsibility to look after everybody even if they could. And so there is now much ferment over whether there is in fact a single world order.

Insofar as the current world order has behind it a maritime foundation, it is still something relatively new, a product of the eighteenth century. Today, we use words like global and globalization loosely in all sorts of contexts. We even try to date its origins to the ancient past when being global covered a much smaller portion of the world. However, globalization now refers to the whole world being tightly connected. This degree of interconnectedness stems from the post-Columbus crossings to the New World. It is the New World that made true globalization possible. And that was possible because of the rise of maritime power. I will not go into that transformation history. Enough to say that, after the eighteenth century, there was one maritime empire on which, as the British would say, the sun never sets, a power that circled the globe by sea.

This maritime global empire was further strengthened by the economic order of capitalism. Capitalism went by sea, so to speak, and spread around the world looking for markets and resources, creating the new kind of globalization that we have been living with. Before that, recorded history of the Old World was largely Eurasian and

North African, centered on the landmass between China and eastern Asia on one side and Europe and the Mediterranean on the other, with the rest of continental Europe and Asia in between, including the lands bordering the Indian Ocean. However, for the last 200 years, we have maritime empires. When I spoke earlier of the exceptional development of the Philippines, it was because it was the first state that actually looked away from Asia across the Pacific. This was when the rest of Southeast Asia under colonial rule from Europe looked the other way, to the nation states of Europe. The difference of having to face the New World for centuries decisively shaped the way the Philippines was to develop. That has clear relevance to ASEAN's regional future.

Now that the 10 nation states of Southeast Asia have come together as a region, what is this world order that the region is in? It is tempting to call it an Anglophone world order in which using English as a common international language has made it possible for ASEAN states to communicate more easily. That would also remind us that the region stemmed from links with the post-1945 settlement with which the world order defeated the Soviet Union and its allies.

That world order is now being challenged. The economic center of gravity is moving from the North Atlantic to the Pacific by the fact that China is rising and India's rise is only a matter of time. Given that, Southeast Asia can look forward to a time when it will be at the heart of activities that will change the economic conditions of the world. With the shift towards Asia, the importance of the Indian and Pacific Oceans in the global maritime capitalist world makes Southeast Asia even more significant. As we move away from post-1945 strategic thinking to the economic interests of the

twenty-first century, to the second stage of ASEAN's development, it will not be long before the centrality of ASEAN is not a matter of whether the South-east Asians want it or not. This region will be central in the Indo-Pacific zone, a core-area between the maritime powers and the Eurasian Old World.

Maritime power hinges for now on the New World because its Pacific and Atlantic base is on both sides of the United States whose dominance in that realm could remain for a long time. This maritime foundation remains the key part of the new world order.

For Southeast Asia, however, it is still part of the Old World that has for the past two centuries been dismissed as backward. This world also includes the progressive parts of a Europe that lost its nerve after the two world wars that nearly destroyed it. I am sure the Europeans would not agree here, but to most of us in Asia, they now look rather tired and unsure where to go as they face a whole lot of new problems. I am not suggesting that Asia does not have problems too, but Asia is now on the ascent after centuries of being dominated by the West. Asians feel that they have learned so much from the West; they have benefited from the great discoveries the West has made; they have mastered most of newest techniques in science and engineering as well as in economics and finance, and in the world of entrepreneurship. Asians have mastered just about everything that the West has to teach them. This is changing that part of the Old World to which Southeast Asia belongs. It is the part that is being renewed and transformed by New World standards and inspirations. We are now looking at a region that could fundamentally change its nature. That is why we can talk about the region of new nations, even though we know there is still a long way to go before that can be considered real.





## **Towards Common Interests**

Let me end with one example to show just how far we have to go. For some time now, people have talked about a Southeast Asian community. They have said that, to be a real community, there must be shared values. That sounds simple, but it is an objective loaded with great difficulties. What do they mean by shared values? At one time, they were thinking largely of shared political values, of having the same kinds of political ideals, like democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. If we have that, there would be shared values. But I have to say that

that is a narrow and only a minimalist approach towards what needs to be shared. There is much more than that. Although the goal may be somewhat beyond us, it is one worth aiming for. I am not suggesting that the cultures and values of every country in Southeast Asia should one day be the same. That is not a good idea, and I do not think it is possible anyway. On the other hand, I do think that the desire to become better able to comprehend, understand, and appreciate one another is necessary if not vital, and that would be a valuable step forward for all the nations in Southeast Asia. If they can achieve that, or move firmly towards

achieving that, then the people of Southeast Asia will gain the self-belief that would bring them confidence and give the region credibility in the eyes of others. That is something really worth working for. It is a great challenge for this region of 10 new nations that have started from such different backgrounds. To reach for such a high goal is probably over-ambitious, but I have always been an optimist and do not know how to be otherwise. And, as an optimist, I say this challenge can be met.

Thank you very much.





## Region and Academe in Turbulent Times

**Pasuk Phongpaichit**

Professor Emeritus, Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn  
University



I am hugely honored by the invitation to give this keynote. I wish to congratulate everyone who has helped to create this event. I salute its historical significance. I confess, I am also terrified by the responsibility.

The organizers asked me to reflect on what *we* do. By “we” I mean academics working on South-east Asia, wherever we were born, wherever we now live, whatever disciplines we choose. But I mean especially those who research, write, argue, attend conferences like these, and sometimes *shout* about our concerns because we care about the region, its people, and its future.

I plan to do this in three phases. First, I will revisit the time when I was starting my academic career. Looking around this hall, I see some old friends and familiar faces of my own generation. I want to remind them of how much has changed over our academic lifetimes. For younger friends, I want to hint how much change they can expect—far more than in my generation. Second, I will sketch a few major changes over the past 30 years—economic, political, and intellectual—that have transformed how we think and work. Finally, I will outline some issues that would frame my thinking if I were embarking on my academic career right now.

### Looking Back: Development, Democracy, and Knowledge

In my own education, from the 1950s to the 1970s, I went from a small Thai village, to the big city of Bangkok, and then to universities in the wide

world, in Australia and the UK. Looking back, I realize this was an extraordinary journey. I believe others of my generation here today went through something similar. Before our time, this journey had been confined to a very few—the very rich and the very royal. But we were lucky—partly because our own societies were becoming a little richer, and more ready to invest in education; but also because some advanced countries were enjoying the great post-war boom, and were inspired by ideas of international cooperation and universal values.

What were the ideas shaping the academic environment at that time for those in the humanities and social sciences?

Perhaps the single most important was “development,” at heart a very optimistic idea that we could engineer a better future. “Development economics” had been invented as a branch of the discipline, and was being taught in universities all over the world. “Developing countries” had become a new classification. Agencies from the UN and World Bank were telling governments how to “develop.” And it seemed to be working. With few exceptions, developing countries were reporting positive growth rates, often spectacularly fast. They were carried along by the stable international economy under the Bretton Woods system, the recovery boom after the Second World War, and the liberation of energies following the collapse of colonialism.

Related to development, was the idea of “social science,” which carried a belief that we could engineer better societies too. The pioneers of social anthropology were a product of the late colonial era, but the subject took off as a university disci-

pline from the late 1950s, and reached us a decade later. At the university where I work, the subject was first taught by a former French-Canadian Jesuit, who helped set up a social research institute, and trained its first generation of researchers.

