Title: The Role of the Royalist Jurists in Thailand
Speakers: Dr. Piyabutr Saengkanokkul, Assistant Professor,
Faculty of Law, Thammasat University & Ms. Eugenie Merieau, Ph.D.Candidate, INALCO, Paris, France

Date: June 19th (Fri.), 2015, 14:00 – 15:30
Place: Tonan-tei Room No. 201, Inamori Foundation Memorial Building, CSEAS, Kyoto University

Abstract:
According to principles of the Rule of Law, the state must be bound by law. Law is both the source and the limit of power. A Constitution guarantees rights and liberties, the separation of powers, and a system of checks on the exercise of state power. As “law” has become the pillar of the liberal political model, jurists have been called to play a greater role in the polity.

In Thailand, the rise of jurists exhibits specific characteristics that this paper seeks to explore. Thai jurists have played a role in the building and preservation of the “democratic system with the King as Head of State”. This system allows liberal democracy to develop and elections to be held as long as they do not affect the institution of the monarchy. Thai jurists have done so through both doctrine and practice.

First of all, jurists constructed a legal doctrine used for the restoration of royal power in the aftermath of the 2500 coup d’etat by General Sarit Thanarat. Although there was no Constitution under the dictatorships of “Sarit-Thanom-Praphat”, successive military dictatorships diffused the royalist legal ideology through the use of state mechanisms. When liberal democratic ideas spread to Thailand, the Kingdom engaged in a democratization process. Thai royalists could not
escape democratization yet they managed to embed “the spirit of royalism” in liberal democracy. From 1990 onwards, constitutional jurists endeavoured to build “royalist liberal democracy” by placing the monarchy at the center of constitutional law teaching. Constitutional law was made to acknowledge royal power, even though “by nature” constitutions are intended to limit royal power. Likewise, no credit was given to the 24 June 1932 Revolution nor to the 27 June 1932
Constitution. Jurists constructed a “royalist constitutional history”.

Jurists also played a role in building mechanisms of “political reform”. “Political reform” became the dominant political narrative after the May 1992 events. Academics argued that in order to succeed, political reform required the drafting of a new Constitution that would feature a high number of new state bodies dedicated to checking the exercise of State power. Doctrine provided the underpinning for this argument, namely that liberal democracy cannot survive without independent state bodies staffed by judges and legal experts.

Judges are under the influence of royalism. The 24 June 1932 revolution has led to a democratic system of constitutional monarchy but it didn’t affect the structure of the judiciary nor the ideology of judges. Judges consider themselves as civil servants acting “in the name of the King”. The monarchy encourages this belief through various means such as royal
addresses to judges on the occasion of oath-taking ceremonies, regular appointments of Supreme Court judges as Privy Councilors, etc.

This talk will explore the birth of royalist jurists in Thailand and examine their role in both fields of legal doctrine and practice to build legitimacy for “royalist liberal democracy” and the mechanisms of “political reform”. It will show that the independence of the judiciary as enshrined in the Constitution means insulation from political institutions whose members are elected but not independence from the monarchy. The courts use legitimacy derived from principles of the Rule
of Law and liberal democracy to conduct a mission of preservation of royalism. Ultimately, they sanction political institutions linked to electoral processes and all acts that are seen as threatening to “royalist liberal democracy”.

Moderator: Pavin CHACHAVALPONGPUN, CSEAS, Kyoto University