要 旨：
This paper addresses the factors, effects and tenacity of socially embedded
economic institution through analyzing disparities of agricultural wage
rate in present central Gujarat, India. Villages in Central Gujarat can
be roughly divided into two groups; villages near urban area and villages
in remote area. Theoretically, agricultural wage rate in the former is
higher than that in the latter, since the former villages are easier to
enjoy off-farm employment opportunities of higher wage and the agricultural
wage is also pulled up by the opportunities through “trickle down effect”.
In central Gujarat, however, agricultural wage rate of the former is paradoxically
much lower than that in the latter. This paper firstly clarifies explanatory
factors of this paradoxical phenomenon by regression analysis with empirical
data of 61 sample villages, and concludes that its main factors are not
only excess supply of agricultural labor in former villages but also existence
of local institution called Kaymi, in which the landlord supply a big amount
of credit to his laborers for security of the laborers’ livelihood which
makes them be willing to work at lower wage rate. The analysis also clarifies
that Kaymi is strongly related with caste composition of each village.
Important implication of this result is that “trickle down effect” is not
working smoothly in the nominal agricultural wage rate due to caste-based
or socially embedded economic institution that is Kaymi.
In contrast, agricultural wage rate in villages where Kaymi does not exist
has been increasing rapidly since 1990’s. This is obviously because of
the “trickle down effect” of economic development which has brought huge
demand of new cash crop like onion and technical development of cotton
farming. And laborers in those villages who are not tied (Kaymi means “tied”
in local language) can search higher wage rate freely. Market mechanism
is working actively in comparison.
Kaymi, which is constraining to smooth and visible “trickle down effects”,
however, could be collapsed by economic development, if the development
is in massive and continuous. With intensive case study in a village located
very close to industrialized city, this paper tries simultaneously to describe
the process of collapse of Kaymi as a result of massive and continuous
economic development. The industrialized city has been supplying a considerable
amount of off-farm employment opportunities to the villagers since 1980’s.
The collapse of Kaymi, however, never happened solely by this, but did
with many important agrarian structural changes; i.e. land distribution,
tenancy arrangement, cropping pattern from labor-intensive to labor-saving
and reciprocal relationship between landlord and the laborers in various
meanings. The collapse of Kaymi, therefore, would take time, and actually
for almost 10-15 years. It had not emerged immediately after economic development,
and during the period of chrysalis, agricultural wage rate in this village
had raised very little.
This paper aims to show a case which is telling us how socially or historically
rooted institution is important when one tries to analyze the Indian village
economy.