A third inspiration was the idea of democracy. The idea had arrived in the region with the anti-colonial movements. Looking around this region in the 1960s and 70s, we saw mostly dictators and oligarchs, yet, what arrived in this era was a faith in the possibility of popular action. This was inspired in part by the student-worker movements in Europe and Australia in the late 1960s, by the anti-Vietnam War movement in the US, and by the explosion of New Left writing by people reinterpreting Marx for a new era. Through people power, we could look forward to a “democratic transition.” These thoughts inspired the multiplication of NGOs, and other forms of public activism. From this period, scholar-activists have become a feature of our region, more so than in most areas of the world.

Finally, what strikes me about this period is the conviction that *knowledge* was a force for good, and that hence the accumulation of knowledge—by research, analysis, theorizing, debate, conferences—was a noble pursuit. Of course this thought was especially appealing to those who could suddenly find a place in the academy.

The one complicating and confusing fact amidst all this optimism was America’s war in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. America dominated our perception of the world because America completely dominated cultural production at the international level, from Superman to Hollywood, from Elvis to

Jonathan Livingston Seagull. America symbolized the modern package of rights, liberties, democracy, and prosperity—the holy grail of “development.” But America was fighting an ugly war in our backyard, pitting its wealth and technology against a society of poor peasants. And as part of this war effort, America was supporting governments in our region that represented the very opposite of the modern package of rights, liberties, and democracy.

I studied economics, and returned to teach development economics, but I was lucky to be exposed to political economy in both Australia and the UK. By “political economy” I mean the broad proposition that economics makes more sense when politics is taken into account. I was struck that designing development policies for well-being, equity, and justice that truly helped the disadvantaged was not so difficult, but getting such policies adopted, implemented, and enforced seemed impossible. Economics could not properly be separated from politics. This conviction led me to concentrate my research on the political economy of labor, the sex industry, the illegal economy, corruption, and inequality, but also to study the social

forces that can bring about change, including labor unions, social movements, and political parties. Unfortunately, political economy has now become an endangered discipline. The faculty where I studied in Australia was then called the faculty of economics and politics, but it changed first to economics alone, then to economics and business, and is now the faculty of business and economics.

### *Ending the Cold War*

Now let me move to the second part. I am going to outline four changes. These are changes both in the world around us, and how we think about that world. I don't pretend that these four are comprehensive. This is a personal choice. They have strongly affected me.

The first is the ending of the Cold War. This had the enormous benefit of returning peace to our region, but it had knock-on effects which have been less benign, in two ways. First, it led to the collapse of leftist thinking on a world scale, which opened the way for the triumph of neoliberalism, meaning an extreme belief in the importance of the market.

This has had a devastating effect on economics. Development economics has almost disappeared. The Cambridge-Korean economist Ha-Joon Chang (2002) has described this brilliantly as “kicking away the ladder,” cancelling the optimism that societies can engineer their own growth, and graduate to first-world levels of prosperity and quality-of-life. Jayati Ghosh (2015) has recently observed that the aim of the whole international development apparatus has shifted from “development,” meaning the transformation of a society, to “poverty alleviation,”—cleaning up the worst mess of an unequal and unfair world, not trying to change it.

The second knock-on effect of the end of the Cold War has been the staggering growth of global business and finance dominated by huge companies, shrinking space for government and community institutions to influence the way we live.

The expansion of global finance as a result of financial deregulation from the late 1970s has reproduced exactly the same conditions of instability and international conflict that prevailed in the last era when finance capital was so strong, namely the run-up to the First World War. At that time,



measures to control finance were imposed only after a disastrous period for humanity. The smaller and weaker economies are the most vulnerable to this instability. After each crisis, here most obviously after the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98, there is some discussion of controlling finance. But while countries have installed better methods to defend themselves, very little has been done to address the problem at its root, at the global level, because big financial conglomerates are so politically powerful (Lim and Lim 2010, 14).

### *Postmodern Revolution*

My second big change is very different. This is the impact of the postmodern revolution in philosophy on the study of the humanities and social sciences. This is a massive subject but here I will mention just one aspect, which is the greater awareness of, and sensitivity to, the relationship between knowledge and power. This has produced some very exciting scholarship, especially in the areas of history

and literature.

But in the study of society, the impact has been two-edged. It has been easy to deconstruct the approaches of structuralism and structural functionalism, to point out the essentialism and the capture by grand narratives. But I have the impression that postmodernism has been better at knocking down than at rebuilding. The very terms, *postmodernism* and *postcolonialism* and *postwhatever* all look to the past and not to the future. Sociology and social anthropology seem to have become much less attractive as fields of study, and also much less productive of radical ideas for bringing about change.

### *Inequality and Conflict*

In my third big change, I want to put several things together in a group. They are: the disappointment with democracy; the rise of inequality; and the return of violence. I will first use Thailand as an example, because it may have wider implications for

the region, before broadening it out.

Fifteen years ago, Thailand was seen as a beacon of democracy in Southeast Asia. It figured strongly in the studies of “democratic transition” that mushroomed after the end of the Cold War. It had a working electoral parliament, a rather free press, an active civil society. The army seemed to be in retreat. But now, the results of four national elections have been overthrown. Political parties have been dissolved and politicians banned. The army has made a coup twice. Thailand is now the only country in the world with a military government installed by a coup. Many people have been jailed for long periods for thought crimes. The media and civil society are cowed by threats. The country has plummeted down every ranking for political modernity. Though I am sorry to say it, I think the country's stock in the world is at its lowest ever.

How did this happen, so quickly, and rather unexpectedly? Let me sketch it in very simple terms. Thailand's rather successful economic development—tripling average real per capita income in

one generation—has led to big social changes. The rural mass, with more income, more knowledge of the world and soaring aspirations, has become aware of the great inequality in power, status, and the distribution of public goods. And it has challenged for power to bring about change. The old bureaucratic elite and the new urban middle class are frightened by this challenge because they will lose power and privilege. This conflict is damaging the economy and obstructing progress in many areas.

Behind this conflict in Thailand is a high level of inequality—not just in incomes and wealth, but in access to power and rights of all kinds. On a world scale, there has been a big rise of interest in inequality over the last few years. Every major international agency has written a report about it. President Obama made it the theme of his State of the Union address last year. The Pope tweets about it. And there has been a flood of books by economists, political scientists, philosophers, and doctors. There are two reasons for this surge. First, inequality has been getting worse in many countries, particularly in the US, and possibly on a world scale. Second, many believe inequality lies behind rises in violence and conflict, including the clashes of the Arab Spring, riots in European cities, and even (perhaps) the Syrian crisis.

There is now a major industry on the analysis of inequality. Joseph Stiglitz and others have blamed neoliberalism, especially for destroying welfare systems and promoting corporate wealth. Thomas Piketty claims there is an inbuilt tendency towards inequality within capitalism. These analyses come from the advanced economies of the west. In Asia, too, inequality has been rising, but I think the causal factors are different here. In the development era, economists promoted unbalanced growth in the belief that inequality stimulated entrepreneurship, and those policies have never really been revised. Weak judicial regimes give scope to the ruthless. Old ideas of social privilege have never been properly challenged. And most governments have paid very little attention to issues of distribution.

The relationship between inequality and conflict is not straightforward. High or rising inequality does not necessarily lead to conflict. Indeed, over the period of rising conflict in Thailand since around 2000, inequality has actually been improving. But in the past, it was very high for quite a long time. This seems to be the danger. In such periods, people at the top of the pyramid get used to the benefits and privileges of an unequal society. When the fundamentals of the society then begin to shift, there is a risk of conflict as these benefits and privileges are at risk.

In many countries of the region, inequality has been rising over the past decade. I fear we can expect increased conflict in some of these countries in the future.

### *Future of the Planet*

My last big change is about the future of the planet. This issue has come from nowhere over the past generation, and is now arguably the biggest, because it is deadly. Concern over the environment was just beginning in the 1970s. We started to worry about the ozone layer in the 1980s. Global warming came into the picture in the 1990s, and climate change by the 2000s. In this region, awareness has lagged behind the world because we don't see and feel the changes. In Europe, people understood global warming when they could see the plants, birds, and insects around them changing. In the US, more extreme weather disasters have begun to convert many. But here in tropical Asia, our sensitivity is lower. We are used to tropical heat, so a little extra is hardly noticed. We are used to the battering of typhoons, and the drought and flood that result from the unreliable monsoon, so more extreme events are not so shocking. But it's a global issue that we cannot ignore.

There are two frightening aspects of the climate issue. First, though the scientists have found out a lot, there is a lot they do not know. Will the arctic ice sheets melt, exactly how much might the sea levels rise, and when? Second, we seem incapable of doing anything about it. The Kyoto Protocol was agreed in this building 18 years ago this week.<sup>1)</sup> It has had little impact on the trend of emissions, because the bigger countries were not committed. President Obama—the most powerful man in the world—made a strong commitment to action on climate change, and achieved some reduction in greenhouse gas emissions in the US, but has not affected the worldwide trend. The current conference in Paris is an important step, but its outcome remains very uncertain.

Behind this failure of commitment lies the power of big global business, and its influence over states—and especially the power of the power industry, something which people in Japan are very aware of, especially after the Fukushima incident. Other countries are not so aware, yet.

I became aware of this some years ago. At a conference in Thailand, I wondered aloud why a cool and damp country like Germany derived a much larger proportion of its power from solar than a hot, sunny country like Thailand. A representative from the electricity-generating monopoly replied that the quality of the sun in Germany was very high, while the quality of our sun in Thailand was very low. He said it with a straight face. I thought we had only one sun in our universe. Some time later, a green activist calculated that Thailand could provide for all its additional power needs by installing solar panels over an area of semi-desert. The power experts went bananas explaining why this was impossible. More recently, the electricity monopoly has come up with the idea that our grid cannot accommodate more than a small supply of solar-generated energy. This is very clever, because it makes the barrier a technical issue in a facility over

which they have total control.

Recently one of my colleagues has been looking at Thailand's power industry (Nopanun 2016). It is a closed world. It is enormously lucrative. The people controlling it have a shared interest in upholding the status quo. Their job is to make profit for shareholders. They may be neither for nor against solar. But they prefer to invest in centralized large scale-systems that big firms can manage efficiently. Thus the idea of solar is a big threat to them.

My last point about climate is that the impact for most of us will not be the direct physical changes, such as the sea rising around us, but the social impact of changes happening elsewhere, in the most vulnerable spots. Moreover, these social impacts are already happening but are difficult to relate with certainty to climate change. Several experts have pointed out that the revolt in Syria began after a four-year drought in the country's eastern region, induced by climate change, which sparked an exodus of 1.5 million farming families to the cities (Femia and Werrell 2012; Goldstone 2015). Of course, we cannot gauge how much the drought was a cause of conflict. But the possibility that the unfolding social crisis in Europe is in part a result of an ecological crisis in the Middle East illustrates how complex, how difficult, and how *big* the consequences of climate change will be.

### **Looking Forward**

Now let me wind up. I have sketched the issues which influenced my work at the start of my academic career, and then those which are shaping my thinking now, towards the end of that career. My first and simple point is that these issues have changed enormously. The world has changed, and our intellectual equipment for understanding the world has changed.

My second point is that the old ideas of “development,” “social sciences,” and democracy may now be badly tarnished, yet they enshrined an optimism about the future that was a powerful motivation of both research and activism. These same ideas need to be reworked for a new era.

My third point is that the challenges facing the academy have become tougher as a result of the increasing complexity of our globalized world. The barriers to the use of solar energy in our sun-drenched region can serve an example. This is a problem that involves science and engineering to solve problems over storage and distribution, political economy to understand the role of the existing power industry, and law and politics to plot the course of change to a new power regime. Within the academy, this requires more interdisciplinary cooperation.

A model for such cooperation can be found right here at Kyoto University, in a project entitled “In Search of Sustainable Humanosphere (meaning living environment) in Asia and Africa,” which brought together scientists, social scientists, and historians to think about the planet in a new way.<sup>2)</sup>



This need for interdisciplinary work and “big thinking” is equally true for the other issues I have mentioned—inequality, the domination of finance—and many more.

My fourth concluding point is that knowledge matters, that academic research and debate needs to be protected, and that we should never be discouraged. Very few politicians will admit to being influenced by something that an academic has said or written. But somehow, whenever politics take an authoritarian turn, academics are among the first to be threatened. That has happened since the last Thai coup. Several academics have been called in for “attitude adjustment,” some on several occasions. The junta announced it was going to cure inequality so we should stop talking about it because it might cause division. When we were going to hold a seminar, they threatened to surround the building with soldiers so nobody could get in.

Earlier this year, the education minister in the current Japanese government sent a letter to Japan’s 86 national universities, calling on them to take “active steps to abolish [social science and humanities] organizations or to convert them to serve areas that better meet society’s needs.” Prime minister Abe talked about promoting “more practical vocational education that better anticipates the needs of society” (Grove 2015). Apparently 26 universities agreed to make some reduction, but these decisions may be influenced by falling applications and financial constraints. You will be pleased to hear

that Kyoto University informed the minister that it would simply not comply.

The issues that I have chosen to describe are those which appeal to a political economist. For a historian, or a political scientist, or a literature specialist, or an anthropologist, or a student of cultural studies, the issues will be different, but the message is the same. Be engaged. Be sensitive to the time and the place. Be prepared to explore new avenues and multidisciplinary researches. Maintain the optimism that change for the better is possible. Never be discouraged. Your innovative ideas, writing, and agitation—as well as your courage—have never been so much in demand as they are right now!

Thank you.

## References

- Chang, Ha-Joon. 2002. *Kicking away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective*. London: Anthem.
- Femia, Francesco; and Werrell, Caitlin. 2012. Syria: Climate Change, Drought and Social Unrest. At <http://climateandsecurity.org/2012/02/29/syria-climate-change-drought-and-social-unrest/>.
- Ghosh, Jayati. 2015. From “Development” to “Poverty Alleviation”: What Have We Lost? *Frontline*, September 4, 2015, at <http://www.networkideas.org/news/aug2015/Development.pdf>.
- Goldstone, Jack. 2015. Syria, Yemen, Libya: One


Factor Unites These Failed States, and It Isn’t Religion. At <http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/11/30/syria-yemen-libya-one-factor-unites-these-failed-states-and-it-isnt-religion/>.

- Grove, Jack. 2015. Social Sciences and Humanities Faculties “to Close” in Japan after Ministerial Intervention. *Times Higher Education*, September 14, 2015, at <https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/social-sciences-and-humanities-faculties-close-japan-after-ministerial-intervention>.
- Lim, Michael Ma Hui; and Lim, Chin. 2010. Financial Crisis Has Thus Become More Frequent and Accentuated with the Dominance of Finance over the Real Economy. *Nowhere to Hide: The Great Financial Crisis and Challenges for Asia*, pp. 16–43. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Nopanun Wannathepsakul. 2016. Network Bureaucracy and Public-Private Firms in Thailand’s Energy Sector. In *Unequal Thailand: Aspects of Income, Wealth and Power*, edited by Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, pp. 97–119. Singapore: NUS Press.

## Notes

- 1) On December 11, 1997.
- 2) HP of Global COE Program, “In Search of Sustainable Humanosphere in Asia and Africa.” At <http://www.humanosphere.cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp/en/>.

Some years ago Ben promised me to quit smoking; I was worried about his health because he had a mild heart attack in 1996. As it turns up in this photo, he must have been smoking 'behind my back' heaven-only-knows-since-when! As I remember fondly, Ben was a wise man but with his share of foibles.



At his Bangkok apartment, early 2015  
(Photo by Courtesy of Anan Krudphet)

## Three Cheers for the Hare that Did Not Stop Running to Take a Nap: In Celebration of the Life of Benedict Anderson (1936–2015)

*Kato Tsuyoshi*

*Professor Emeritus, Kyoto University*

When I think of Ben Anderson, I often think of one of Aesop's Fables, "The Tortoise and the Hare." Yeap, it is the story about a slow-crawling tortoise and a fast-running hare, and the former beating the latter in a race because the hare was so confident of winning and took a nap midway through the race. There is a critical difference, though, between the hare of the fable and Ben: Ben never stopped running! Being not exactly a hare in the academic race, I used to ruefully mutter to myself how unfair it was that this hare did not want to take a nap even after his retirement, thereby not giving the tortoise the slightest chance of threatening, let alone beating, him. There came a time, however, when even Ben the hare finally had to stop running . . . to rest. . . . Oops, I should not go too fast in telling my story about Ben.

By way of self-introduction, let me explain first how I got to know Ben. I went to Cornell University in the fall of 1968 to study sociology and

Southeast Asian studies, and had Ben as an academic advisor in the latter field. Ben got his PhD in 1967, a year before my arrival at Cornell and was just appointed as a young assistant professor at the Department of Government. Being the youngest and newest faculty member, he was properly dressed in tie and jacket when I went to see him for the first time at his office. It was also the time when old-fashioned propriety still reigned on American college campuses. Girls' dorms and boys' dorms for graduate students had been separate at Cornell until their "integration" a couple of years prior to my arrival, and students at Law School and Business School went to classes in tie and jacket. In any case, when Ben turned around to get some papers behind him, I noticed there was something not proper in his attire. His shirttail was sticking out from under the end of his jacket. Seeing that, I secretly gave a smile of approval and thought I could get along with this guy nicely. Indeed, get along nicely we did

for all the years after our first encounter.

I went to West Sumatra in Indonesia in early 1972 for fieldwork. Ben was to visit me there as he had never been to the land of Minangkabau people; but he was detained in Jakarta and "famously" expelled as all of us know. After finishing my fieldwork, I got back to the United States in late 1974. The Ben I knew in 1968 and the Ben I saw in 1974 were different. In 1968 he was in tie and jacket. In 1974 he was all in blue jeans. His favorite was denim overall. Can you imagine Ben in denim overall? In winter he wore a denim jacket with thick lining, the kind worn by cowboys of the Marlboro Country. I suspected he must have been having a mid-life crisis or something and groping for a new identity. Pablo Picasso went through the Blue period, then the Rose period, and eventually through cubism. Ben in 1968 was in the period of tie and jacket. In 1974 he was in the period of jeans. Can you guess what his later period was? Yes,



it was the period of T-shirt, short pants, and sandals with his sweet and often mischievous smiles (Fig. 1).

When I got back to Cornell from fieldwork, my scholarship was about to end, and Ben kindly took me in as a free lodger at his house in Freeville outside Ithaca. During my stay at his house there were a few more occasional “lodgers,” such as one of his colleagues who was divorced from his wife and even a collie (!) whose owner moved from Cornell to a university in New York City and could not immediately find an apartment that allowed her to keep the dog. If I am not mistaken, the collie stayed with us for more than one year.

These two-plus years with him at Freeville were one of the most wonderful times in my life. I enjoyed countless hours of intelligent and not so intelligent talks we had, driving to our offices at the now legendary 102 West Avenue where the office of the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project was located, barbecuing in the summer with other officemates—mostly fellow graduate students who had come back from fieldwork in different parts of Southeast Asia—at a park near Cayuga Lake, going shopping and cooking together, drinking and having dinner, enjoying seasonal dancing parties at his house with the Rolling Stones’ “Satisfaction” blaring (thank heavens, Ben’s house was in the countryside), and seeing Ben fall into a doze in the middle of our conversation near the fireplace at winter night. You see, Ben was somewhat of an insomniac; I could sometimes hear him walking around the second floor of his two-story house in the wee hours of the morning and he usually got sleepy early at night due to the lack of proper sleep.

It was because of his influence that I wrote my dissertation in a way I had not expected to. American sociology in my graduate school days tried, perhaps still tries, to be “scientific.” It meant, among other things, that *American Journal of Sociology*, *American Sociological Review*, and other famous sociology journals in the US had no articles published without tables or results of statistical testing. When I came back from fieldwork, I was armed with piles and piles of filled-out questionnaire sheets whose results were to be coded, punched into IBM cards, and processed through computer for statistical testing (I feel so ancient writing this!). Ben did not say anything about what I was doing. However, after two years of my analyzing fieldwork data, doing literature survey, and dissertation writing, I had the following to say in the preface of my book of 1982 on the matrilineal Minangkabau of West Sumatra, which had grown out of my dissertation of 1977:

Special thanks are due to Benedict R. O’G.

Anderson, who, as teacher and friend, taught me the importance of appreciating Indonesian society for itself rather than merely using it as a sample to theorize about. It is primarily because of his influence that I have written a book that is, in the terms of contemporary sociology, rather unconventional. (Kato 1982, 12)

For one thing, the final product was far more historical than initially planned and it even incorporated mythology that, as I came to see it, indicated Minangkabau cultural conceptualization of their history. How much could a neophyte sociologist trained in the US go astray and become so “unscientific”?

I went back to Japan at the end of 1976. In the summer of the following year Ben visited me and Ajarn Charnvit of Thammasat University, who was then a visiting scholar at Center for Southeast Asian Studies of Kyoto University. The three of us made the most memorable trip, cycling along the southern coast of Shikoku Island for about 10 days. We were in our mid-30s to early 40s and had fun like kids; enduring heat under a straw hat; quenching our thirst with beer (admittedly not part of kids’ fun); having leisurely dips in the sea whenever and wherever the fancy took us (bicycling *is* freedom!); competing against each other to see who could cycle up first to the top of an arched bridge; staying at countryside accommodations, selected on the daily, random basis from a guidebook of Shikoku

guesthouses (*minshuku*), and enjoying sumptuous seafood dinners they provided. In the pre-Internet age with no access to popular ratings, even hitting a guesthouse with so-so dinner was as much fun as hitting a jackpot. One time we had lunch at a small eatery. When we came out of the place, Ben was surrounded by giggling high-school girls. In a far corner of a remote island in Japan of those days people had never seen a “real Caucasian” in the flesh as it were, and they wanted to have Ben’s autograph! (The girls were sufficiently civilized or timid not to poke at Ben’s flesh with their fingers.) Naturally he was quite embarrassed but gracious as well as amused enough to comply with their request.

Moving fast forward, it was after the late 1990s when Ben half-retired and later completely retired from his professorship at Cornell that we began to see each other rather regularly again. I visited him a few times at Freeville in the summer and Ben often stopped over in Kyoto on his way from the US to Bangkok, where he stayed half of the year, or the other way around. Traveling to *onsen* (hot springs) was part of our *adat* (custom) whenever Ben came




Fig. 1 At a Mall in Bangkok, Late 2014 (Photo by Courtesy of Anan Krudphet)



to Kyoto. Among these encounters I specifically want to talk about my visit to Freeville in the summer of 2008. This visit was for preparing the Japanese translation of Ben's "memoir" that was to be later published in Japan in 2009. I am sure many people would want to know how it came to be published in Japanese, not in English, and how the idea of this book had been conceived to begin with. It was the book Ben never intended to write. Its idea came from Endo Chiho, a young female editor at NTT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone) Publishing. Chiho was a great fan of Ben and she was curious to know what kind of books the European intellectual who wrote *Imagined Communities* read in his formative years and throughout his academic career.

She approached Ben for the first time on the book project in April 2005 when he attended an international conference in Tokyo. He was not enthusiastic at all about the project. He reasoned that none of his revered teachers wrote such books and thought he should follow their example. Besides, to quote him, "great books are much more important than the people who write them." In any case, he said, he had always been far more interested in, and curious about, the big world and its history than in and about himself (Anderson 2009, 1).

Unfazed by Ben's reluctance, Ms. Endo, bless her, approached him again in November 2007, this time with me beside her as a Yojimbo or "muscular counselor," so to speak, when Ben stopped over in Kyoto on his way from the US to Bangkok. You know, Ben had this soft spot for young people. He always wanted to help them. I don't know if Endo was aware of this but in their second meeting she begged him to write the book for young Japanese scholars and graduate students who aspired to be academicians. That did the trick. He finally relented, saying he had many good friends in Japan and this could be one way of thanking them for their friendship. There was one condition: it would be a Japanese edition only without any English one

in the future, because he said he would be too embarrassed to see his life story printed in the language he could read. It was agreed that I would translate the manuscript into Japanese.

It was Endo who provided the basic framework of the book, asking Ben to retail his childhood, his experiences at Cambridge and Cornell, and his thoughts on area studies, fieldwork, the importance of comparative studies, and interdisciplinary studies. On my part, I asked him to add a concluding chapter on his experiences after retirement; I myself was approaching retirement then and wanted to know how he could maintain his intellectual curiosity and be so academically active after retirement. I had thought that retired professors were likely to vegetate in the rocking chair.

Ben started writing in spring 2008 in Bangkok and sent me chapter by chapter via email between April and June each time he finished one of them. The last chapter was done in mid-July. Ben was already back home in Freeville by then and I had just arrived there a day earlier. I was to spend a month with him to go over the manuscript and ask him whatever questions I had about it. It turned out that I needed a lot of clarification about his family history and also had to ask him many questions about Classical Studies and European history both of which were not my cup of tea.

My stay in Freeville was most enjoyable and educational. It was like a one-month-long personally tailored tête-à-tête seminar, one session in the morning and the other in the afternoon everyday, with a glass or two, sometimes more, of margarita and light conversations thrown in before dinner. Ben had brought back the cocktail recipe of margarita after attending the International Congress of Orientalists in Mexico City in August 1976 when I was still staying with him, and it became "our drink" for summer whenever I stayed at Freeville. Ben encouraged me to insert into the Japanese translation whatever extra information that, in my opinion, might help Japanese readers better understand his writing. As a matter of fact I did so rather freely, drawing a lot from what I learned through the "seminar sessions" with him. In this sense the Japanese edition of his "memoir" was to become more than a "right-to-left" translation of the English manuscript.

It was only in the last couple of years that I came to realize how much that month-long stay at Freeville in 2008, together with my involvement in the translation of the "memoir," had influenced my postretirement life and academic interests for the last several years. Not that he told me I should be interested in this or that. Yet the daily "seminar sessions" definitely awakened, without my realizing it, my curiosity about so many new things and especially made me more appreciative of the importance of history and comparison in looking around my daily life (e.g., Japanese clothing, cooking, and dwelling) and at the world in general. Thus, in addition to comparative historical studies of Japan, China, and Korea on which I recklessly started

teaching about 10 years ago *à la* bicycle riding, that is, keep on pedaling or studying lest I fall, I am now very much interested in learning the histories of Europe, the US, and Latin America, all in connection with the history of "development ideology." One is never too late or too old to start new things in life. Ben was a living proof of that.

Getting back to the "memoir," Ben had placed "My Good Luck" at the head of each chapter title as some sort of identification mark: "My Good Luck Introduction" or "My Good Luck Fieldwork," for instance. I thought "My Good Luck" would not do as a book title, although it was one of the themes running through the manuscript. After getting back to Japan, I mulled over this question and eventually suggested to Ben that we title the Japanese translation as "Out of the Coconut Half-Shell" ("Yashi-Gara Wan no Soto-e"). It is related to an Indonesian (and Thai) proverb, *katak dibawah tempurung* or "a frog (caught) under the (overturned bowl made of) coconut half-shell," which was mentioned in the manuscript. It describes the situation where the frog, unable to get out of the coconut half-shell, gradually begins to feel comfortable under it and even thinks the space inside it is the entire universe. "Out of the Coconut Half-Shell" meant to tell the frog that it should not be the case. For a long time Ben did not want to call his "memoir" "autobiography"; "memoir" was the closest he was willing to concede to as its designation. After we decided on "Out of the Coconut Half-Shell" as the memoir's title in Japanese, Ben was gleefully referring to it as "the Frog book." I am happy to say that Ben liked a lot the front cover design of the Frog book (Fig. 2).

Ben eventually changed his mind about not having the Frog book published in English. It was, I think, sometime in the fall of 2014 and his brother Perry was instrumental in finally persuading Ben to come around on this. I spent July 2015 at Freeville, ostensibly to help him prepare a manuscript for the English edition. (He for some reason began fondly to refer to Freeville as "Free Village" from around this time, which had not happened before as far as I remember.) If truth be told, my role was more like his margarita buddy in the evening when he got tired of sitting in front of the computer. I understand that the English edition, which is a revised and partly expanded version of the Frog book, with my additions for the Japanese readership removed, will be published by Verso in May 2016 and titled *A Life Beyond Boundaries: A Memoir*. It is uncanny that, after all, Ben would not get to see his autobiography published in his mother tongue.

One important message Ben wished to convey through the Frog book was that aspiring young academics needed to get out of socially imposed or sometimes self-imposed boundaries in their thinking prescribed by institutional structures of the university, disciplinary segmentation, and narrow-minded nationalism (which, unlike earlier antidynastic and anticolonial nationalisms, scarcely share crossnational solidarities), if they wanted to be intellectually creative and simultaneously resist



Fig. 2 Cover of "Out of the Coconut Half-Shell"





Fig. 3 At Wat Wuang, Ang Thong Province, Central Thailand, May 13, 2015 (Photo by Courtesy of Anan Krudphet)

the onslaught of academic professionalization and globalizing influences of American English and Google search engine.

In one place in the concluding chapter of the Frog book he writes:

For a very long time, different forms of socialism, anarchist, Leninist, New Leftist, social democratic provided a 'global' framework in which progressive, emancipationist nationalism could flourish. Since the fall of 'Communism' in its Stalinist-Maoist forms, there has been a global vacuum, partially filled by feminism, environmentalism, neo-anarchism, and various other isms, fighting in different and not always cooperative ways against the barrenness of neoliberalism and Machiavellian 'human rights' interventionism. But a lot of work, over a long period of time, will be needed to fill the vacuum. This is the task to which young scholars can make vital contributions. (Anderson 2009, 274)

He concludes the book with the slogan "Frogs of the world unite! You have nothing to lose but your coconuts" (*ibid.*, 282).

I wrote a long afterword to the Frog book and

ended it with a Waka poem, a classical form of Japanese poetry consisting of "5-7-5-7-7" units with a total of 31 syllabic units; in contrast, Haiku poetry consists of "5-7-5" units with a total of 17 syllables. Below I write my Waka in Romanized Japanese and provide a rough but literal English translation (*ibid.*, 300):

Atogaki-wo	Afterword
Shitatame umashi	Just completed Sweet
Saké-wo hoshi	Saké drunk up
Tomo-tono tabi-ni	To journey with my dear friend
Toh-ten-wo utsu	Put a comma

When composing this Waka, I obviously had thought that there were still many more years to come for us to resume the joint intellectual journey. However, even the tireless hare eventually had to quit running to take a well-earned rest; I hereby reluctantly put a period to our journey.

Ben left me a lot of joyful memories and funny stories to chuckle about. As some of you may know, one small book he put out in 2012 is titled *The Fate of Rural Hell: Asceticism and Desire in Buddhist Thailand* (Anderson 2012). It is about this Disney-

land-like hell recreated at a Buddhist temple in central Thailand. Before going into hell, however, let me make a little digression and talk about the devil, for the discussion of hell, I feel, will not be complete without first paying due respect to the devil.

Fortunately one of Ben's works comes in handy on this matter too. With the cooperation of two other people, he translated from Spanish into Tagalog and English and published *Ang Diablo sa Filipinas ayon sa nasasabi sa mga casulatan luma sa Kastila / The Devil in the Philippines according to ancient Spanish documents* (De los Reyes 2014). The original material is a "horror story" written and published in the late 1880s by Isabelo de los Reyes, who, among many hats he wore, was the first Filipino folklorist. It largely consists of exchanges between two Catholic priests about the "superstitious" belief in evil spirits, witches, sorcerers, and so on common among the "natives." The catch of the story is that the exchanges revolve around actual records on these topics left by four friars between the late sixteenth century and the first half of the eighteenth century. Isabelo depicts the friars and the clergymen, as much as the "natives," as deathly afraid of these malevolent forces—or newly

invented folklorish presences if we follow Isabelo's intimation—that were objectified as the “Devil” and “Satan” according to Catholic teaching and thus were “imagined presences” shared by both the colonizers and the colonized. Spanish colonization of Latin America and the Philippines took place around the time of the Spanish Inquisition (from the late fifteenth century to around 1800) with witch-hunting in tow. I would not be surprised if the friars lived in a mental world where witches and devils, whether Castilian, Filipino, or otherwise, were very real to them, irrespective of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment that transformed mental frames in other parts of Europe. I got the impression that Ben drew enormous pleasure and satisfaction translating the story from the fact that he sent me a copy of it soon after it was out in Manila. That was not the case with the book on hell, possibly because its satisfaction did not measure up to that of the *Diablo* or because it was published in India and not easy to get hold of an extra copy for me.

So, what about the imagined hell at the Thai temple? Ben told me that one of the female statues represented in hell at the temple was a housewife burned in fire (Fig. 3). Her sin? She was, according to the explanatory plaque, lazy and did not prepare breakfast for her husband. He said one never knew for sure for what sin one might be thrown into hell. He added that the hell was far more fascinating than the paradise. I guess his observation is somewhat akin to what is meant by the famous opening lines of Tolstoy's (1960, 1) *Anna Karenina*: “Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.” I keep wondering if he were now somewhere up there or down there comparing “real hell” and the Disneyland-like hell of the Thai temple. We do not have to worry if he might be in hell. He told me another of his great discoveries about hell: interestingly hell is “sectarian” in its “membership,” that is, only Buddhists get into the Buddhist hell, Muslims into the Muslim hell, and so forth. There is no religious mix-up in hell. And if I may dare say, there is no hell for Nonbelievers or . . . paradise for that matter, only Mu or Nothingness, a Zen Buddhist term often associated with Satori (Enlightenment), which Ben had picked up from his good friend, the late Tsuchiya Kenji of Kyoto University, and turned into one of his most favorite expressions ever, no matter with or without Satori.

Ben passed away in Batu, Malang, at around midnight of December 12, 2015 (officially on December 13). It goes without saying that all of us who have known Ben are sad to see him gone but at the same time we will all be happy, I am sure, if we know as I do that he breathed his last peacefully in his sleep in his beloved East Java after having visited two Candi or ancient Hindu temple ruins he liked most, in retrospect, as if to bade goodbye to them, in the company of three devoted friends who

attended to him dearly at his last hours. He was cremated on December 19, his ashes scattered in the Java Sea the next morning. When the urn of his ashes was released into the sea at a more than one-and-a-half-hour distance by boat from the shore, a yellow butterfly appeared from nowhere, and in a short while was joined by a few more.

Kotsu-tsubo-wo	Ashes
Toki-hanachi-taru	Freed
Una-bara-ni	Into sea
Ki-i-roki-cho-no	A yellow butterfly
Ma-u-sugata Ha-e	Its dancing image etched in the air

No doubt there will be many obituaries written about Ben praising his invaluable scholarly contributions of “global significance,” surely citing *Imagined Communities*, for instance. What amazes me and impresses me most about Ben, though, is the kind of works he took the trouble to bring out into the world, the *Diablo* book for one, because he found them interesting and worthwhile to be republished or translated into English. One primary example is the republication of *Indonesia dalem api dan bara* (Indonesia in Flames and Ashes) written by an author under the penname Tjamboek Berdoeri or Thorny Whip (Tjamboek Berdoeri 2004). The saga of Ben's personal involvement in the book, whose beginning dates back to the time of his first fieldwork in Java in the 1960s, is recounted in the final chapter of the *Frog* book (Anderson 2009, 254–261). The mysterious writer turned out to be Kwee Thiam Tjing, a well-known Sino-Indonesian journalist (1900–74) who “came from an old East Java Chinese family stretching back many generations.”

The book was originally published in 1947 and, after almost 60 years, republished in 2004 with Ben's introduction and a large number of footnotes, of course all in Indonesian; it was followed by an edited book titled *Menjadi Tjamboek Berdoeri* (To Become Tjamboek Berdoeri) in which are compiled articles written by Kwee between 1971 and 1973 (Kwee Thiam Tjing 2010). It was Ben, the “scholar of world renown,” who labored to resurrect to Indonesian readership, including that of Chinese Indonesians, the books and their author, who, according to Ben's description, “was proud of the fact that he could not read Chinese characters, and felt himself to be an Indonesian patriot” (Anderson 2009, 257). What his effort must have meant to the Chinese Indonesian community in general and that in East Java in particular was evident to me throughout Ben's funeral in Surabaya; I thought to myself what more a student of area studies could wish for as a token of unworldly worthiness and heartfelt appreciation of his or her works.

I have already overshot a great deal the amount of space allowed for this writing and so will no longer say what a terrific teacher Ben was. I am sure all

the students who studied under and with him would vouch for that in their own words. As my last tribute in celebration of his life, I just want to add what a wonderful human being Ben was. He shunned arrogance, self-promotion, and authoritarianism, both in principle and practice. He was always on the side of the young, the weak, and minorities, and cared for and about people close to him. He was the kind of person whose deeds—not only what he did but also how he did it—make you believe in the goodness of human beings and want to search for something or anything good inside you to have it grow so that it will be socially meaningful.

OK, Ben, wherever you might be now, I imagine you must be feeling ticklish and uncomfortable in the shower of praises, so I stop here and say “Farewell” to you “with a comma” . . . until I see you again. . . . Darn, I am going to miss you, Ben.

## References

- Anderson, Benedict. 2009. *Yashi-Gara Wan no Soto-e* ヤシガラ碗の外へ [Out of the coconut half-shell], translated by Tsuyoshi Kato. Tokyo: NTT Publishing.
- . 2012. *The Fate of Rural Hell: Asceticism and Desire in Buddhist Thailand*. Calcutta: Seagull Books.
- De los Reyes, Isabelo. 2014. *Ang Diablo sa Filipinas ayon sa nasabi sa mga casulatan luma sa Kastila / The Devil in The Philippines According to Ancient Spanish Documents*, translated by Benedict Anderson, Carlos Sardiña Galache, and Ramon Guillermo, with annotations. Mandaluyong City: Anvil.
- Kato, Tsuyoshi. 1982. *Matriliney and Migration: Evolving Minangkabau Traditions in Indonesia*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Kwee Thiam Tjing. 2010. *Menjadi Tjamboek Berdoeri: Memoar Kwee Thiam Tjing* [To become Tjamboek Berdoeri: A memoir of Kwee Thiam Tjing], edited by Arief W. Djati and Ben Anderson, with an introduction by James Siegel. Jakarta: Komunitas Bambu.
- Tjamboek Berdoeri. 2004. *Indonesia dalem api dan bara* [Indonesia in flames and ashes]. Jakarta: Elkasa.
- Tolstoy, Leo. 1960. *Anna Karenina*, translated by Joel Carmichael. New York: Bantam Dell.

## Note

Reprinted, with minor alterations, from Kato Tsuyoshi, “Three Cheers for the Hare that Did Not Stop Running to Take a Nap: In Celebration of the Life of Benedict Anderson,” *Philippine Studies: Historical and Ethnographic Viewpoints* Vol. 64, No. 1, March 2016, pp. 178–191, with the permission of the Ateneo de Manila University.



## Southeast Asian Scholars at the Edge

Interviewer: **Loh Kah Seng** (Assistant Professor, Sogang University)

This interview on the perils and taboos of historical research in Southeast Asia came out of failure—failure to persuade Ben Anderson to come to a 2010 conference in Singapore on researching and teaching controversial pasts in Asia. Yet the failure sparked a lively conversation between Ben and me on the subject. It led to this interview over email two years later when I was a postdoctoral fellow at CSEAS, with encouragement and contribution from another fellow Jafar Suryomenggolo. In the interview, Ben shares his thoughts on writing difficult histories in Southeast Asia, both in his time and in the present day—issues that are close to Southeast Asian scholars who look to write and speak about their research beyond the ivory tower.

**Loh Kah Seng (LKS):** Hi Ben, what are the taboos of academic, particularly historical, research in Southeast Asia (SEA)? Debates in SEA about the state, communist threats, monarchy, religion, race, and homosexuality come to mind, all of which differ from academic discourse in the West.

**Benedict Anderson (BA):** In the US and in Europe there are very few taboos (in the traditional sense) anymore. In the technical sense, some still exist. If you are an academic writer, the taboos are jokes and witticisms, deliberately using slang, dialects, straightforward language rather than professional argot.

But the taboos only apply really to the swarm of non-profitmaking university presses and professional journals. Out in the big world, almost anything is possible if the publishers think there is a market. The US is a special case since the universities belong either to particular states, or to private corporations. There is no National University, and Washington itself has only second or third rate universities. Professors there are not civil servants, whereas in Europe there are many state universities with high prestige where professors are effectively civil servants. Status is therefore higher, and the thumb of the state is felt once in a while. Religious groups are generally weak enough or discredited enough not to be able to create taboos. But this condition is rather new—that is to say, it came into existence after centuries of struggles, right up to WWII.

Nonetheless Western scholars working on regions like SEA are of course really affected by SEA taboos, enforced by local states and powerful lobbies. Funders are usually unhappy if the local regimes/veto-groups are angry, and they often don't want to give research grants for this reason. Students are afraid of not getting grants and being denied visas. There is also the peculiar status of languages. If one writes in English, you have a better chance of the work surviving into publication, because the ruling groups don't read much in English except at the policymaking level and they assume that the toiling masses can't read such books anyway. When I asked Malaysian filmmaker Amir Muhammad whether he had trouble with his collection of stories by gays and lesbians, he laughed and said: No, the UMNO (United Malays National Organization) gang never read if they can help it, especially not whole books. Let alone English language books.

**LKS:** Are taboo subjects historically and culturally determined, e.g. are they constructed to maintain the legitimacy of “theatre states” in SEA?

**BA:** There are such taboos based on traditional institutions, but most of today's taboos come from contemporary regimes and lobbies. It is harder today to write about the region's militaries, polices, the Church, Islam etc., than it was 40 years ago. State archives are much more guarded/shredded than was the case earlier. One reason why so many historians write on the colonial period is that the colonial archives are 90% open.

**LKS:** How far is history (and academic research as a whole) “controversial” in Southeast Asia? There are surprisingly few clear cases of historians getting into trouble (such as your experience in Indonesia). Does this mean that most critical scholars have been co-opted by their host states and have supported nation-building projects? Or have academics simply treated the issue as an elephant in the room?

In Indonesia, only a few history books written by Indonesians have been banned: Pramoedya Ananta Toer's *Haokiau di Indonesia* (banned during the Soekarno years) and Slamet Muljana's *Runtuhnya Kerajaan Hindu-Jawa dan Timbulnya Negara-Negara Islam di Nusantara* (by the Soeharto regime). Other historians like Nugroho Notosusanto have used history to legitimise the Soeharto regime.

**BA:** My sense is that history actually faces more taboos than political science, because history covers vast pieces of human time, while the latter is usually about the present and very recent past of which living readers have their own experiences and opinions. The biggest problem is actually local nationalism—Indonesian historians have created a whole range of national heroes who actually didn't think of themselves as Indonesians or even heroes. Pramoedya was the only man to invent the concept of pra-Indonesia—in other words, Indonesia emerged only in the early twentieth century. Everything before that is pre-Indonesian.

Indonesians know very little about Srivijaya—“discovered by Dutch scholars around 1905” but not mentioned as such—but they love the idea because Srivijaya goes back to the eighth century—and nations want long lineages. Dutch scholars in the early twentieth century wrote quite a lot about homosexuality in the Indies (pedophilia actually)—

based on the study of old documents and anthropological studies, but most Indonesians think homosexuality was a poison brought by the Dutch.

The historian who writes a book of quality about earlier Javanese cultures including attitudes and practices about homosexuality would have a tough time. The same would go for a serious history of the Catholic church up to our time.

Science books don't last very long while histories often survive decades and have more and deeper effects. The same is true of Islam. Indonesia's best known history of Islam starts with the first two centuries in the Middle East then jumps to Indonesia in the eighteenth century. There is no later Islamic history in the Middle East and Asia generally, and no earlier history of Islam in Indonesia.

**LKS:** To what extent are academics, particularly historians, involved in the practice of the “S” word—self-censorship? Are academics in danger of losing their social voice and relevance to NGO activists, investigative and citizen journalists, bloggers, and independent filmmakers?

**BA:** All these groups are subject to self censorship. But SEA scholars have the most to lose—since a large number of them are civil servants, many have political access to the rulers, and have a high social status (i.e., they have titles such as Professor, Colonel, Doctor). So they are more timid and more often think of themselves as the “benign” part of the ruling groups. They don't go to jail and, are rarely murdered.



**LKS:** At risk of perpetuating a divide between Asia and the West, is there a real difference between how disagreement is received in the two regions? Do Western and local scholars working on sensitive issues in SEA face different challenges?

**BA:** This is a complicated problem. The “Look West” idea starts with advanced research in the West by SE Asians. In retrospect, it can be understood as a kind of paradise. Calm campuses, fabulous libraries covering much of the world, not-too-feudal teachers, and years of the easy life. No Southeast Asia library can compete, campuses are rowdy, everyday society a constant interferer, teachers are often vain and semi-feudal, there are sideline jobs as well as campus politics etc. Conversely, Western researchers often find a different kind of “paradise” in Southeast Asia, where everything is new (good/vile), exciting, and they have a “white” social status.

A Western worked-out thesis by a Southeast Asian is the result of a great deal of work, including learning new languages, trying to write in English: monitored by decent, but critical supervisors. The circumstances are such that it is very hard for them to write a second serious book, due to time, money, but mostly motivation. So the temptation is strong to live on their “laurels.”

There are academics who in their heydays have written a great thesis but after that nothing comparable. Hence, the turn to university politics: the fight to become dean, or vice-provost and so on.

In the West, on the whole it is the second book that is crucial because the young professor has to do it as entirely self-produced, no longer dependent on the support and criticism of his or her mentors. Another tendency in SEA is to publish collections of articles for newspapers and magazines—which almost never happens in the West. The problem is that though these little books often sell well, they very rapidly become out of date.

A final problem is language competence. The Philippines is a vivid example. People like the Filipino José Rizal (1861–98) learned to read Spanish, French, German as well as English, and, of course, if they grew up in Manila, Tagalog. The importance of multilingualism is not merely that one has access to many different sources and archives, but also links to the outer world. In the Philippines, Spanish died out more or less in the American period, Tagalog improved its attractions, but also at the cost of Ilokano, Bisayan and so on. Hence, there is a huge amount of navel-gazing.

It is only very recently that young Southeast Asian scholars have started to try to learn their neighbors' languages. Very few have good access to the immensely aged Chinese and Japanese archives. Ditto serious Arabic.

**LKS:** How far does Singapore stand apart from other countries in SEA in the practice of academic freedom?

**BA:** My view of the situation in Singapore is that it is very much like its neighbors, just richer. The program of making the National University of Singapore a world-class university is a phantom, and money alone will not make it happen. Maybe I don't keep up any more, but I am still looking for an awesome book written by a Singaporean scholar. The motivation behind the program is money (foreigners will flock there some day) and status, not quality or originality.

**LKS:** What is the likely future for independent research and academic freedom in SEA? Is there hope that taboos will fade as society matures?

**BA:** One has to hope, of course, and remember that “academic freedom” came very late in European and American history, and there too there is no guarantee that it will persist. The commercialization of a vast number of universities is having really bad effects.

**LKS:** Alternatively, was your generation of committed academics—both foreigners and locals—exceptional in the optimism towards academics as agents of change, e.g. those who came to SEA through the Peace Corps program? After postmodernism, globalization and the commodification of education, and the political and economic crises in the region, are we seeing a new breed of academics in SEA who not only shun political and social engagement, but also prefer to look beyond the state to transnational, cultural, and funding-friendly studies?

**BA:** I don’t think my generation was uniformly activist. For all of us in the US especially, but also elsewhere, the vector was the Vietnam War, with also the 60s general politico-cultural upheavals. We were ordinary people living in an unordinary period. It was difficult to be bored; rebellion was in the air. I think this was comparable to the situation Southeast Asians experienced in the period 1910–40. By mistake, the US educational elites created the concept of “area studies” for their own purposes, but it had an unintended effect. Almost no courses that we took were focused on a single country: Religious change in Southeast Asia; Minority ethnic groups in Southeast Asia; Bureaucratic centralization in Southeast Asia, and so on. You could say we were trained as “comparativists.”

In this case, we had an advantage over East Asian studies, where not much comparison was developed because of the allure of and huge archives on China and Japan. But gradually this comparativism declined under pressure from professionalism, money, years of study etc., so that most Southeast Asianists today effectively study only one country.

The study of languages has been declining for a long time. When I first came to Cornell in 1958 all students had to show they could read

French and German/Spanish. Ten years later, only one language was required. Twenty years later there was no general competence in languages. Now American is all-dominant and you can read plenty of scholarly books whose bibliographies are all in American and are published in America.

I am not fully convinced that “relevance” to contemporary problems is really the right way to think about academic work. Some great works (and how we need them now!) are really like-time bombs, i.e., not much practiced when published but very influential 25 years later. John Sydenham Furnivall’s brilliant short book called *The Fashioning of Leviathan: The Beginnings of British Rule in Burma*, on the early formation of the colonial state in Burma, was published in the 1930s, but didn’t have its effects till the 1980s.

American scholars are vulnerable to “theoretical fashions” and to the laughable idea of “cutting edge” research, i.e. hopelessly “presentist.” Students are forced to study mainly “the latest.” So departments rarely offer courses in the history of political science, anthropology, history, and so forth.

The fine old idea that you will only realize a book is great when you read it for the second time is almost lost. I also suspect that one can learn from the parable of the diseased ill oyster producing the pearl. Times of grave crisis are often very productive. The current world financial crisis should be something like that, especially if it spreads to Asia. The coming ecological crisis should have the same effect.

One reason why Singapore’s riches are deleterious is that people live comfortably and think even more comfortably, and often, one knows arrogantly. Pain is often the best stimulus.

I often think that I was lucky to be kicked out of Indonesia from 1972–99. It hurt enormously, for years I couldn’t bear to listen to gamelan music. If this pain had not come I probably would have remained an Indonesia expert throughout my career. So I moved on to Thailand and later the Philippines. You can see the effect if you compare *Java in a Time of Revolution*; romantic, nationalist, one country, out in 1972; and the 1983 publication of *Imagined Communities*, ironic, much less one country-nationalist, and fully comparative. All in just 11 years.

**LKS:** Thank you, Ben.



Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, 46 Shimoadachi-cho, Yoshida, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8501, Japan  
Tel: +81-75-753-7302 Fax: +81-75-753-7350  
京都大学東南アジア研究所 〒606-8501 京都市左京区吉田下阿達町46 Tel: 075-753-7302 Fax: 075-753-7350

**Editors:** Mario Lopez, Shitara Narumi      〈編集〉 マリオ・ロペズ 設楽 成実  
**Date of Issue:** Spring 2016

ISSN 2185-663X